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Abstract
In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway applied the mathematical reductionist proof tech-
nique to cryptographic authentication protocols, at a level which was more
practice-focused than previous theory-focused cryptographic reductionist proofs.
These proofs are powerful. The reductionist proofs mean that as long as the prob-
lem that a protocol reduces to remains hard, particularly “impossibly hard”, then
the protocol remains secure. That means that any technique found to break the
protocol can be used to solve the previously thought to be impossibly hard prob-
lem. Thus, security should be assured (until a way to solve the impossibly hard
problem is found). However, in reality reductionist security proofs have failed for
protocols which involve humans. This is typically because the approximation of
the real-world problem, the model, used to construct the security proof in, does
not capture enough real world considerations. The security proof only holds for
what is covered by the model. In particular, when considering protocols which
involve humans, is the question of how to model human behaviour.
We focus on protocols which include humans, which have previously been
labelled security ceremonies. We research human usage of protocols such as
HTTPS. We expand the understanding of what a security ceremony is and what
ceremony analysis allows. From this base of understanding, we go on to develop
three main tools which will aid cryptographers to create security proofs for pro-
tocols which involve humans. The three tools are: we present a generic model for
capturing the human recognition capability, since a human being able to recognise
an object seems critical to any protocol where an entity authenticates itself to the
human; we provide a tool for generating human-assisted random values which
are recognisable to the human who created them called Computer-HUman Recog-
nisable Nonces (CHURNs); and we provide a model for capturing the concept
of human perceptible freshness, thus allowing cryptographers to create protocols
resilient to replay attacks for the human.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There has been an increasing trend to meld information security with the social
sciences, as indicated by conferences both in the U.S.A and in Europe such
as WEIS (economics), SHB (human behaviour) and SOUPS (usability). This
multi-disciplinary approach brings into context the human usage of information
security systems. As Shostack and Stewart stated in 2008, “. . . our approach to
information security is flawed” and “the way forward cannot be found solely in
mathematics or technology” [111].
The most comprehensive method currently known for ensuring security of
a protocol is by using provable security, specifically practice oriented provable
security (POPS). In 1993 Bellare and Rogaway introduced POPS by defining
a model for reductionist security proofs for cryptographic key exchange proto-
cols [7]. Since this time, many cryptographic protocols have been accompanied
by a reductionist security proof.
A reductionist security proof means that the security of the protocol is re-
duced to a known hard mathematical problem, such that if an adversarial advan-
tage is achieved over the protocol, then there will be some significant advantage
over the known hard problem. If a protocol is proven secure using a reductionist
proof, as long as the “hard” mathematical problem remain sufficiently hard that
it is not solved, the protocol is unbreakable within the defined security model.
Unfortunately, many protocols so proven to be secure in theory, have been
found to be insecure in practice, when deployed in the real world. This inequality
between the theoretical security and the actual security can be traced back to a
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
deficiency in the security proof model. The mathematical security models while
useful, especially for examining the security of a protocol in isolation, do not
take into account the wide range of side channel attacks, social engineering, and
interfaces to other protocols and the environment, which occur in the real world.
Jesse Walker coined a term security ceremony which Ellison wrote was a more
robust method for examining the security of a protocol than by examining a pro-
tocol in isolation [41]. Security ceremonies may be described as protocols in their
context of use. For example, the protocol HTTPS [97] provides a connection
secure from eavesdroppers between two nodes on a network. However a security
ceremony would explicitly also encompass the human user, who is viewing a web-
site on their computer, and who is using HTTPS via their web browser running
on their computer to securely connect to another computer on the network.
In this thesis we move the understanding of security ceremonies forwards in
three main steps. The first step is that a security ceremony is a protocol in
its context of use. The second step is the realisation that adding steps to an
underlying protocol simply makes another protocol. A fundamental realisation
here is that just as the security of a particular cryptographic building block, such
as a hash function, would not be proven via its usage in an arbitrary protocol;
the security of the underlying protocol cannot be proven via its usage in the
higher level protocol. The third step forward in the understanding of security
ceremonies is that protocols involving humans need to be human followable. As
a step towards achieving this and being able to prove that protocols have this
human-followable quality, we define human-followable freshness.
In general we focus on mutual authentication, particularly providing the hu-
man with assurance that they are communicating with the party they intend
to be communicating with. We blend concepts from the provable security com-
munity, network security community, human computer interface (HCI) design
community, and sociotechnical community.
To be able to create proofs of security for protocols which include humans, we
research human security and privacy concerns [47,92,95], their usage of protocols
such as HTTP and HTTPS [92,93], and research the ways that current security
ceremonies fail [93,94]. Based on the knowledge gained through this process, we
develop three tools which will aid cryptographers create and prove the security
of protocols which involve humans. Those tools are a formalisation of human
recognition, CHURNs which can be used with humans to guarantee freshness,
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and a formalisation of human perceptible freshness which is a critical stepping
stone towards human perceptible security.
1.1 Motivation: Provable Security that Stands-
Up to Human Usage
There are a number of sub-topics which ideally should be highlighted so that an
understanding of our path may be understood. We shall go through a set of such
topics here to provide the motivation for this research.
1.1.1 Secure Protocols
The most obvious sub-topic is that security protocols which involve humans
need to be secure. When communicating with a bank, a user may expect that
the protocols used provide:
Confidentiality No one except for the user and the bank can see the informa-
tion being passed between the user and the bank;
Integrity The messages between the user and the bank cannot be manipulated
without the user and the bank knowing a change has occurred; and
Authentication The user should have confidence that they are communicating
with the intended bank, and the bank should have confidence they are
communicating with the intended user.
Contrary to user expectations, the security services outlined above are not always
provided. Most login protocols involving financial institutions only involve the
human authenticating themselves to the bank, and not the bank authenticating
itself to the human. Therefore this process needs to be understood and protocols
that more correctly meet user expectations need to be developed.
1.1.2 Provable Security
Having decided that secure protocols need to be developed, the next topic is
“How do we know the protocol is secure?” Different researchers and different
practitioners use different techniques. One method may be to create a list of all
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known attacks, and to examine the protocol to see whether each attack works.
While this is useful, of course it is only able to detect previously known attacks.
Today there are two main types of approach to analysis of security protocols.
One is the formal methods approach which treats cryptographic primitives in
a black-box manner. The approach we have used is the concept of mathemat-
ically provable security used by cryptographers. Reducing the protocol down
to a known mathematical problem has significant security implications. If the
mathematical problem that the protocol reduces to is known to be what is called
“hard”, and by this a lay explanation may be “impossible to solve using all the
computers on earth in the next billion years”, then suddenly we do not need to
have pre-conceived and coded attacks. Because of the reduction from protocol
to hard problem, we now know that any successful attack on the protocol can be
used to break a problem thought to be impossibly hard.
Both techniques have their advantages and disadvantages. Both have their
place. We have used provable security because it gives the greater security as-
surance.
1.1.3 Modelling Humans
To be able to create a mathematical proof of security, we need to have a model to
base the proof on. Since we are focusing on humans and including human users in
cryptographic protocols, significant research must take place regarding humans
and their usage of protocols. In this we differ from many computer scientist
researchers, where they conceive of and create something, and then they do a
human trial to see how it performs. We did the human studies first and built our
creations using that knowledge. While we still tested our creation in a human
trial, see Chapter 6, and further human trials could be conducted, by conducting
generic quantitative studies we reduced our need for assumptions and expanded
our knowledge-base beyond our own experiences before creating.
1.2 Contribution and Outline
The thesis may be seen to be in two parts. The first part, Chapters 3 and 4, may
be seen as researching and expanding the understanding of the problem space.
The contributions from these chapters were:
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 We contributed a greater understanding of human security and privacy
issues in HCI designs [47,95].
 We contributed a greater understanding of how humans use the Internet,
what the security decisions they identify are, and how they make their
decisions [92].
 We contributed a greater understanding of the methods humans use to
protect themselves on the web, and what the users believe are the items
they need protected (see Chapter 3).
 We further developed the understanding of what a security ceremony is,
and what ceremony analysis can encompass [93].
 We provided a greater understanding of what is required for the creation
of a secure human protocol [94].
The second part of this thesis, Chapters 5, 6 and 7, are the contributions we
made having explored and expanded the understanding of security ceremonies,
human security decision making, and protocols that involve humans. The goal
of the thesis was to provide cryptographers with tools that would allow them to
make secure protocols which involve humans, without having to re-learn their
craft or to take on a second research area. As such, our contributions from these
chapters were:
 We contributed a general model based on an expanded understanding of
human security issues, for use in a cryptographic security proof for the
ability of a human to recognise. Modelling the human recognition capability
seems fundamental for any protocol where an entity is to be authenticated
to a human (see Chapter 5).
 Based on the knowledge we had gained about human protocol use and
flaws in security ceremonies which involve humans, presented in Chap-
ters 3 and 4, we contributed a method, supported by a human trial and
analysis of the data collected, for creating a cryptographically sound ran-
dom challenge and response for a human. We called this creation a Com-
puter-HUman Recognisable Nonce (CHURN) (see Chapter 6).
 As our final contribution, we took a significant step towards human-follow-
able security in that we define Human-Perceptible Freshness (HPF). We
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provide a model for proving the existence of HPF in a protocol. Finally,
we provide a compiler to allow cryptographers to turn a base protocol which
has certain security properties into a secure protocol which has HPF (see
Chapter 7).
We present what we believe is a meaningful expansion of our work and our
conclusions in Chapter 8.
Chapter 2
Background
To create a mutual authentication protocol between a human and a computer,
which is secure with respect to the common understanding of confidentiality
and integrity [60, 79], a number of fields of research need to be examined. An
adversary having the capabilities of a computer, and one of the parties in a
protocol being a computer, means that lessons learned in the non-computer world
between humans cannot be directly applied. For example, an attack in a physical
environment (such as a robbery) may need a success rate of, at worst, one in ten
to be worthwhile for the perpetrator; whereas in the cyberworld attacks that
work one time in a million can be seen as successful [111]. So this suggests
cryptography with enough security to withstand a computer attack is required,
and yet humans are known to have neither the patience, nor the capacity, to
compute the necessarily large numerical values required for modern cryptography.
Further, if modern cryptography is used, then the human loses visibility, the
process becomes non-transparent, and hence, for the general populace, blind
trust is required that the data is secure.
Further, cryptography is no longer required only by nation states, the mili-
tary, or secret lovers as was the case in the past [81]. Today, the general pop-
ulace, in developing and first world countries, have huge amounts of data and
communications they would like protected, and there are many real-world set-
tings, such as smart phones, RFID tags, and e-commerce, that require protected
communication. The ubiquitious usage of cryptography throughout a human’s
day means that, even if we could somehow remove the advantage that com-
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puters provide the cryptanalyst over human capabilities, for example by using
CAPTCHAs [39, 120] or POSHs [27], the amount of encrypting and decrypting
required makes anything more than human involvement in the cryptosystem at
critical authentication steps unrealistic.
In this background section, with our goal being a secure authentication pro-
tocol which is not only usable by humans, but also understandable by humans
in such a way that blind trust is not required, we will cover security ceremonies
(a term coined by Jesse Walker) [41], and the ideals of provable security. We
will examine some human-computer interaction (HCI) design and sociotechnical
considerations, and close with the need for freshness in cryptographic protocols.
2.1 Security Ceremonies
The concept of a ceremony was developed earlier than 2007 [42], before a paper
on ceremony design and analysis by Elison [41]. Although little progress has been
made regarding ceremonies since 2007, a number of researchers in different ar-
eas have agreed that ceremony analysis is a promising research direction. These
research areas include formal methods, network security, and applied cryptogra-
phy.
In the formal methods’ security community, there has been a call to include
parts of ceremony analysis in the formal methods’ analysis of protocols [76]. This
work has been further developed in Martina et al’s more recent work in the PKI
context [77]. Martina et al used the verification method outlined by Ruksenas
et al. [102, 103], adapted using Bella’s goal availability principles [4], to address
the open question that Ellison posed as to how to model human behaviour.
Recently, progress has been made towards a ceremonies threat model for the
formal methods’ community [20].
In the network security community, the concept of a ceremony has been
used to describe protocols which include humans, and thus to create more ro-
bust security ceremonies [64]. Karlof et al. describe a concept of conditioned-safe
ceremonies, based on a defence-in-depth approach adapted from the human relia-
bility community. Central to their approach is the use of forcing functions whose
property is to prevent a user from proceeding, until a critical step is completed.
In the applied cryptography community, Ellison’s ceremonies have been used
as a basis for modelling authentication ceremonies involving humans [14]. In the
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authentication ceremony described by Brainard et al., a human who still has
their primary authentication details intact, the helper, vouches for another per-
sonally known human who has lost their authentication details (the asker). This
vouching process, an extra factor in identification of the asker, allows emergency
authentication details to be provided.
There is a large body of work on such topics as phishing on the internet, and
social engineering in general [35, 57]. This reflects the common understanding
that many security decisions are based on trust, such as trust in a brand, rather
than the mathematical assurances of a correctly executed protocol. For this
reason, ceremony analysis provides a more complete understanding of the issues
surrounding the use of a protocol by a human, than protocol analysis alone.
2.2 Provable Security in Protocols Involving Hu-
mans
In 1993, Bellare and Rogaway responded to a need to add more rigour to au-
thentication protocol analysis [7]. They applied reduction techniques for proving
algorithms1 to authentication and key distribution protocols. These techniques
had been previously used by Goldwasser, Micali, Rivest, Blum and Yao in other
cryptographic primitive settings [10,49,50,124]. The critical concept of a reduc-
tionist proof of security is that, if an adversary can break the protocol, then the
adversary can also break the underlying cryptographic primitive.
Perhaps a more significant contribution of Bellare and Rogaway’s 1993 work
was the concept of practice-oriented provable security (POPS). Provable secu-
rity research prior to this had been based on only theoretical primitives [5].
This mean that, at the time of Bellare and Rogaway’s 1993 papers, provably
secure cryptographic primitives tended to be much less efficient than primitives
used in practice [7, 8]. Since there was no intersection between provably secure
cryptographic primitives and the primitives used in practice, provable security
pre-1993 was just theory. With the addition of an idealised model, the random
oracle, protocols using the primitives used in practice could have security proofs
developed.
Unfortunately, the concept behind POPS has not extended as far as required
into protocol design, particularly in the area of protocols which involve humans.
1These reductionist proof techniques were collectively called provable security.
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A fundamental ideal of POPS is that at no point should a protocol be able to be
broken without breaking the underlying cryptographic primitive, and hence the
protocol should not be weaker than the underlying primitive. In reality, partic-
ularly with respect to humans, this is not the case. Beyond human involvement
and potential social attacks, information is leaked concerning otherwise secure
protocols via means such as observing computation time and power consumption,
collectively known as side-channel attacks. For example, humans have shown
themselves to be susceptible to many social engineering attacks, which allow the
theoretically secure protocols (which have a reductionist proof) to be broken in
practice. Further, humans do not execute a protocol as the protocol designer
thought they would. The reasons protocols, proven secure mathematically, are
broken when humans use them, can be summarised to the model used for the
security proof was insufficient. Such a statement masks a variety of sources of
deficiency, some of which include:
 modelling a human is too difficult, and hence humans are either left out of
the model and security proof, or else humans are given unrealistic powers
such as being expected to follow the protocol 100% correctly, 100% of the
time; or they are expected to completely forget previous actions.
 The model, and hence the security proof of the protocol, does not include
critical out-of-band (OOB) communication and necessary setup steps prior
to the protocol running.
 The protocol definition, and hence the security proof based on the model,
does not include the complete design (for one example, see Section 4.3).
Most particularly, decisions that affect security, particularly HCI decisions,
are left out of the protocol definition and are hence being made by non-
security-aware practitioners.
2.2.1 Provable Security in the Presence of Human Factors
Two of the main benefits of practice oriented provable security are firstly, the
focus on cryptographic primitives actually being used; and secondly, the pro-
vision of a concrete level of security defined around security parameters usable
by the implementers of protocols. For example, the probability of success of an
adversary may depend on the number of hash function calls made [7, 8].
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Two promising directions in the provable security community have been made
by Hopper and Blum [59], and by Gajek et al. [44]. Hopper and Blum’s contri-
bution was to provide a goal of creating (α, β, t) protocols for use by humans, in
which at least (1− α) of the human population can do what they need to do, in
at most t seconds, with probability of correct execution of the protocol greater
than (1−β). This data could be collected empirically, and their idea was to cre-
ate light-weight cryptographic protocols that would have a mathematical proof
of security, with ideally 90% of the population executing the protocol correctly
inside 10 seconds, 90% of the time [59]. Unfortunately, the protocol they sug-
gested resulted in 10% of the population executing the protocol correctly inside
300 seconds, 80% of the time, and has gone on to become the basis of light-weight
protocols for constrained devices, such as RFID, rather than human executable
protocols [18, 53, 63]. However, the concept of combining empirical evidence of
usability with a security proof is a promising direction.
2.2.2 Human Perceptible Authenticators
Gajek et al. presented a protocol for mutual authentication between a human
and an online entity, via the web [44]. This work was extended, with a different
proof, in the journal version [45]. This protocol, discussed in depth in Sections
4.3 and 5.3.1 and the basis of our proposal, has a number of innovative and useful
features. Firstly, for the purposes of the security proof, the human is separated
from their computer and web browser, so that the authentication between the
human and a server has three parties, being the human, the human’s computer
with a web-browser, and the server. Secondly, the human and the human’s
computer are given specific functions in the security proof model. These functions
were that the browser on the human’s computer renders a webpage (based on
browser state), and the human must be able to recognise what Gajek et al. called
a human perceptible authenticator (HPA) [44]. The HPA can be anything, but in
the protocol [44] the HPA was an image previously selected by the user and sent to
the server, for the server to use in subsequent protocol runs as their authenticator
to the human. By adding these functions, the human’s involvement is partitioned
from the non-human protocol messages, and a formal proof of security is created.
This technique of creating a protocol proof with the human assumptions be-
ing included but partitioned in such a way that a human trial will inform how
secure the protocol is, is a significant step forward in the quest to prove proto-
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cols secure for human use. However, a complete design, informed by iterative
cumbersome protocol-specific human studies following each new protocol design
and developed proof, would potentially take years with no guarantee of success.
Human protocols do need to be verified via human trial post-theoretical proof,
however simply writing a security proof in terms of the human is not sufficient
and a method is required for arriving at a design more likely to succeed.
2.2.3 HTTPS Usage
A protocol used daily by many internet users is HTTPS which is the secure
version of the basic HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) used to view webpages
over the internet. Any banking transaction, online purchase, accessing on online
email or social media, will typically be conducted using HTTPS. The security
is accomplished by the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol suite. As such,
HTTPS and TLS are used interchangably.
To give a feel for how often this HTTPS protocol is used each day, in February
2012 a certificate authority claimed to provide “over 3.5 billion OCSP lookups
every day” [98]. To explain what this means, one usage of the HTTPS suite of
protocols is that security certificates may be used by parties to identify them-
selves. The certificates are provided by a certificate authority and have public
information mathematically related to private information which is given only
to the owner of the certificate. The certificate means that only the holder of the
certificate, who therefore has the private information, can decrypt anything sent
to them by any other party who uses the public information (or cryptographic
key) from the certificate to encrypt the message.
There needs to be a method of revoking certificates, for example if they have
been found to have been issued to the wrong entity. Therefore, as part of the
HTTPS protocol which is using the certificates, a check should be made by
Internet browsers to ensure the certificate has not been revoked. The method
of checking if a certificate has been revoked is via the Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP). Another factor is that in the majority of HTTPS sessions, only
one party, the server, holds a certificate. Both parties or neither party could hold
a certificate, but the majority of HTTPS sessions has only one party holding a
certificate and this is what would be checked using OCSP. Therefore, while other
protocols may use security certificates, such as secure email or Virtual Private
Networks (VPN), a single certificate authority having over 3.5 billion OCSP
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lookups every day gives an idea of the number of HTTPS connections that are
made each day, as HTTPS is the most common usage of security certificates.
Many of the examples from our thesis focus on the use of HTTPS in security
ceremonies.
2.3 HCI and Sociotechnical Considerations
HCI research on browser-based authentication protocols has revealed much con-
cerning what humans can, what humans will not, and what humans cannot, do,
drawing over the years from what Harrison et al. have identified as three broad
paradigms of HCI research – a-theoretic, cognitive and situated [54]. Lessons can
be learned from initial work by Simon [113, 114], which showed us the bound-
aries of human short term recall, and cognitive load issues, through to specific
controlled studies on decision making in use of security systems. An example of
such research is by Schechter et al. who created a study in which bank websites
were progressively changed, to become less and less secure, and the researchers
determined whether the participants continued to enter their password into the
website (which they did) [108]. Our research has indicated that a recent security
improvement, which attempts to provide users with the necessary authentica-
tion information via the use of Extended Validation Certificates [43], and the
associated inbuilt functionality in current browsers to colour code and present
typically real world company name information to the user, is not being used by
web-users in their web security decision making (see Chapter 3) [92].
Dourish has provided a bridge between social science and HCI design, con-
tributing significantly in areas such as defining and using context [36]. Of specific
concern, when defining context, was the impression (still common seven years
later) that context is fixed, explicit and can be adequately captured by explic-
itly measurable information rather than something that is “. . . being continually
renegotiated and defined in the course of action” [36]. One simple application of
the concept of context is the case of the rushing user. A rushing user is used by
Kumar et al. to describe a user who, in a rush, takes the shortest path through a
protocol, skipping steps which are not required for subsequent steps to work [68].
As Dhamija et al. describe, security is typically not the primary task and hence
users may not notice security indicators or read warning messages [35]. There is
also a body of work which focuses on achieving security by aligning what a system
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does with the user’s mental models of that system [104,115,126]. As far back as
1975, there were design principles created for securing computer systems, all of
which are still current and two of which should perhaps be reminded today: keep
the design as simple and as small as possible, and it is essential that the human
interface be designed for ease of use, so that users routinely and automatically
apply the protection mechanisms correctly [104]. As Smith states, “Repeatedly,
I ended up with problems because what computers are doing with cryptography
doesn’t match the mental model that humans have - end users as well as system
programmers [115].” More recent work includes Chiasson et al.’s research into
constructing a set of design principles for security management systems [23].
The concept of aligning the actual system to the user’s mental model of
the system (or vice versa) is useful at a guiding level along the lines of “the
user must understand what the system is doing, and what the response to her
actions will be.” However, the concept of the human cognitive model that ex-
ists prior to the situation is a contentious one. There is significant evidence
that people co-construct meaning using embodied competencies and situational
circumstances [117]. Suchman argues understanding conversations and inter-
actions, as dynamic co-constructions, could prove more useful for designers of
human-machine interactions. The lesson we take from this body of work is the
necessity for the user to be in control and to have visibility of (and to understand
and actively participate in), ideally, the cryptographic authentication processes.
This is in keeping with the central concept of Norman’s popular design book,
which is “when people have trouble with something, it isn’t their fault - it is
the fault of the design [85].” The human user being in control is a fundamental
driver for the design of the CHURNs presented in Chapter 6.
Finally, Sasse et al. have argued that existing HCI techniques are sufficient
to address security issues in the design of systems [105]. While this may be true,
we argue that it is also necessary to understand the security requirements and
establish a consistent security framework.
2.4 The Need for Freshness in Cryptographic
Protocols
In general terms, a replay attack is an attack where messages sent between
participants in a protocol are captured by the adversary and stored, to be re-
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sent (replayed) at a later time to the participants. A replay attack is defined
as “The adversary records information seen in the protocol and then sends it to
the same, or a different, principal, possibly during a later protocol run [13].” It
should not be possible to replay messages from previous protocol runs as valid
messages in the current run of the protocol. To ensure that replaying does not
occur, some assurance of the freshness of messages, meaning the message is new
and has not been used before, is required. Three traditional methods used to
ensure freshness are random nonces, timestamps and counters. A random nonce
is defined as “a random value generated by one party and returned to that party
to show that a message is newly generated,” and critically the value can be used
only once [13].
Figure 2.1: 1978 Protocol by Needham and Schroeder (as shown by Boyd and
Mathuria [13]).
As an example of a replay attack, Figure 2.1 displays the famous protocol by
Needham and Schroeder [84] as shown in the protocol design book by Boyd and
Mathuria [13]. The symbols used in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 are defined as:
S is a trusted third party, which holds long term keys for communication between
S and A, denoted KAS, and between S and B, denoted KBS.
A and B are entities, possibly with no prior relationship, who wish to use their
existing relationships with S to establish a new key KAB, which A and B
will use for future communication with each other.
N is a random nonce, that is, a random number used only once. Therefore, NA
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is a random nonce generated by A, and NB is a random nonce generated
by B.
KXY is a secret key between parties X and Y .
The Needham and Schroeder protocol shown in Figure 2.1 already made use
of a random nonce to ensure freshness, but only for the messages to party A
via the use of random nonce NA. The lack of a random nonce from party B
led to an attack being discovered by Denning and Sacco [31]. Message 3 from
Figure 2.1 has no assurance of freshness, that is no random nonce, timestamp
nor counter, and hence an adversary could replace message 3 with a previously
recorded message 3. This would mean that party B would communicate with an
old key K ′AB which the adversary may have knowledge of. The solution was to
include a nonce from B in the messages, as shown in Figure 2.2 [13].
Figure 2.2: Protocol from Figure 2.1 with Random Nonces for both Parties (as
shown by Boyd and Mathuria [13]).
Timestamps and counters have a common flaw which requires that protocol
participants remain in synchronization with each other. To achieve synchroniza-
tion, usually both a prior and a continuing relationship are required. There-
fore, in Internet-based applications where no prior nor continuing relationship is
mandatory, random nonces are most commonly used to provide freshness assur-
ances to messages.
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2.5 Notation and Nomenclature
Throughout the thesis, a number of symbols, abbreviations and names are used.
Cryptography blends together algebra, set theory, discrete mathematics, logic
and computer science. As such, some explanations are provided in Table 2.1 for
reference when reading the thesis.
Table 2.1: Notation and Nomenclature for use in thesis.
Symbol Explanation
∈ Means “is an element of.”
⊆ Subset. HPASpaceH ⊆ HPASpace may be read as “Every
element in the set HPASpaceH is in the set HPASpace.”
∪ This is the union of two sets. The union of two sets is
the set of all elements from each set. Since there are no
duplicates in a set, an element is either in the set or not in
the set, any element that is contained in both sets is shown
in the union set only once.
\ This is the set-minus symbol. {HPASpace \ HPASpaceH}
may be read as “what is the set of all elements of HPASpace
which are not in HPASpaceH .”
{x|f(x)} This is a predicate notation that defines a set. The “|”
symbol may be read “such that” or “where”, as the values
to the left of “|” are the values returned when the boolean
condition to the right of the “|” returns true. Therefore
{x|f(x)} may be read as “what is the set of all x where
f(x) returns true.”
Continued on next page. . .
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Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Symbol Explanation
← This means “an algorithm outputs.” Other words that
may be used are “a function outputs” or “an oracle out-
puts.” That is, a computer program outputs a value based
on a sampling distribution or some sort of logic. The
symbol is critical because it captures the concept that
the value output each time the algorithm runs may not
be the same, even though the input is the same. So
HPAH ← GenHPA(H,HPASpace) may be read “the al-
gorithm GenHPA takes as input H and HPASpace, and
outputs HPAH .”
· This is used as a wildcard, meaning it can take any value.
Therefore, for a function GenHPA which takes two inputs,
a human H as the first input and a space as the second in-
put, writing GenHPA(·,HPASpace) means that any human
H can be used as the first input to GenHPA.
⊕ This is the exclusive OR symbol, meaning that for two
values there can be either one or the other, but not both.
When considering values of 0 and 1, this means that (0,0)
and (1,1) return 0 while (0,1) or (1,0) return 1.∑
A symbol denoting the addition of a sequence of numbers.
n∑
i=1
may be read as “the addition of all values in a sequence
from value in position 1 to the value in position n.”
|x| This is called the cardinality of the set x. This may be
read “the number of elements in x.”
{0, 1}κ This is short hand for writing “a κ length sequence of 0s
and 1s.”
Chapter 3
Learning about Human Users
To discover essential aspects that need to be considered when designing crypto-
graphic protocols that involve humans, we focused on internet and web browser
usage as an area where humans use information security every day. Even though
web security protocols are designed to make computer communication secure, it
is widely known that there is potential for security breakdowns at the human-
machine interface. Our analysis of protocols which involve humans where the
security of the protocol is known to be broken has confirmed that one source of
security flaw may be attributed to the designers of systems and software. As
described in Section 4.2.1, the design of the human-computer interface in that
web-based security ceremony is such that the necessary information for making
an informed security decision is hidden from the user.
Since the research community does not have a good understanding of how
people make security decisions, we conducted two studies with human partici-
pants at the start of our research. In the first of the studies we left our partici-
pants in their own context and they kept a log of their decision situations, their
thought processes to make their decision, and the resulting decision. In the sec-
ond of the studies we conducted in-depth interviews with our participants. These
exploratory qualitative studies provide the basis for the research, analysis and
decision making in our future work. As such, these two early qualitative studies
were framed in an open fashion which gained information from participants and
themes were distilled from the data collected. This is in contrast to the third
and final human study we did, presented in Chapter 6 which was a quantitative
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study conducted after a design was created to validate a design.
3.1 Introduction
The human-machine interface is acknowledged as one of the primary challenges
in designing secure human-computer security systems [89]. As discussed in Chap-
ter 4, the combination of the human users, (potentially multiple) cryptographic
protocols, and the various systems which are used to interact with the protocols,
may be described as a “security ceremony” [41].
The central figure in Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) is “the user” [106].
Gaining an understanding of how users make security decisions when using a web
browser is very complex. Whether they are aware of it or not, when browsing the
web, people make many security related decisions. However, little research has
been conducted to explore the range of security decisions made and perception
of those actions.
Our analysis of security ceremonies known to be broken [41,83], presented in
Chapter 4, has revealed that one source of security flaws may be attributed to
the designers of the systems and software. From our case study work on what
users wish to keep private, and the tensions that the need for privacy creates
versus the information a device or technology needs to function correctly, we
have seen how groups of users will build up a collective information practice
[47, 95]. This collective information practice is the way a group of people will
collectively develop a method for using a design, which is overlaid with the
concept that the way a design is used is rarely the way the designer expected.
Since, from the human perspective with respect to web usage, we do not have a
good understanding of how users make security decisions, it became critical to
explore the ways that humans were actually making security decisions and using
their web browsers, in their own environments. The purpose of our studies was
to examine the security system in its entirety, from the perspective of interaction
design, examining the users in their context of use. By understanding such
decision making processes, our aim is to improve future designs of interfaces to
better protect user security.
Our exploratory studies used qualitative approaches to investigate users’ web
usage in their natural environment. In our first study we used week-long diary
entries for 20 participants. In our second study we used in-depth individual par-
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ticipant interviews with 18 participants from the initial group (two participants
were no longer available) exploring their security decisions made in their web us-
age. From this data we distilled common themes about users’ security decisions
concerning web usage.
3.2 Background
Our work is focused mainly on design aspects of security of online programs and
entities, particularly web browsers and websites. As such, the prior work which
most closely shares the ideals and approach of our work is by Dourish et al. [38].
Their research, which focused more on mobile and wireless ubiquitous computing,
similarly used semi-structured interviews to gather data, and grounded theory
to analyse the data. This is appropriate when searching for the right questions
to ask rather than the answers to specific questions. Our work adds a further
piece to the landscape that Dourish et al. began to describe. While they focused
on a set definition of security and to what degree existing approaches met that
definition, we, using both diary and semi-structured interview data collection
techniques, explored what is important to users, what their definition of security
is, and what systems individual users put in place to ensure their security goals
are met.
There have been many controlled studies in decision making regarding secu-
rity and privacy in the use of systems, for example, studies into MySpace and
Facebook security and privacy settings [69,88]. Lampe, Ellison and Steinfield, in
their study of 1085 Facebook users which explored users’ expectations of privacy,
found that 90% of participants believed that no one from outside their university
would read their Facebook page. 97% of participants believed that no law en-
forcement agency would look at their Facebook page [69]. These types of studies,
while useful, examine what has already been implemented in the systems to pro-
tect users’ privacy and security, rather than what the users of the systems believe
should be protected. Qualitative research is required to gain an understanding
of both what the users wish protected, and the methods of protection which will
be intuitive to them.
Various studies concerning trust on the internet, such as that done by Lee
et al. [71], have been conducted using surveys. However, while these works pro-
vide overview data, the survey methodology employed tends to generalize across
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contexts and frame questions from the researchers’ perspective. This means that
little insight is gained into each individual’s priorities, decision making processes
and practices. This was also the conclusion of Connelly et al., when they stated
that surveys were not able to reflect participants’ privacy concerns accurately,
and that the discrepancy depended on the context [25].
Several studies have been conducted into the effectiveness of web-based secu-
rity warnings [16,108,116]. In their study, Sotirakopoulos et al.’s primary finding
was that laboratory experiments concerning security decisions were fundamen-
tally flawed. They observed that the most common reason the participants gave
for ignoring security warnings was that they trusted the study in which they were
participating. Secondly, they stated that the security conscious were reluctant
to take part in such studies, so we have ensured we have included members from
the computer security community [116].
Sotirakopoulos et al. and Connelly et al. raise questions about the ability to
draw security practices and user behaviour conclusions for the general population
from such non-contextual studies. This has led us to take a different approach
centred on people and their own contexts of use.
We examine a more fundamental question of, “What is it that the users are
trying to protect?” rather than first presuming what needs to be protected and
secondly attempting to create more useful warnings to protect those presumed
areas.
There is a body of work which focuses on achieving security by aligning what
a system does with the user’s mental models of that system [23, 115, 126]. The
concept of aligning the actual system to the user’s mental model of the system
(or vice versa) is useful at a guiding level along the lines of “the user must
understand what the system is doing, and what the response to their actions will
be.” However, the concept of the human cognitive model that exists prior to
the situation is a contentious one. There is significant evidence that people co-
construct meaning using embodied competencies and situational circumstances
[117].
3.2.1 Trust
Literature from the past 15 years is replete with papers concerning trust on the
web. The reality of a world wide web necessitates investigating trust issues in a
number of categories. Areas of trust include what makes users trust a website,
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the role of trust in customer loyalty, and how to address trust across cultural
boundaries [26, 40,55].
Attempts to establish trust with people the first time they visit a website are
usually aimed at a range of triggers upon which users have been “trained” to
base their decision to proceed. These triggers include the list of measures taken
to ensure data is transferred, processed and stored securely, and displaying seals
of independent trusted third party auditors [40].
Notably, there appears no consensus regarding whether ease-of-use is a factor
which strongly relates to the user trusting a website. Some studies have shown
there is little correlation [46, 90] while other studies have shown a strong rela-
tionship [99]. In addition, usability has been shown to be a security issue, with
poor usability directly impacting the security of a system [122].
Spelling and grammar have been found to be a factor in establishing a user’s
trust in a website. Poor spelling, grammar and syntax create doubts about the
party’s identity and thus impede what is termed calculative and knowledge based
trust [66].
Koehn divides trust into four categories:
1. Goal-based trust: the trust that arises when two parties have a similar
objective.
2. Calculative trust: trust that is created based on evidence. Is there a good
reputation and a history of keeping promises?
3. Knowledge-based trust: trust based on knowledge of the other party, their
character, and having worked with them previously. This is not distinct
from calculative trust.
4. Respect-based trust: the parties respect each other, do not wish to exploit
each other, and are open to constructive criticism [66].
Most efforts to establish trust between vendors and buyers online, such as se-
curity certificates, are targeted at calculative and knowledge-based trust. Respect-
based trust is more lasting than either calculative or knowledge-based trust [66].
Finally, trust is significant with regard to customer loyalty. Specifically in the
context of e-commerce, significant supportive evidence suggests that customers
who feel a higher level of trust in the store will revisit the site more often [71].
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3.2.2 Privacy
Privacy is generally approached as a social consideration, whereas security is
seen as a technical concern, though they are closely related [37]. We argue that
technical security decisions have such an impact on privacy, that privacy needs
to be considered from a technical perspective, in order to ensure that the privacy
expected from the social perspective is protected.
3.2.3 HTTPS and Extended Validation Certificates
Most users have visited websites with addresses starting with “HTTPS”. Ad-
dresses starting with HTTPS should mean that a secure connection has occurred
between the user’s web browser and the viewed web site, accomplishing the se-
curity goals of confidentiality and integrity.
There is nothing in HTTPS which guarantees who the owner of the certificate
is, and thus there is no guarantee as to the identity of the other party. We know
that only the owner of the corresponding private key can read messages sent, but
not who the owner of the private key is. All that the user can be assured of is that
they are securely connected to someone, and unfortunately that someone may
not be the entity the user believes they are connected to [41]. To help combat
this, Extended Validation Certificates have been introduced.
The process of acquiring an extended validation certificate enforces that the
holder of a certificate, required for HTTPS communication, is who they claim
to be [43]. This allows web browsers to display the name of the company who
owns the website, as well as the company’s web address. Recent enhancements
include colour coding of the address bars in web browsers which is now standard,
and more effective visual warning techniques regarding security certificates as
described in Maurer et al.’s research [78].
3.3 Methodology
Although there were two trials at two different times, the participants in each
trial were identical, except for two participants who left Australia before the
second study started. The first study we call Web Logs and the second study we
call In-depth Contextual Interviews.
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3.3.1 Participants
Twenty participants (18 for the second study) were recruited in Australia via
two research groups (human-computer interaction (HCI) design and informa-
tion security) and from personal contacts of the researchers. Seven participants
were from the general community (aged between 25-64), six were HCI design
researchers who build prototypes and systems for humans to use (aged between
25-54), and seven participants were computer security researchers (aged between
25-74). 45% were female and 55% were male, with all having tertiary quali-
fications. Nine participants were recently from a country other than Australia
(within the last two years), while 11 participants have been in Australia for more
than l0 years. There were eight nationalities, from four continents, represented.
All participants owned their own computer (at least one).
3.3.2 Procedure
Participation involved a week long diary study of web-based security decisions,
typically accompanied by pictures of their screen at the time of decision, followed
by in-depth qualitative interviews.
Web Logs / Diaries
Participants were asked to keep a one week log of their security decisions made
while using the web on their computer. A template for the log file was provided
to each participant. The template, a Microsoft Word document, consisted of a
table with three columns. The columns were titled:
Screen image (of the web page)
Thoughts about the security decision
Your security decision
An example web log entry from one of the participants is shown in Figure 3.1.
Web logs were encouraged wherever the participant used the Internet, be
that home or work, with some participants having a web log for home and for
work. Participants’ web logs ranged in size from one participant having one entry
through to two participants having more than 15 entries. Typically web logs had
four to seven entries.
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Figure 3.1: Example web log (fonts adjusted for readability).
In-depth Contextual Interviews
Participants’ perceptions of computer security, their decision making processes
and their subsequent actions were elicited via semi-structured in-depth inter-
views. The interview process was conducted in the tradition of Beyer and
Holtzblatt who recommend a Master-Apprentice technique, where the inter-
viewer is the apprentice learning from the participant who is the master [9].
These 30-70 minute interviews covered four broad topics, including: a) par-
ticipant’s experience using computers, b) the meaning of computer security, c)
the range of activities and settings used on the internet and d) responsibility for
computer security. In this way, the interviews explored the participant’s back-
ground to better understand their experiences and reasons for their methods and
actions, without resorting to subjective “assess your computing knowledge on a
numerical scale” techniques.
Throughout the study, in all communications the term security was used,
with no further delineation provided. As Yee states, “It is impossible to even
define what security means without addressing user expectations [125].” To this
end, in their interview, conducted after completion and submission of their web
log, each participant was asked to complete the sentence “Computer security
means to me...”
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This approach of blending interviews and web logs was chosen as a useful
way to achieve an understanding of decisions made in the context of use. Diary
studies have the shortcomings of any self-reporting mechanism, but the diary
studies provide significant insight into a participant’s decision making process in
their own environment, and the self-reporting issues were partially mitigated via
the subsequent in-depth interviews. This methodology provided us with rich in-
formation about how each individual uses the web in their normal environments.
3.3.3 Analytic Method
The data collected from the web logs and interviews was compared and analysed,
with a thematic analysis conducted to identify themes and patterns [48, 72, 73].
Through reading and rereading the data, web log entries and interviews were
investigated and classified. Coding was done with common and contrasting con-
cepts identified. Finally, themes were identified to create a comprehensive picture
of how and what users protect on the web.
3.3.4 Ethics
Permission was gained from our university’s Human Ethics committee for each
of these trials. Risks were minimal compared with every day computer usage.
The greatest risk was the possibility that a participant may include some pri-
vate information they did not wish to share in a screen-shot for the web-logs.
To mitigate this risk, this risk was explained to all participants and the partic-
ipants had the option of writing about their security decision without including
a screenshot. All participants were able to cease being part of the trials at any
time.
3.4 Findings
There were two broad themes presented in our data. Firstly, a problem was
identified, which was that there is a lack of delineation between what should be
trusted and what could not be trusted. This problem has led to our participants
individually realizing that their security and privacy are insufficiently protected.
Secondly, we outline what behaviours and processes the participants have ex-
hibited, on an individual basis, to protect themselves and mitigate against the
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risks created by this absence of rules. This leads to our discussion regarding the
impact of our findings to HCI design.
3.4.1 Identified Problem: Users Need to Protect Them-
selves on the Internet
Particularly the participants from the general population and the participants
who design human-computer interfaces identified that there was a lack of delin-
eation in the web interface regarding what could be trusted and what could not
be trusted. This led to an unknown status regarding their privacy and security.
Secondly, a continuum of concerns, for which the users need to have security and
privacy provided, was identified. Thirdly, the participants responses provided a
clear message that the responsibility for security is being forced on the users.
Lack of Delineation Leading to Obscured Security
Several users, in both their web logs and interviews, cited aspects of a web page
as reasons to trust a website. These aspects included the VeriSign logo, privacy
policies, FAQs, and terms and conditions. In line with Eggar’s guidance on
how to make users of e-commerce websites feel more comfortable, participants
reported feeling more confident if a local physical address is listed, and a local
telephone number [40].
However, a contrasting view was reported from other participants. They
wondered how hard it would be for the designer of a malicious web page to
include these items, and whether they should be basing her decision on them. In
direct contrast to Eggar’s guidance on how to make users feel more comfortable,
a participant from the general population stated in his web log that he looked
for HTTPS and the padlock symbol, in the interview he made a point of saying
that he did not trust graphics such as the VeriSign logo posted on the web page,
or statements made on the website about encryption.
The concerned users asked two essential questions: “Who decides?” and
“How do I know that it hasn’t been faked?” The question of “Who decides” is
central to users having trust in their web experience, including both the web
browser and the web page. There is no overarching rationale or conceptual
explanation of why programs are the way they are. Who decides if a padlock
is shown? Who decides if the company name is shown in the address bar and
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elsewhere on the page? This is a step away from providing clearer or more obvious
security indicators or warnings (such as in [78]). As a step before enhancing
security indicators or warnings, the user needs to clearly understand the question
of “Who decides” if the security indicator or warning is shown.
To counteract a lack of assurance that the user is connected to the correct
website, Extended Validation Certificates were introduced in 2007, which has
led to colour coding of address bars in modern browsers. However, not one
participant in their week of logging their web-based security decisions, referred to
making use of any of the additional information Extended Validation Certificates
afforded them. This is in keeping with Lin et al.’s finding regarding domain
highlighting, where they found in their study that domain highlighting also had
little benefit [74]. Domain highlighting is another enhancement, similar to colour
coding based on Extended Validation Certificates, also aimed at preventing users
from visiting incorrect websites.
In this section we highlight that the delineation between what is easy for
a malicious agent to manipulate, and what is hard for a malicious agent to
manipulate, is currently unclear in the eyes of our studies’ participants. Once
this distinction has been clarified for the users, further work is required to make
transparent to the user the process of who decides when the security indicators
are shown. Again, particularly the question “Who decides?” was another critical
driver for the concept of “Human Followable Security”, as described in Chapter 7.
Notice that this is a fundamentally different approach from previous HCI work,
attempts to provide more understandable warnings, more obvious warnings. To
complete the picture as to why human-followable security is a different approach
to creating better warnings, the question that should be asked is, “Who decides
whether the warning appears?”
Web Concerns Continuum
Participants with little computer security education had different concerns from
those of the security specialists. Although practices are individualized for all
participants, there are some notable differences between the concerns of security
professionals and general participants. For those with little computer security
education, most of their concerns revolved around the entity they were communi-
cating with over the web. For those with significant computer security education,
almost all concerns were with their own computer and with the communication
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channel connecting their computer to the entity they were interacting with over
the web. We characterize the range of concerns from computer to connection to
entity to recipients as a web concerns continuum, noting that people with and
without security education are largely concerned with different aspects of this
continuum.
The concerns the participants from the general population had regarding the
entity they were interacting with. These concerns included employees of the
entity, combined entities, mistakenly sending information to the wrong entity,
and non-entities. Multiple businesses of the same type placing information online,
such that customers could log in from anywhere and access their details, made
participants feel as if that one location was going to be an attractive target
to hackers. Other concerns were regarding sending private information to the
wrong person, or transfering money to the wrong account. Caitlin, who works
from home, was most concerned that the entity may no longer exist:
I must admit sometimes I buy stuff and I think, “What if this website
is a year old and nobody is actually at the other end and people are
just collecting my credit card details and nothing is actually going to
happen?”
And even getting an email back doesn’t mean anything because so
many of them are automated!
In contrast, participants from the security community were far more con-
cerned about their immediate interface device and the communication channel
from their device to the entity they were communicating with. Not one security
participant referred to the entity at the other end, in the way that the general
population was concerned about issues such as the already discussed non-entities,
or who was employed by the company. With respect to the device, the concerns
ranged from the type of operating system, to the browser, to who was the main
user of the computer, and even if the operating system was stored on re-writable
memory.
In this section we have shown a range of issues on the web concerns continuum
that includes the user’s computer, the channel to the website with which they
are communicating, the website, the business whose website is being viewed, and
the employees of the business. No participant thought of the entire continuum,
but allaying fears for the entire continuum is required to satisfy all users.
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Users are Responsible for Computer Security
Particularly notable is that all participants except one, when asked who was
responsible for their computer’s security, answered at least partially “Me”. The
exception was a design researcher with a Masters degree, Chloe, who believes
that the responsibility rests entirely with the software on her computer. For
most participants, the response of “Me” was an absolute, especially for their
home computer. This may be a result of a culture that has developed from
many years of End User Licenses for software removing all responsibility from the
software developers, and placing all responsibility on the user. No participants
were employed as system administrators. Effectively, this means that untrained
people are drawing on their personal experience and are individually making the
best use of the limited set of tools available to them, to protect their computers
and online activities.
3.4.2 Users’ Actions and Motivation
Having identified that there is a problem, that the participants feel the need
to protect themselves, the responses of the participants revealed how they were
protecting themselves and what they were protecting.
Individual Mitigation of the Absence of Rules
The most consistent theme observed through the analysis of the web logs and
interviews was the diversity of security techniques employed while using the
web. All participants used their computer daily, all were university educated,
and a third of the participants were security researchers. Therefore, some level of
consistency in line with a collective best practice may be expected. Instead, there
was little or no consistency, especially when each participant’s technique was
explored in detail in the interview. Each participant was found to be protecting
themselves to the level of their knowledge. This is indicative of a system without
defined and enforced rules.
We separate the responses into three groups: the general group who will
use the system, the HCI researchers who design the systems, and the security
researchers who may be considered experts to give insight into the extremes of
the measures taken. In keeping with Yee’s observation that, “It is impossible to
even define what security means without addressing user expectations,” [125] we
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will include the participant’s definitions of what security means to them.
General population: Rebecca has different definitions for security if she is
at home or at work. She completes her financial transactions at work since she
believes the computer system and network at work is a more secure system than
at home. In contrast, Georgia, a government worker with a Bachelor degree,
whose definition of security asks whether she is broadcasting her information to
other people, specifically will not complete any financial transactions at work.
She states that this is because at work she has no control over the network,
software, or how often protective programs are run. Georgia uses a low limit
credit card, PayPal, and EBay, since she is confident that if she challenges a
purchase attributed to her via these means, they will refund her money. Brian,
whose definition of security is to feel confident and uninhibited to do the task
he needs to do, searches, shops and makes bookings online but sends credit card
details via fax.
HCI researchers: Bianca, PhD, defines computer security as only she can
access her computer and no one else can. Bianca posts her credit card details
using traditional mail to smaller organizations, rather than send the details over
the internet. If she must send her credit card details over the internet, then
she does so via email and splits the credit card number into two emails. Chloe,
whose definition of computer security is protecting her data from being accessed
by other people, never purchases online. She researches her purchases online,
but then travels to physical stores to make her purchases.
Sarah separates her definition of computer security into protecting the com-
puter from attacks that come over the network, physical protection such as not
leaving the computer in a location where it may be easily stolen, and backing up
her data. Sarah completes almost all of her shopping, including groceries, online.
She has a low credit limit credit card solely for online purchases, and separate
bank logins. With one bank login, she can access all of her accounts, but cannot
transfer to any account that is not her own. With the other bank login, she
can only access one account which normally has a very low balance, and with
this login she can transfer money online to other people’s bank accounts. When
Sarah needs to transfer to another person’s account, she logs into her bank with
the first login. She then transfers from her main account to the account that can
be accessed with the second login and logs out. Sarah then logs back in with the
second login, and transfers the purposefully placed money to the other person’s
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account.
Security researchers: Samuel, who has a Masters degree, has a security
definition which he separates into three parts. Those parts are: physical security
similar to Sarah’s definition; network security which is the transmission of infor-
mation point to point; and information security where the main goal is to hide
the information. Samuel specifically asked for, and acquired, an electronic de-
vice from his bank which provides him with a new electronic token every minute.
Each time he wishes to log in to the bank, he uses his login and password, and
the extra electronic token. Once logged in, he uses the changing token for any
transfers out of the bank also.
Dylan has a definition of security which he separates into the computer’s
security and the communication security. The computer’s security refers to the
machine, operating system, and software. The communication security refers to
working safely on the internet. Security is looking after assets in a broad sense
- whatever is important to you. Dylan consciously chooses to use the Linux
operating system when browsing the web, since there are fewer attacks designed
for the Linux operating system than for more mainstream operating systems.
In particular, Dylan will not make purchases or conduct online banking on his
children’s computers.
Nicholas, PhD, defines computer security as being there to secure personal
information, and personal transactions. Nicholas has an operating system on
CD, which he boots from when he wishes to use the internet for banking, and
then uses only the web browser. He does this because booting from a non-re-
writeable CD minimizes his exposure to social engineering attacks via email, and
exposure to malicious software is restricted to the time the computer is powered.
As soon as the computer is rebooted, the system would need to be compromised
again.
In this section we have provided examples of how users are individually ad-
dressing the problem of needing to protect themselves on the internet. Critically,
everyone was protecting themselves to the best of their knowledge and expertise.
This finding was a critical driver in the creation of the concept of Human Fol-
lowable Security, as described in Chapter 7.
There was not a delineation of “those who care about security” and “those
who don’t”; rather, everyone cared and already employed the best scheme they
knew. A theme common to the techniques employed is the theme of separation,
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for example using a separate credit card or bank account, sending information
via another communication channel such as facsimile or email, or even using a
separate computer or operating system. While educating users about the secu-
rity and privacy settings of the latest online applications and devices may be
unrealistic, general lessons such as being aware of and maintaining separations
may have some merit, and HCI designs should enhance rather than undermine
these separations for the sake of security and privacy behaviours.
What Users Wish to Protect
Having identified how the users are protecting, we now outline what participants
stated was important enough for them to want the information protected, which
was found to depend on the participant’s circumstances. Protected information
included:
 financial details and accounts used to access money,
 personal information such as physical address and telephone number for
themselves,
 details concerning children such as photos, names and schools,
 medical details, and
 information that could directly lead to identity theft such as a scanned
image of their passport.
Participants typically had three levels of safe guarding, though some had only
two. Always in the top level was financial information. Nicholas said the reason
for this was because it was “real money.”
Money: Placing money-related web interaction in the category that requires
the greatest protection was consistent across study participants. This categoriza-
tion occurs even though some participants consciously noted that they had never
heard of an online attack on a bank. Participants described that they was more
aware of physical devices being added to Automatic Teller Machines, which would
acquire their card details and Personal Identification Number, than any losses
made due to Internet banking. Even without concrete awareness, all users placed
online finances in the most protected category.
3.4. Findings 35
Medical conditions: None of the participants in the age groups younger
than 45–54 mentioned concerns regarding searches for medical conditions. Al-
most all participants in the 45+ age groups raised concerns about searches for
medical conditions being traceable back to them. These participants highlighted
that if they visited a physical library and read a book inside the library, no one
would have a record of that occurrence. However, searching for the information
on the internet created a permanent record which could be linked back specif-
ically to the participant’s machine. A participant drew an analogy to HIV 30
years ago, when there was a stigma associated with the disease, and that there
are ailments with similar stigmas now. As an example, she considered the case
of a person using the Amazon website to purchase a book on a topic with a
similar stigma, and worried that the website with its knowledge of past trans-
actions would prompt the user “You may be also interested in....” She stated,
“The prompt insensitively indicates that they, an online bookseller, know all
about the medical conditions you are interested in.” Patrick notes that records
of the interaction would exist at potentially multiple locations such as the par-
ticipant’s Internet Service Provider (ISP), the search website they used, and the
subsequently visited website.
Personal Levels of Security
Some participants control their levels of security by password use. If a website as
critically important, then the website gets its own password. Less important sites
get shared passwords. One participant’s method of categorizing the websites is
based on finances. Her lowest level of shared password is used for websites, such
as EBay and Amazon, where obtaining her password allows an attacker to make
purchases or bids on her behalf, but not pay for them. She hopes and believes
that the people involved at EBay and Amazon would understand if an attack
occurred. While participants wished for the ability to group their passwords, they
noted that there is no consistent rule for what is a secure password. On some
sites, the rule for what constitutes an acceptable password may be letters and
numbers only, while others may require letters, numbers and special characters.
Most participants had three levels of concern, with one participant having a
separate physical device for each of the levels. As mentioned, for banking and
anything with “real money”, he boots a laptop using an operating system on
non-re-writable CD. At the next level down, for personal items that could lead
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to identity theft, he has an encrypted USB stick. This encrypting both restricts
access under what he describes as normal “browsing the desktop” circumstances,
and also protects in the case of loss of the USB stick. At the lowest level are the
websites he is not concerned about, such as news, Wikipedia, and the universal
library.
In contrast, some participants had only two levels. Chloe states that as long
as the website is related to money, then she looks for security indicators. If the
website is not related to money, then it is “just for fun” and she is not worried
about privacy issues. Specifically, she does not mind sharing her name and
address. Chloe’s view, that the most important protection aspect for her was
protection from her data being lost, was unique for the participant group. She
stated that she prefers to share the data than to lose it. Also in contrast to the
three-levels of security that most participants had was that for some participants,
the levels are fluid. They decide whether to enter personal information on the
context, and whether they believe the organization needs that information.
In this section we have provided the range of information that users identified
as being worthy of special protection. We have shown that most users sort their
information into three tiers of security importance, though some users have only
two tiers. Common amongst all participants was the need for financial security,
and then, depending on the participant’s situation, items such as information
about their children or medical information became critical for them to protect
also.
3.5 Discussion and Impact to Web-Based HCI
Design
We have shown that the delineation between what is easy for a malicious agent
to manipulate, and what is hard for a malicious agent to manipulate, is currently
insufficient in the eyes of our studies’ participants. This has led to an unknown
status of security and privacy, where the participants, none of whom are trained
system administrators, are responsible for the security and privacy of their sys-
tems. Each participant was therefore protecting themselves to the best of their
ability, based on their experiences, with the limited set of tools available to them.
Already, this study has highlighted some major issues, such as the need for an
overarching set of guidelines for browsers, which allows users to understand which
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parts of what is displayed to them are browser-controlled and which parts are
website-controlled. Secondly, increased responsibility for security and privacy is
required with the software production companies - all end user license agreements
(EULAs) examined for major browsers and operating systems had disclaimers
such as “AS IS” and “WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND.” There have
been notable shortfalls in the trustworthiness of programs, even amongst the
world’s biggest software companies. These include compiled-in “back door” ac-
counts that allow access to all implementations regardless of access and password
settings, and backup facilities that corrupted files as they were copied [21,118].
Our research has described a web-security continuum, which the participants
have described as being the range of areas that they are concerned about re-
garding security and privacy. This continuum includes the user’s computer, the
channel to the website with which they are communicating, the website, the
business whose website is being viewed, and the employees of the business. This
means there is a need to design for trust at the computer, communications, web-
site and business levels, and the whole continuum holistically, for web usage to
be unhindered by security and privacy concerns. An overview of the findings
from our two human studies are presented in Figure 3.2.
We have described how, in the absence of an effective security and privacy so-
lution, our participants have individually constructed and implemented schemes
to enhance their security and privacy protection. Central to many of the dis-
parate measures was the concept of separation, ensuring that, as much as pos-
sible, a malicious entity could not acquire what the participant would like to
protect by compromising one location. This is an essential message to the de-
signers of web applications and signup processes, who may be designing systems
which undermine their users’ main protection mechanism, which is keeping in-
formation separate. An example of undermining of users’ protection schemes is
described in the experience Dylan shared regarding PayPal:
I had an issue with PayPal in the last few weeks, where they restricted
my account. I hadn’t used it for several months and then I tried to
use it and they said your account was restricted and then I had to go
through all these kinds of security checks including giving them my
credit card number again which of course one of the reasons to use
paypal is to avoid using the credit card. . . . My reaction to that was
that I didn’t go ahead with that at that time. I went off and I did
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Figure 3.2: Findings overview.
some googling and I found out various people talking about this and
it turned out that several other people had also been suspicious about
this kind of activity. . . . I eventually got some confidence that this
was a normal PayPal procedure and eventually decided to go ahead.
Our participants have provided insight into what types of information they
wish to protect, and shown that they typically need three levels of security de-
pending on the activity and the context. Also applicable may be the realization
that for Internet interaction which requires the highest level of security, for exam-
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ple internet banking, some participants are employing self-protection techniques
resistant to change such as using operating systems on non-re-writable media.
Such websites that are subsequently adjusted to use the latest technology for
aesthetic reasons may render these CDs and their browsers obsolete, which un-
dermines the user’s protection mechanism.
3.6 Limitations
While the studies were quite useful to us there are some notable limitations of
this study. Concerning the demographics, all participants were tertiary qualified
and the data was collected in one country, Australia. There were no extremely
novice users - the least amount of computer use was seven years. There were
no significantly infrequent users, e.g. less than once a week, and there were no
children amongst the participants.
Our participants, who are all tertiary educated, may present the best case
scenario for how people go about protecting their own data. While the themes
of everyone protecting themselves to the best of their ability, and using various
forms of separation to provide protection seem likely to remain constant, ques-
tions regarding what the users view as worth or needing protection, seem likely
to change.
Concerning the technique of users keeping a web log, the technique has the in-
built issues that any self-reporting mechanism has, including changing behaviour
due to the keeping of the diary, self-censoring, and no absolute guarantee of truth-
fulness (though all participants were quite trustworthy). This limitation was at
least partially mitigated by the subsequent interviews, in which participants were
queried about their web usage.
3.7 Summary
The study of tertiary qualified individuals has shown that users have identified
that the current framework, that allows them to interact with the internet se-
curely, is insufficient. In the absence of credible solutions, users are creating their
own techniques aimed at enhancing their security, to provide them with the con-
fidence to interact online. This finding was a major driver for the creation of
human-followable security, as described in Chapter 7.
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A significant contribution of the study is the mapping out of the ways in which
people rationalize and develop their own individual approaches and techniques
to protect their own security. As such, we have added a further piece to the
landscape that Dourish et al. began to describe [38]. HCI design has a major
role in the establishment of a consistent framework which users are comfortable
enough with, so that they feel less need to create their own ad hoc solutions.
The literature is replete with research concerning the role of trust on the
internet, usually the role of trust in determining if the user will interact the first
time, and subsequently. Our research supports this. Further, our participants
have identified questions of trust concerning the protocol and software. This is
despite critical software, such as the operating system and web browser, having
license agreements which state the software is provided on an “as is” basis. This
basis for the creation of software clearly does not meet the users’ requirements
for trust.
We have shown the web concerns continuum and the levels of safe-guarding
users have for the data they identify as worthy of protection, which the HCI
designers need to address and facilitate. Further work is also required in the
user-identified lack of delineation between parts of the web interface which they
could presume were difficult for a malicious party to manipulate, and the parts
a malicious party could manipulate easily.
Finally, we provided a list of HCI design issues identified by the participants
in our study. Since users need to protect themselves, HCI designers need to
be aware of the methods they are using to protect themselves. Any technique
employed by a HCI designer that undermines a user’s self-protection mechanism
is counterproductive.
Chapter 4
Security Ceremonies
In Chapter 3 we researched human usage of security protocols and information
systems in general. As a second critical foundation for the cryptographic tools we
will introduce in later chapters, we investigated security ceremonies. In the main,
the investigated ceremonies were already known to be flawed. So the benefit of
this research was to consider the problems from a ceremony point of view, which
had not be done before, and thereby to gain an understanding of what a security
ceremony is.
4.1 Introduction
The best definition of a security ceremony we have created based on our un-
derstanding of the usage of the term, taking into account a target audience of
cryptographers and security professionals, is protocols in their context of use. As
such, an underlying protocol could be used in one instance (or context) to trans-
port messages in an access card reader scenario. In another implementation the
same underlying protocol could be used to update message boards in an airport.
When the contextual information of the human interaction, the device reader,
the door, etc. as well as the underlying protocol is considered, this becomes a
security ceremony.
While this definition “protocols in their context of use” allows understand-
ing of what a ceremony is, on another level, when extra steps are added to an
underlying protocol, what is formed is another protocol. Yes there may now be
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a human and other equipment involved, but it is a protocol and as such needs
no special name, since “normal” protocols are made up of building blocks which
may be sub-protocols. So to aid the reader in understanding how the term se-
curity ceremonies is used in the literature, perhaps think of security ceremonies
as protocols which involve humans. As long as that description also conveys
that now graphical user interfaces and other equipment and information flows,
perhaps omitted in the past and thus considered out-of-band, may now also be
considered part of the security analysis.
We will firstly present an analysis of three security protocols which involve
humans, which are known to be broken. We analysed these known-to-be-broken
security ceremonies to gain an understanding of the issues with ceremony anal-
ysis. Then, based on the information gained from our human trials outlined
in Chapter 3 and the lessons learnt from ceremony analysis, we will summarise
what we believe are the critical elements which are required in creating a secure
human-and-computer protocol, defining the concept of POPS+ in the process.
This will be the foundation from which we create our three tools to aid in the
development of protocols involving humans.
4.2 Analysis of Flawed Ceremonies
Ellison wrote about security ceremonies in 2007 [41]. In this paper, he attributed
the name ceremony as being coined for this purpose by Jesse Walker. Ellison
provided several central ideas in a network security context, which can be di-
rectly applied to cryptographic protocols in general. The properties of a security
ceremony that we distil from Ellison’s work are as follows:
 a ceremony is a superset of protocols;
 there is nothing out-of-band; and
 humans, when part of the ceremony, are explicitly included.
While theoretically nothing is out-of-band, our research has shown that in reality
the scope of analysis needs to be set at some point. Bounding at any point
that “makes sense” and, in particular, any point that reveals flaws previously
unconsidered, is useful.
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4.2.1 Ceremonies Example: HTTPS with MITM Attack
HTTPS is a protocol used on the internet to provide confidentiality and integrity
to messages between two parties. An example HTTPS ceremony derived from
Ellison’s paper is shown in Figure 4.1. This ceremony has a number of parts,
between multiple “nodes” or parties. First, on the right hand side of Figure 4.1, is
the root key distribution part of the ceremony. The nodes in this key distribution
process have been denoted by CA, R and C. Here the certificate authority is
represented by CA, and R represents the registration authority which involves a
number of human steps between the CA and the human party C. The human
C will use the key from the CA on C’s computer CC. The messages for placing
the key on C’s computer CC are shown in messages 1 to 3. Notice that there is
no time scale on the ceremony.
The attack is shown between the user C, and the user’s computer CC and
the server S, in messages 4 to 6. The attack is carried out via two adversaries,
A1 and A2. At some time after the user’s computer CC is set up ready to take
part in HTTPS, adversary A2 sends a name (server S’s name) and an address
(adversary A1’s address) to the computer CC. User C decides whether or not
to proceed to the server based on the server’s name alone, because the software
running on CC does not present both the name and address to user C, only the
name.
From here, the ceremony proceeds as expected through messages 7 to 22, and
hence the attack. User C’s computer, CC, securely connects to adversary A1
(messages 7 to 10) using HTTPS, adversary A1 securely connects to server S
(messages 11 to 14) using HTTPS, and then the adversary A1 faithfully relays
communication between the user’s computer CC and the server S. Specifically
A1 passes on the login and password information, which adversary A1 now has
in plaintext form for the future (note the decryption and re-encryption between
messages 21 and 22 for the password, and similarly for the login). After message
22, adversary A1 is securely logged into server S, and is free to proceed as desired.
Ellison’s example ceremony presumes that only the name of the target, and
not the target’s web address, is passed on to the human through the web browser
in message 5, for the human to make their decision on. If this is the case, then
this is clearly an issue that will result in the security of the ceremony being
compromised. Some readers may suggest that this should not be the case any
longer, due to such advances as extended certificates which have been introduced
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since 2007 (http://www.cabforum.org/). However, as described in Chapter 3 in
one of our human studies we asked our participants to log their web usage security
decisions for a week. We found that not one participant based any of their
security decisions in a week of web use on any of the information made available
by the extended certificate enhancements. Also, extended certificates are not yet
mandated for use in HTTPS. Hence the issue remains current. Further, even if
the address, as well as the name, is displayed to the user to base their security
decision on, Ellison asks whether the human user will be provisioned ahead of
time with the association between the address of the server and the name of the
server, and the correctness of the name [41].
The above means that, in the ceremony shown in Figure 4.1, the user (C)
believes that their computer (CC) is securely connected to the server (S). Indeed,
CC is securely connected to something, just not the intended server. The point is
that the HTTPS protocol is not broken, there are successful usages of the protocol
between CC and A1, and between A1 and S. But the security ceremony, which
includes the HTTPS protocol, is fatally flawed.
4.2.2 EMV Smart Card Security Ceremony
EMV is a suite of protocols for use in smart credit cards (credit cards with a
chip). EMV was named after the initial companies involved in the creation of the
standard (Europay, Mastercard and Visa). With widespread use in Europe, and
now being phased in throughout the world, the companies that are currently
signed up to the EMV standard are Visa, Mastercard, American Express and
JCB (http://www.emvco.com/about_emvco.aspx).
A standard use of an EMV card is for the user, a client of a financial insti-
tution, to pay for a purchase in a retail outlet. The user will insert their card
into the point-of-sale (POS) terminal, and then enter their personal identifica-
tion number (PIN) to authorise the transaction. The chip on the smart card
will verify the PIN. If the PIN is accepted, the POS terminal will contact the
financial institution over a network to check if the purchase will be accepted by
the institution. If the purchase is accepted, a sales receipt will be printed at the
POS terminal stating the words “Verified with PIN”.
One reason for the widespread uptake of EMV has been at least partially
the financial benefit to the institutions of accepting this new technology, at the
customer’s cost [82]. When a transaction is disputed, where the card holder
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denies making the purchase, there has been a liability shift from the merchant to
the card holder. This shift has been engineered by the creators of the card system,
and moves the liability by having the transactions verified with a signature to
being verified with a PIN [11,83].
Figure 4.2: Murdoch et al.’s EMV Ceremony [83].
The EMV ceremony from Figure 4.2 can be segmented into a number of parts.
The physical process which is described by Figure 4.2 is that instead of a card
holder inserting their card into a card reader at a POS terminal, the attacker
inserts a man-in-the-middle (MITM) device, which would respond to the POS
terminal through a card-like interface. The POS terminal would believe it is
communicating with a card. The MITM device’s other end would be connected
to a stolen card, with which the adversary wishes to make a purchase without
having had access to the card’s PIN.
Therefore, after the MITM device is inserted in the terminal, the terminal
asks the user for a PIN. The PIN is sent from the terminal to what it sees as
a card, but is in fact the MITM device (message 1). Regardless of what PIN
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is entered, the MITM device simply responds with a card verification message
that would result from the correct PIN having been sent to the card (message 2).
The terminal then asks the card to generate an authorisation request cryptogram
(ARQC), which contains the terminal verification results (TVR). This process or-
dinarily simply encrypts the TVR, some issuer application data (IAD), a message
authentication code (MAC) and a description of the transaction which would be
later forwarded on to the bank. The issue is that the TVR states only that the
card holder verification was a success, not how the card holder was verified, so a
card holder verification technique of no verification (as is allowed by unmanned
terminals with no PIN acceptance capability, such as parking machines) may
have been used.
The ARQC containing the TVR is sent on to the card through the MITM
device (messages 3 and 4). The card accepts that the transaction has been
verified, and creates the ARQC. From this point on, the ceremony proceeds as
per the ideal case, with the MITM device faithfully passing the messages on
in both directions. The ARQC is sent to the bank, and the bank creates an
authorisation response code (ARC) based on the contents of the ARQC, and
sends the ARC back to the terminal (messages 5 to 8). Considering the ARQC
says that the card holder has been verified, the bank will have no reason to
reject the purchase (unless the card is already overdrawn or similar), and hence
the ARC will state that the transaction has been approved.
The final part of the process is still the ceremony proceeding as normal. The
terminal receives the ARC, and creates an authorisation response cryptogram
(ARPC) which is typically a MAC over ARQC and ARC, which will allow the
card to verify that the ARC corresponds to the ARQC that the card created
(messages 9 and 10). The card then generates a transaction cryptogram (TC)
signifying that it is authorising the transaction to proceed, and this TC is sent
back to the bank via the terminal (terminal and bank keeping a copy - messages
13 to 15). At this point the terminal prints two copies of a receipt with the words
“Verified with PIN” on it. One copy is given to the customer (in this case the
adversary) and the other copy kept by the store.
The central reason the MITM attack works in the EMV ceremony is because
the TVR message, which the terminal sends to the card to encrypt, contains
only the fact that the card has been verified. The TVR does not show which
method was used to verify the card. EMV cards have a number of methods of
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verification, suitable for the range of uses that credit cards have today [83]. This
ambiguous TVR message is encrypted and sent on to the bank (see messages 3
to 7 in Figure 4.2).
This means that the MITM device can simply prevent the PIN comparison
message sent from the terminal to the card from reaching the card. The MITM
device sends back to the terminal the equivalent of PIN verified without passing
the PIN attempt on to the card. The ceremony then proceeds as if the card
holder has been verified by a technique other than the PIN, while the terminal is
left in a state which believes that the user verification has been completed with a
PIN. Added to the significance of the traditional MITM attack, is the final step
in the ceremony depicted in Figure 4.2 (step 16). The receipt generated by the
terminal and given to the human has the words on it “Verified with PIN”.
4.2.3 Opera Mini Ceremony
Opera Software ASA is a company which develops a suite of multi-platform web
browsing software programs (http://www.opera.com/company/). For the three
years from August 2009 to August 2012, Opera had the greatest market share
of any mobile web browser in the world 1. There are different versions of Opera
web browsers for different purposes. The three main variations of the browser
being:
 standard Opera for PC/Mac
 Opera Mini for mobile telephones
 Opera Mobile for devices such as PDAs
Opera Mini Design
Opera Mini is the version for devices such as mobile telephones, which have
restricted computing power and resources. Opera Mini has no full rendering
engine on the device. Instead, Opera has proprietary servers which handle the
internet requests made on the mobile.
This process of sending requests to the internet via a server which handles
the rendering and compresses the data before sending the resulting page back to
the mobile telephone, has benefits both in a reduction of the computing power
1http://gs.statcounter.com//#mobile_browser-ww-monthly-200812-201305
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required on the device, and also reduced bandwidth requirements to the device
which is running Opera Mini. The issue from a security point of view is that there
is no end-to-end security. The requests from the mobile telephone to Opera’s
server are encrypted using Opera’s proprietary encryption, but the messages are
decrypted from Opera’s proprietary encryption at the Opera server, and then
the data is re-encrypted using standard HTTPS and the certificate of the actual
target website (http://www.opera.com/help/mini/faq). As the Opera Mini
FAQ on security reads:
“Opera Mini uses a transcoder server to translate HTML/CSS/JavaScript
into a more compact format. It will also shrink any images to fit the
screen of your handset. This translation step makes Opera Mini fast,
small, and also very cheap to use. To be able to do this translation,
the Opera Mini server needs to have access to the unencrypted ver-
sion of the webpage. Therefore no end-to-end encryption between the
client and the remote web server is possible.
If you need full end-to-end encryption, you should use a full web
browser . . . ” (http://www.opera.com/help/mini/faq#security ac-
cessed 18/05/2013)
4.2.4 Opera Mini Ceremony Analysis
Opera mini’s use in a mobile phone is a quintessential security ceremony. There
is one protocol between Opera’s server and the internet, another protocol be-
tween the mobile telephone and Opera’s server, and finally there is a human user
making security decisions based on what they see on the browser on their mobile
telephone.
Of particular interest in the Opera Mini ceremony is the use of standard
icons to indicate security to the user. In, for example, Internet Explorer, which
almost one in three desktop users currently use worldwide2, the use of the padlock
symbol means that the connection between the user and the website the user is
interacting with is secure via use of HTTPS. By secure, we mean that confiden-
tiality and integrity are assured such that no computer on the path between the
user and the website can decrypt any of the information or change the message
2http://gs.statcounter.com/#browser-ww-monthly-201207-201306
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Figure 4.3: Opera Mini Secure Connection - viewing NAB’s secure logon page.
that is sent by the user or the website. The padlock icon is used similarly in all
other major browsers.
However, as shown in Figure 4.3, Opera Mini displays a padlock symbol (top
right of picture) when there is not end-to-end security. This means that Opera
Mini users, who know what the padlock symbol means in other browsers, are
led to believe that they have a confidential connection to the website they are
viewing, when they do not.
Figure 4.4 describes the Opera Mini ceremony. The ceremony begins with
the user of a mobile telephone typing the address of their bank’s website into the
Opera Mini web browser (message 1). A process similar to HTTPS then occurs
between the mobile telephone and Opera’s Server (approximated by messages 2
to 5). As Opera ASA states:
The communication is protected by 256-bit RC4 and the key ex-
change is done by 1280-bit RSA. All hashes are created using SHA-
256. These are the algorithms used by most SSL sites today. (http:
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//www.opera.com/mobile/help/faq/#security)
A HTTPS connection is also formed between Opera’s server and the bank’s
server (messages 6 to 9). Once this is complete, the request for the page is
passed through to the bank (messages 10 and 11), and the bank replies with
its customer login page (message 12). The Opera server renders this page, and
sends the compressed output to the user’s mobile telephone device (message 13).
On the mobile telephone, Opera Mini then displays the webpage, including the
padlock symbol (message 14). The user sees the padlock symbol, and chooses
whether to input their login information and password. If the user does enter
their login and password (message 15), then this is sent back to the bank’s server
via the Opera encrypted channel (message 16), decrypted at the Opera Server,
and then re-encrypted and sent on to the bank’s server via the HTTPS encrypted
channel (message 17).
As stated in Chapter 3, we investigated security decisions made by users
in a week of standard web usage. We found that most users made the choice
of whether or not to interact with websites that had direct financial interfaces,
such as banks or online retail, based on whether or not the padlock symbol
was shown [92]. Users presumed that a padlock meant that no one, apart from
the website they were communicating with, could see their financial details and
confidential information, such as login and password, in plaintext form. Opera’s
intimation of confidentiality by the depiction of the padlock symbol is not in
keeping with Opera’s statement in the Opera Mini FAQ which says “if you need
full end-to-end encryption, you should use a full web browser. . . ” (http://www.
opera.com/mobile/help/faq/#security).
Recent developments have raised similar issues in many other devices such
as smart phones and tablet PCs. On the smart phones, since there are no
enforced standards for security of applications, app developers choose whether
to display a padlock symbol or not when using SSL/HTTPS. Some apps, even
from legitimate companies, displayed the padlock when SSL/HTTPS was not
used [110]. Similarly to Opera Mini, other low powered devices with web browsers
use a proxy server configuration. Amazon’s Silk browser uses a similar proxy
server setup to Opera Mini, to speed up the browsing experience, but states that
while all non-SSL connections go via Amazon’s proxy server, all SSL connections
are made directly between the browser and the target website. As such, with so
many possible configurations, there is no way for the average user to know if the
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displayed padlock means they are communicating confidentially with the website
they are connected to or not.
Interestingly, while the plaintext state of messages through the Opera Server
clearly is a security issue and probably not realised by most Opera Mini users,
the design has some security benefits. If the user trusts Opera Mini with all
their communication with every party they communicate with on the internet,
then this design of accessing the internet through a proxy provides essentially
anonymous internet usage, as well as protection against various JavaScript-based
malicious software (malware).
4.2.5 Lessons Learnt
By re-investigating known security flaws from a ceremony point of view, we
identified a set of common flaws. This list included:
 each individual protocol remained secure, but the critical security informa-
tion was not passed from one protocol to the next (see Sections 4.2.1 and
4.2.2);
 the information passed on to the human was inadequate for the human to
have any chance of making a correct decision (see Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2 and
4.2.3);
 it is clear that lessons long since learnt for protocols, such as requiring an
indication of freshness, have not been transferred into security ceremony
knowledge (see Section 4.2.1). This leads to many known flaws such as
replay attacks. We address this freshness for protocols involving humans
issue in Chapter 7.
While ceremony analysis has been demonstrated to capture known flaws, and
therefore is useful, the technique is not without pitfalls. The most significant flaw
is highlighted by our definition for a ceremony, stated at the start of Section 4.1,
which was that security ceremonies were protocols in their context of use. This
means that, even if the underlying protocols are found to be secure for a given
context, they may well not be secure in even a slightly different context, leading
to the situation of requiring a new ceremony analysis for the same set of protocols
in each new context.
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All of the ceremonies examined have been use cases, the context of use, of
the underlying protocols, and therefore the first job of the ceremony analyser is
to create a list of use cases to create a rigorous security proof for. Of particular
concern for the ceremony analysis technique are areas where the context of use
for the protocols, for a specific ceremony, do not yet exist. Ceremony analysis
will therefore, by necessity, trail behind users’ use of any given system. For
example, the people responsible for the security of new smart card driver licenses
will only be able to analyse certain security ceremonies once users of the smart
card have been interacting with (potentially previously unknown) third parties.
This interaction with new third parties may be a new context, and hence a new
ceremony will be created which will be able to be analysed only in retrospect.
This is a significant step down from the ideals of provable security, which aims
to ensure that, once a protocol is proven secure, it will be secure regardless of
how it is used.
Therefore the common flaws revealed in the ceremonies analysed to date
suggest these assessments should be completed on security ceremonies prior to
deployment.
 Look for protocol-like deficiencies, such as outlined by Abadi and Needham
[1]. Treat each constituent protocol as a node in the ceremony, and check
that nonces and identification are being passed between nodes. Note that
this finding drove the work presented in Chapter 7, since it meant a nonce-
like device would need to be presented to a “human node” if replay attacks
to the human were to be prevented.
 Ensure that key cryptographic information is being transferred between
nodes in the ceremony.
 If the ceremony includes a protocol including a human as part of the proto-
col, and if the protocol comes with a proof of security, re-examine the proof
of security for the assumptions that were made concerning the human.
 Examine the human’s role in the ceremony. If the only way for the human
to accomplish their goal is via a particular route through a security decision
point, the human will take that route.
 Examine the human-factor considerations of the ceremony. These issues
include how many items a human can remember (for example, web address
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and store name pairs, as per the HTTPS ceremony) and the prior knowl-
edge and education required. For example, in approving the usage of a
HTTPS ceremony, do humans realise that the most critical information is
the address? The study we presented in Chapter 3 indicated that they did
not.
4.3 Investigation of a Provably Secure Protocol
As has been presented in Chapter 2, in 2008 Gajek et al. expanded on Bellare
and Rogaway’s concept of practice oriented provable security [5]. The significant
enhancement that Gajek et al. made to previous security models was that they
proved a protocol including a human to be secure [44]. They achieved this by
adding formal actions render and recognise to a security model. Render is the
process of a web browser rendering a HTML page, based on the browser’s state,
and presenting that page to the user. Recognise is the process of a user viewing
the webpage, judging if the Human-Perceptible Authenticator (HPA) is correct,
and outputting either true or false depending on the results of that test.
The protocol that Gajek et al. proved to be secure, what they called browser-
based user-aware mutual authentication over TLS, is a non-trivial security cere-
mony. In the protocol, there is a user who has a computer, a browser running on
the user’s computer, and the user is interacting with a server via their computer’s
browser. Gajek et al. take the important step of extending the definition of the
underlying TLS (Transport Layer Security) protocol to include the human user.
A sketch of their protocol follows:
1. The protocol is between a server, a human’s computer running a web
browser (which has state), and the human.
2. Before the protocol begins, the human has selected a HPA and provided
that HPA to the server. The HPAs suggested by Gajek et al. are a person-
ally selected image or voice recording.
3. Both the server and the human’s computer have authentication certificates
and associated private keys, and a secure TLS connection is established
between the browser and the server, when the browser on the human’s
computer opens the server’s webpage. This process authenticates the server
to the human’s browser and the human’s browser to the server.
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4. The server sends the human the HPA that the human has stored with the
server (by completing a lookup of the human’s browser-specific certificate,
to know whose HPA to send), via the web browser which renders the HPA
for the user, and this authenticates the server to the human.
5. Having recognised the HPA, the human sends the server their traditional
login and password, thus authenticating the human to the server.
Investigation of the Gajek et al. protocol, model and proof reveals a number
of salient points. These points may be categorised into HCI issues and crypto-
graphic issues.
HCI Issues
For the points of interest that can be drawn from the Gajek et al. case, we will
assume the HPA is an image (though these comments apply equally to voice and
several other types of HPA). As stated in Section 2.2, one of the reasons protocols
proven to be secure fail, when subjected to use by a human, is due to the protocol
specification not extending far enough into the HCI implementation. Thus, HCI
designers, who are not security professionals, are making decisions that security
professionals should have made. Issues that could result from the Gajek et al.
protocol include:
1. Perhaps the most significant issue is requiring the designer to ensure that at
least the image is fully displayed (i.e. images have not been turned off in the
browser, and the image is fully downloaded) before the login and password
box is presented to the user. Otherwise, there is no authentication from
the server to the human, not even potentially any authentication from the
server to the human, and authentication from the server to the human is
the aim of the protocol. This goes beyond the rushing user concern, which
this protocol does not resist at all, since the human can enter their login
and password regardless of what image, or whether an image, is sent.
2. As soon as multiple people send images to a server, design decisions will
be made regarding what format to store them in, what size to store them
in, and what resolution to store them in. This will be done to ensure only
a fixed amount of storage is used, and that similar quality images are used.
The end result will be that some images (which were too small or too low
quality) may be rejected, and other images will lose significant detail.
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3. Since the decisions at the client end are also not specified, different de-
signers of website login forms will make different decisions about how to
display the images. These decisions include the shape of the image (at
least, portrait or landscape) and the size of the image area on the web-
page, which will all impact how many HPAs are human distinguishable
from the complete set of HPAs.
We have seen a variant of the Gajek et al. protocol implemented by a financial
institution. In this real world example, the user does not have a certificate, and
instead the user’s username is sent from the user to the bank, which the bank
uses to identify which HPA to send back to the user. Upon the receipt of the HPA
from the bank, the user sends their traditional login and password information
to the bank.
Exploring this real world example is worthwhile to determine the sorts of
design decisions that can be made by implementers of systems. Design decisions,
that the creators of this login ceremony have made, include:
1. The bank’s users are presented with a set of images to choose their HPA
from. That is, the bank has overcome the issues concerning the range of
image sizes, shapes, formats, resolutions etc., by providing the set of images
to choose from. Unfortunately, this set of images is quite small, less than
20, so the dictionary space |W | of this part of the HPA is quite small.
2. The implementers have added a pass-phrase which the users submit when
they select their image in the once-off setup stage. Both the image and the
passphrase (two parts to this HPA) are sent from the bank to the human
at each login.
3. The bank’s login proceeds without the image part of the HPA being down-
loaded. That is, even if the user turns off image downloads in their browser,
the login and password entry fields still appear and the user can still login
to the system.
4. This protocol is in no way rushing-user resistant. That is, the user can enter
their login and password without looking at the HPA at all, and hence the
protocol can be completed without the recognise task being executed.
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Cryptographic Issues
The main cryptographic issues that surround the Gajek et al. protocol are en-
twined in human issues. From a cryptographic point of view, both security of the
channel and authentication of the two parties is achieved by the use of HTTPS
and certificates at both ends (TLS in client authentication mode). The reason
HPAs are used, is due to the recognition that users do not check, know to check,
know how to check, certificates. There are three central observations:
1. Essentially the server’s password (user’s HPA) is being sent to the human
before the human has been authenticated. Most particularly, the separation
of the human from the human’s browser-computer combination, means that
while the browser has been authenticated to the server via the browser’s
certificate, anyone, especially someone other than the intended user, could
be sitting at the terminal. This would allow an adversary, sitting at the
user’s terminal, to acquire the HPA and later masquerade to the user as
the server.
2. Further, in the real world implementation, since the human’s browser has
no certificate, then the server is sending the HPA without authentication
at the client end, ensuring replay and MITM attacks are possible. A man-
in-the-middle (MITM) attack is an attack where a third party intercepts
messages between two communicating parties, typically without either in-
tended party detecting this, allowing the MITM attacker to listen in and
manipulate messages. The material presented in Chapter 6 can address
this need for one-off HPAs, and Chapter 7 allows for the formal analysis of
protocols to ascertain if the HPA being recognised by the human is fresh
(mitigating replay attacks).
4.4 Application to Future Protocol Design and
Security Proofs
We target two central improvements and considerations which should be included
in authentication protocols involving a human. They include:
1. Rushing user resistance.
2. A security proof at a level above the cryptographic level.
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4.4.1 Rushing User Resistance
Mutual authentication, for example where a bank authenticates itself to its ac-
count holder, as well as the account holder authenticating themselves to the
bank, is important. In most protocols where an entity is authenticated to a
human, there will be a step similar to the recognise function of the Gajek et
al. protocol proof [44]. In this step, the entity will show something (a HPA) to
the human, and the human is meant to examine this HPA and if it is correct
they proceed, and if the HPA is incorrect they should abort the protocol run.
Unfortunately, as we have shown, both in the research literature and in com-
mercial implementations, quite often there is no assurance that the human has
completed the recognise assessment - a human who skips such a step is called a
rushing user. The term rushing user is used by Kumar et al. to describe a user
who, in a rush, takes the shortest path through a protocol, skipping steps which
are not required for subsequent steps to work [68].
To increase the chances of humans completing the recognise step, rushing
user resistance should be included in the protocol. A construction that could be
added to most such protocols is to send the human user not just the real HPA
(HPA1), but also a false HPA (HPA2) in random order. Now, beyond sending
to the server their user name and password, the human must also select which
of the two HPAs was their HPA. If the human selects the wrong HPA, then
the server must abort the protocol even if the login and password the human
provides are correct.
There are a number of intricacies with this solution, especially when trying
to combine the cryptographic elements with the human elements:
 This solution does not enhance the cryptographic security of the protocol.
Rather, this step is only in place to ensure that the human follows the
protocol. This element is not captured in current computational-based
security proofs and models.
 Beyond not enhancing the cryptographic security, this action decreases the
cryptographic security in that the adversary now has twice as many chances
of sending the human a legitimate HPA (if only two HPAs are sent to the
human) since two HPAs are now sent to the human.
 Whether the human is completing the recognise step is being checked by
the server, in that if the wrong HPA is selected then the server should
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abort the protocol and force the human to start again. If the server is
the adversary, then the adversary will accept the username and password
regardless of which HPA the human chooses. So this training of the human
to follow the protocol correctly will only work while legitimate protocol runs
occur with the real server.
 The improvement to the human’s behaviour in following the protocol will
happen over time. This is another concept not captured in current security
proofs and models.
4.4.2 Security Proofs at a Level Above the Cryptographic
Level: POPS+
Modern cryptography has matured enough, and a necessity for provably secure
human-computer protocols has become critical, such that a timely paradigm
shift concerning the building blocks of secure protocols is required. Just as
Bellare and Rogaway defined POPS in 1993 [7,8] (see Section 2.2), thus shifting
the focus to protocols and primitives in use at the time [5], we propose that
there is now a requirement for a further paradigm shift, to move to a higher
level of abstraction [94]. That is, to treat building blocks for human interaction
protocols, such as HTTPS, as primitives, and to create security proofs based on
that in the interests of creating protocols better suited to humans. In this way,
we propose POPS+. The technique remains the same, as does the quality of
the proof. That is, if you believe that HTTPS is secure, and a reduction can be
made from the security of HTTPS to the security of a protocol, then, as long
as there remains no program that can break HTTPS, the protocol will remain
secure. This approach to work at a higher level and treat HTTPS as a building
block has been recently formalised in the work of [62], in which they define a
version of the HTTPS channel to have authenticated and confidential channel
establishment (ACCE) properties. We build on this ACCE work when defining
human perceptible freshness in Chapter 7.
Using the concept of POPS+, a security ceremony is, at the level that most se-
curity professionals consider security, simply a protocol which includes a human.
In the same way that practice oriented provable security (POPS) of block ciphers
is not proven by examining a protocol including a block cipher, the POPS+ se-
curity of a higher level cryptographic building block such as HTTPS should not
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be proven by examining a protocol which includes HTTPS. The proof of HTTPS
is completed elsewhere, and, once proven secure, the super-protocol which uses
HTTPS is proven secure under the assumption that HTTPS is secure. In this
way we have moved beyond ceremonies being protocols in their context of use to
being protocols which include lower level protocols.
To allow this analysis of suitability of a protocol for human use to happen,
ideal instances of the cryptographic building blocks can be used. For example,
an ideal secure channel providing confidentiality, integrity, and authentication
for the participant with the private key, where the other participant is known to
check the certificate, would be used for a HTTPS secured channel. Cryptogra-
phers would argue that if the communication channel is secure then the proof of
security of a human protocol using HTTPS becomes trivial. However, a secure
channel is no guarantee that the correct information is being passed to and from
the human, which is the focus of the POPS+ level of analysis. By assuming that
cryptographic building blocks, such as the channel, are secure, greater attention
can be focused on the protocol flows that interact with the human allowing for
quicker and easier ceremony design and analysis.
4.5 Summary
We have shown that security flaws in complex systems of protocols, with human
interaction, can be analysed using security ceremonies. The analysis of the EMV
smart card ceremony and the Opera Mini ceremony, followed by the analysis of
the TLS protocol which had been proven secure for human use, shows that a
ceremony analysis is capable of capturing a greater range of security flaws than
protocol analysis alone.
In the process of analysing these ceremonies, we have constructed an approach
for analysing further security ceremonies. We also highlight the role that the
designer plays in ensuring that the ceremony is secure. This role necessitates a
grounding in security considerations, and similarly that creators of protocols are
aware of typical design considerations at the human-computer interface.
This chapter has presented significant movement in what the definition of
a security ceremony is. Previously, security ceremony analysis may have been
considered by some to be a more complete version of protocol analysis which ex-
plicitly includes human interaction, setup steps and OOB communication, thus
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proving a ceremony secure is proving the protocol secure. Such an understanding,
while true, does not capture the significance or complexity of ceremony analysis.
We have presented research which shows that each ceremony is a protocol in its
context of use. This warns against the presumption that a protocol shown secure
in one ceremony will mean that the same protocol is secure in another ceremony.
The development of a list of use cases for the protocol becomes critical. Finally,
we went a step further, treating the underlying protocol as a cryptographic prim-
itive or building block, and considering the ceremony as a protocol which uses
that building block protocol, such as TLS.
We have highlighted that cryptographic building blocks, such as TLS, have
become mature to the point where a further level of abstraction is possible from
the level that was applied when practice-oriented provable security (POPS) was
promoted by Bellare and Rogaway 20 years ago. This allows, for the security
proof of security ceremonies that include humans, to abstract away the crypto-
graphic building blocks and extend the security proofs into the human-computer
interface. We have called this paradigm shift POPS+. The philosophy remains
the same, and that is, a reductionist proof such that the way to break the pro-
tocol is to break the cryptographic building block, and as long as the building
block remains secure, the protocol remains secure. We employ this approach in
the construction of a secure channel which provides human-freshness assurances,
outlined in Chapter 7.
Chapter 5
Formalising Human Recognition
In Chapter 3 we described the human trials we conducted to learn what hu-
man participants in protocols do. If we are to create security proofs for protocols
involving humans, we need to formalise as much of the human behaviour as possi-
ble. In Chapter 4, by investigating from an all-encompassing security ceremonies
perspective protocols which involve humans and which are known to be broken,
we learnt which parts of the human behaviour to focus on with this research. In
this chapter we focus on formalising the human’s ability to recognise, which is a
critical component in seemingly any protocol involving human authentication.
5.1 Introduction
As described in Section 2.2.1, practice oriented provable security, for authenti-
cation protocols, was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway in 1993 [7]. Since this
time, many authentication protocols have been proven secure in theory, only to
fail to meet this level of security when used in practice by a human. Increas-
ingly there has been a realisation that to create secure protocols which involve
humans, human capabilities need to be an explicit consideration of the security
model, as exemplified by Shostack and Stewart’s statements, “. . . our approach
to information security is flawed” and “the way forward cannot be found solely
in mathematics or technology” [111].
We focus on authentication protocols involving a human, in which the human
is expected to authenticate the party they are communicating with. This may be
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either mutual authentication or one-way authentication. For such protocols, the
human is expected to recognise an authenticator, or perform some task which
accepts some security information as input and outputs either accept or reject.
In this way we build on the recognise function introduced by Gajek et al. [44,45]
in their work on authentication to a human in a protocol using TLS. We focus
specifically on the recognise functionality a human must perform, and create a
formalisation which may be reused in all such protocols.
A formal construction of the human’s recognise capabilities can be used in a
variety of types of protocols. As already mentioned, there are uses such as the
Gajek et al. protocol, which is similar to protocols that have been implemented
by numerous financial institutions. Similarly, the construction allows for formal
analysis of implementations of the widely used Verified by Visa protocol, in which
a message that the human entered on first use of the system is sent back to the
human to authenticate Visa to the human in all future executions of the protocol.
Less obvious real world protocols, which our construction may allow for for-
mal analysis of, are authentication protocols over a telephone between two hu-
mans. A common example is where an investor calls her stockbroker using the
telephone, says a password to the stockbroker, and the stockbroker ensures that
the password said by the investor matches the password stored for that investor.
Even login messages meant to allow users to compare the last time the sys-
tem recorded their login credentials were used, against the last time the human
remembers logging in, could be analysed for their security properties.
The formalisation captures the distinction between a targeted attack, where
adversary knows the identity of the victim and may conduct research and spe-
cific social engineering attacks against that person, and a trawling or general
attack [12], where the adversary has no direct knowledge of who the victim is,
and therefore must rely on population-wide trends. Schechter et al. highlighted
the significance of targeted attacks, when they researched the security of using
personal questions as an authentication mechanism to reset passwords [107]. At
one level, geographic homogeneity was a factor in allowing the successful guessing
of participant answers 13% of the time within five attempts. As the attack be-
came more targeted, success rates increased, with non-trusted and semi-trusted
acquaintances being able to guess correctly 17% of the time, and trusted ac-
quaintances being able to guess correctly 28% of the time [107]. This means that
the severity and likelihood of success of an attack varies greatly, depending on
5.2. Security Model for Human-Based Recognition 65
whether the attack is a targeted attack or a trawling attack.
We will show a range of uses for our formalization, with two examples of
adaptations of security proofs. We will show how our approach may be applied
in the case of a web-based mutual authentication protocol (see Section 5.3), and
in the case of human-assisted pairing of two bluetooth devices (see Section 5.4.1).
The former will cover the case of human-selected authenticators, while the latter
will provide an example of device-selected authenticators. In both cases the
central human recognise step remains critical and constant.
5.2 Security Model for Human-Based Recogni-
tion
The security model describes the human’s role in recognising information sent
to the human, which is a typical process in a protocol where the human authen-
ticates a second party. The model formally describes how an attacker interacts
with the human, and what capabilities and constraints the attacker has.
5.2.1 Formalisation
We begin by describing the situation where a human generates a HPA which
they memorize. As described in Section 2.2.2, a HPA is a human perceptible
authenticator. Subsequently, some information, HPA′, is generated by another
party and is sent to the human, and the human assesses the HPA′ by comparing
the received HPA′ to the HPA they have stored in memory. A concrete illustrative
example may be the case where the human selected HPA and the HPA′ generated
by the other party are images and the human checks to see if the two images
HPA and HPA′ are equal.
A central ideal we have incorporated is that this behaviour will be different
from human to human. That is, HPAs that a human generates will be human
specific. We shall call HPAs that are specific to a human HPAH . While in one
context an example use of the HPA is that the human shares the HPA with an
entity, so that the entity can use the HPA to authenticate to the human, this
may not be the case all of the time as HPAs could be generated by the entity
and given to a human in a setup stage. Therefore we focus exclusively on the
recognise step common to most device-to-human authentication protocols. That
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is, a HPA′ is received by the human, the human compares the HPA′ with their
HPA, and either accepts or rejects that HPA′ is the same as HPA.
HPA Scheme
We defined HPASpace to be the space of HPAs. To use the traditional example of
alphanumeric passwords, for a specific protocol this space may be bounded by the
94 character possibilities, consisting of 26 lowercase, 26 upper case, 10 numerals
and 32 special printable characters, and the number of characters accepted for
the password. For example, for eight characters, this is 948 possibilities.
The value of HPAH is the output of a probabilistic algorithm GenHPA which
is specific to each human, and hence accepts as inputs the human H and the
HPASpace of the protocol being analysed,
HPAH ← GenHPA(H,HPASpace).
To return to the example of an alphanumeric password, it is widely known
that while the possibility of selecting a randomly selected eight character pass-
word may be 94−8, or approximately 53 bits of security, non-random human
selection typically brings this figure closer to 30 bits of security for humans in
general [19]. However, for a specific human, the set of alphanumeric passwords
generated may be far smaller [19], and hence the output HPAH will be part of
the human’s specific HPASpace i.e.
HPASpaceH = {HPAH |HPAH ← GenHPA(H,HPASpace)}.
Notice that HPAH ∈ HPASpaceH ⊆ HPASpace.
The function Recognise is defined to model the human’s ability to take two
inputs, HPA and HPA′, one potentially in memory and the other being presented
to the human, and compare the two inputs. If, in the human’s opinion, there is a
match between HPA and HPA′ then Recognise outputs a one, otherwise Recognise
outputs a zero. This models the human’s assessment of “The two values are the
same.” Therefore, the Recognise algorithm depends on the human:
0/1← Recognise(H,HPA,HPA′)
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Of course, no human performs the recognise function perfectly. There will
be both false positives and false negatives from the Recognise function. False
positives occur when the human assesses there is a match between HPA and
HPA′ and yet the two values are different. False positives are seen as being
a result of human’s inability to distinguish between two objects, if they are
similar enough though not identical, and are discussed in detail below. False
negatives result when HPA = HPA′ and yet the human assesses there is no
match, and the recognise function outputs a 0. False negatives, for example
the human being presented with two identical pictures and yet assessing them
as different, are seen as an error condition, modelled by an error probability .
False negatives are in agreement with Hopper and Blum’s (α, β, t) method of
describing human protocols, where value β is the probability of the human not
successfully executing the protocol [59].
Human Indistinguishability
We denote the set of different HPA′s which the user recognises as being indis-
tinguishable from their chosen HPA as being the set WH,HPA. This is the set of
the actual HPA and false positives. Note that a HPA′ that is recognised by a
human as being indistinguishable from their HPA may come from their human
specific HPASpaceH or from the general HPASpace. For the sake of analysis of a
specific protocol, we explicitly exclude any other object in existence which is not
from HPASpace. That is, if the HPASpace of a system is defined as a four digit
personal identification number, then a five digit personal identification number
would not be a valid HPA. This commonly accepted constraint is a limitation
of our approach, since there may be objects from outside HPASpace which the
human will accept as being their HPA.
To aid in the understanding of how the set of false positives WH,HPA inter-
acts with HPASpace and HPASpaceH , the relationship is depicted in Figure 5.1.
These false positives form a set of HPAs, specific to a human, which are similar
enough (or human indistinguishable) that the Recognise function will output a
1 for a given HPA:
WH,HPA = W
′
H,HPA ∪W
′′
H,HPA
where W
′
H,HPA is the set of HPAs from HPASpaceH and W
′′
H,HPA is the set of
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Figure 5.1: How WH,HPA relates to HPASpace and HPASpaceH .
HPAs from HPASpace which are not in HPASpaceH . Formally:
W
′
H,HPA = {HPA′ ∈ HPASpaceH |Recognise(H,HPAH ,HPA′) = 1
with HPAH ← GenHPA(H,HPASpace)}
and
W
′′
H,HPA = {HPA′ ∈ {HPASpace\HPASpaceH}|Recognise(H,HPAH ,HPA′) = 1
with HPAH ← GenHPA(H,HPASpace)}.
The relationship between W
′
H,HPA and W
′′
H,HPA and HPASpace is shown in Fig-
ure 5.2.
Security and Usability
An interesting distinction between false positives and false negatives is made
when considering security and usability. False positives result in a less secure
system. That is, the adversary can now produce not just the exact HPA, but
any of potentially many HPA′ (i.e. |WH,HPA|) which the human will accept as
indistinguishable from HPA.
In contrast, false negatives do not impact security. If a human is presented
with HPA′ which equals HPA and yet still does not assess that this is a match,
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Figure 5.2: How W
′
H,HPA and W
′′
H,HPA relates to HPASpace and HPASpaceH .
then the protocol will be aborted and hence the system will remain secure. How-
ever, false negatives do impact usability in that if the protocol does not success-
fully proceed when HPA′ = HPA, then the human will not be able to use the
system, or at the very least the human will need to execute the protocol one
time more than they needed to. This is similar to the well known trade-off in
biometrics.
Probabilistic versus Deterministic
In our formalism, WH,HPA represents the set of HPA
′s which the user recognises
(mistakenly, except in the case where HPA′ = HPA) as being indistinguishable
from their chosen HPA. We have captured that this will vary from human to
human. We also, in Definition 5.2.2, capture that sometimes the real HPA will
not be recognised as being the real HPA by the human. Finally, we capture that
the set of HPAs that a specific human may pick will be different from human to
human, in our definition of GenHPA.
However, while this variability is captured and gives useful results, the set
WH,HPA is constant and deterministic for a human in our model, whereas in
reality such a set may vary over time particularly with context. Further, the set
HPASpaceH is constant in our model, and again this set may vary with context.
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5.2.2 Security Definition for Human Recognition
In our model, we define security in terms of the adversary A’s ability to obtain a
HPA value which will cause the human to output a 1 from the Recognise function.
The security game proceeds as follows. A HPA is generated for a specific
human H using the GenHPA algorithm. This models a human selecting their
HPA.
HPAH ← GenHPA(H,HPASpace) (5.1)
The adversary A knows HPASpace and gets oracle access to Recognise(H,
HPAH , ·) and GenHPA(·,HPASpace).
HPA′ ← ARecognise(H,HPAH ,·),GenHPA(·,HPASpace)
Access to the GenHPA oracle models A’s ability to gain information about
expected HPAs from humans, including the target human. That is, we have
not limited A to only using the GenHPA oracle on the target human. This
allowsA to use the GenHPA oracle to effectively construct HPASpaceH , including
frequency distribution, for both the target H and other humans. We call this
constructed HPASpaceH , “HPASpace
′
H”. This is now a targeted attack, which
is more damaging than a general attack. Access to the Recognise oracle allows
A to test A’s selected HPA′ to see if the selected HPA′ is accepted.
Recognise(H,HPAH ,HPA
′) = 1.
Upper Bound on A’s Probability of Success
The adversary can either work from HPASpace or generate a HPASpace ′H for
the human using the GenHPA oracle. As shown in (5.1), HPASpaceH contains
at most qgen elements, where qgen corresponds to the number of GenHPA(H,
HPASpace) queries.
If the adversary selects from HPASpace then the attack is described as a
general attack, whereas if the adversary selects from HPASpaceH then the attack
is described as a targeted attack.
Targeted Attack A selects an authenticator HPA from HPASpaceH , creat-
ing a targeted attack. In this case,
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SuccA Human = Pr[A wins] ≤
max
HPA∗←GenHPA(H,HPASpace)
q′|W ′H,HPA∗|
|HPASpaceH |
· Pr[HPA∗] (5.2)
where q′ is the number of queries to the Recognise oracle to test a HPA generated
using queries to the GenHPA oracle, and Pr[HPA∗] is the probability of HPA∗
being generated by GenHPA. This is the case of the targeted attack against a
human, byA somehow having knowledge of HPA choices for that human (perhaps
by knowing HPAs used by that human on other systems).
Prior work by Gajek et al. [44] considered only non-human-specific indistin-
guishability, and from the entire HPASpace (|WHPA|). In addition to adapting
this to the human-specific targeted attack setting, the upper bound on A’s prob-
ability of success must take into account the likelihood that a HPA is generated
by GenHPA(H,HPASpace).
Intuitively, a HPA∗ with a large |WH,HPA∗ | is unlikely to be the upper bound
on A’s success probability if the likelihood that HPA∗ is picked as the authen-
ticator is minute. This introduces the concept of the frequency of use of HPA∗.
Therefore, for the targeted attack, informally the maximum of the frequency of
use Pr[HPA∗] combined with the size of set WH,HPA∗ is the upper bound on A’s
success.
Trawling Attack A picks an authenticator from the general HPASpace. In
this case,
SuccA Human = Pr[Awins] ≤ max
HPA∗←HPASpace
q′′|WH,HPA∗|
|HPASpace| (5.3)
where q′′ is the number of queries to the Recognise oracle with corresponding
no prior query to the GenHPA oracle. This is the case of the general trawling
attack, with no prior knowledge regarding the human’s choices, such that the
adversary has to select from the entire HPASpace.
Usually we can expect that the targeted attack is more likely to be successful
than the trawling attack, but there could be exceptional cases in which this
is not true. Therefore, in general the probability from Equation (5.2) may be a
more exact upper bound on the adversary’s success probability. However without
access to GenHPA the upper bound remains as in Equation (5.3). We can now
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define what it means for our schemes to be secure and correct.
Definition 5.2.1 (δ-security). We say a HPA scheme is δ-secure, meaning that
the scheme can be used as an authentication scheme for an entity to a human, if
SuccA ≤ δ.
Definition 5.2.2 (-correctness). We say a HPA scheme is -correct if, for all
HPAH in HPASpace, where HPAH ← GenHPA(H,HPASpace),
Pr[Recognise(H,HPAH ,HPAH) = 1] ≥ 1− 
where  represents the false negative rate of correctness. For correctness, we are
not concerned about false positives, which is covered by WH,HPA.
5.2.3 Analysis and Discussion
The HPASpace will be system specific. Using a classic human authenticating
scenario which may be adapted to create mutual authentication, a system for
banking Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) may have a HPASpace limited
to four numerical digits, while other systems may have graphical or alphanu-
meric HPASpaces. The effect of GenHPA taking as an input HPASpace is that
comparison between security results for different systems can be made.
Giving the adversary A oracle access to the human specific GenHPA, allows
the modelling of the effect of HPA reuse and of the preferences of the user. If the
size of HPASpaceH , the output of GenHPA, is less than the size of HPASpace,
then the adversary receives an advantage. There may be instances where A does
not get this capability, depending on whether the attack is a targeted or trawling
attack. A targeted attack is by far the stronger and more damaging attack, as in
the real world this would model the case where an adversary has knowledge of a
human’s HPA choices. This knowledge may exist because the adversary may be
a legitimate server where the human logs in elsewhere, and thus the adversary
has seen many prior examples of the human’s HPA choices.
In general, ensuring that GenHPA and Recognise are human specific func-
tions, allows for modelling of targeted attacks at a specific human. Giving A
oracle access Recognise(H,HPAH , ·) to the human specific Recognise function
means that an adversary with infinite resources could create the set WH,HPA for
a given HPA.
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5.3 Human-Specific HPAGen
In this section we will describe the case where a human chooses the HPA. In the
next section, we will cover the alternative case where a device selects the HPA
for the human.
Our formalisation, as defined allowing for targeted attacks, is ideal for use in
existing device-to-human (D2H) authentication scenarios, such as the protocol
by Gajek et al. [44], or protocols involving authentication by humans in general.
5.3.1 Gajek et al. Browser Based Mutual Authentication
over TLS
As discussed in Section 2.2.2, Gajek et al. have created a mutual authentication
protocol including a human and a HPA. A sketch of the Gajek et al. protocol,
including a description of where the HPA is used and how the human recognise
function is applied, follows [44,45]:
1. The protocol is between a server, a human’s computer running a web
browser (which has state), and the human.
2. Before the protocol begins, the human has selected a HPA and provided
that HPA to the server. The HPAs suggested by Gajek et al. are a person-
ally selected image or voice recording.
3. Both the server and the human’s computer have authentication certificates
and associated private keys, and a secure TLS connection is established
between the browser and the server, when the browser on the human’s
computer opens the server’s webpage. This process authenticates the server
to the human’s browser and the human’s browser to the server.
4. The server sends the human the HPA that the human has stored with the
server (by completing a lookup of the human’s browser-specific certificate,
to know whose HPA to send), via the web browser which renders the HPA
for the user. This step authenticates the server to the human if the human
recognises the HPA.
5. Having recognised the HPA, the human sends the server their traditional
login and password. This step authenticates the human to the server.
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Our formalisation makes proof of such a protocol more complete by replacing
game 20 of their proof [45]. The sketch of their proof is that SSL is proven in
games 0 to 19, and in game 20 the ability of the adversary to guess a HPA that
the human will recognise is considered. Further, the analysis presented [45] could
be simplified since the initialisation stage can now be explicitly comprehended
as running the GenHPA algorithm, and the process of recognition realised as an
invocation of the Recognise function. Including the concepts of Gajek et al.’s
specific proof, the result of this game would become:
|Pr[Win20]− Pr[Win19]| ≤ SuccA Human
where SuccA Human is defined by either Equation 5.2 or Equation 5.3. This is
in contrast to the corresponding equation in the original proof [45], using our
notation:
|Pr[Win20]− Pr[Win19]| ≤ q|W ||HPASpace|
where q is the number of executions of the protocol.
The above demonstrates how our formalism can be used in a certificate or
SSH-based key exchange protocol. Our proof goes beyond the Gajek et al. proof
in the following areas:
1. In the Gajek et al. proof, A selects from all of HPASpace, roughly equivalent
to our trawling attack, whereas our proof allows for a targeted attack where
A selects from the human-specific HPASpaceH .
2. Our model covers the concept of frequency of use of a HPA, not just the
size of |W |.
Furthermore, the technique used here can be applied to any authentication pro-
tocol, password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol or key agreement
protocol which requires the human to authenticate a message in the protocol.
While these examples are network based, there are examples of use involving
just the human and a device, such as a trusted computing scenario where a
computer’s trusted platform module (TPM) could be used to securely assess the
computer and securely present a HPA to the user.
An example trusted computer scenario may involve a login procedure where
a picture is constructed by the trusted module for the human. That is, the
TPM creates a list of hashes from different stages of a computer’s boot sequence,
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and these hashs are graphically presented to the user in some way. Thus, the
computer’s TPM could be used to securely assess the computer and securely
present a HPA to the user where the HPA’s construction (rendering by the TPM)
depends on the status of the computer. As long as nothing has changed on the
computer, then the same HPA will always be shown to the user to recognise each
time she logs in, otherwise a completely new HPA will be sent to the user (i.e. in
the same way that a one bit change will create a completely new HASH value).
So a possible concrete implementation may be a 64 pixel black and white picture,
8 pixels high by 8 pixels wide, so the size of HPASpace would be 264. GenHPA
would be generated by the trusted platform module to generate HPAs uniformly
over HPASpace. A typical WH,HPA may consist of any picture with a similar
number of white (or black) pixels as HPA. Since the HPAs are device controlled,
A’s advantage would be limited by Equation 5.3. Modelling the login procedure
in this way would allow adjustment of security parameters such as the number
of pixels and the number of colours in the image constructed by the TPM and
presented to the user when they login, to arrive at the desired security for the
login procedure.
5.3.2 Human-based Recognition with Non-human Con-
trolled Authenticators
This leads us to the many practical protocols in use where HPAs have been
chosen by devices or the system, rather than by the human. From a usability
perspective, a human may be able to better remember a HPA they have selected.
However, the essence of a D2H authentication protocol, where a human recognises
some information (HPA) sent by the device, is that the HPA has been previously
agreed on by the human and the device. Whether a human registers a HPA
at a bank, or whether the bank sends the human a HPA in a setup stage, is
irrelevant from the perspective of whether the protocol will function. In either
case, the HPA can be sent to the human by the bank in all future protocol runs
to authenticate the bank to the human.
Having the HPA chosen by the device means that HPASpaceH , the subset
of HPASpace which the HPA will be in, encompasses all of HPASpace. This is
because the device will choose the HPA from the entire HPASpace by a probabil-
ity distribution, presumably a random distribution. From a security perspective,
this maximises the space that the adversary has to select from to acquire a HPA′
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which the user will recognise as their HPA. Having the HPA chosen by something
other than the human, shifts the upper bound available to the adversary from a
more powerful targeted attack to a weaker trawling attack.
We now adapt our formalisation towards non-human specific HPA selection,
where non-targeted general trawling attacks apply. We focus on more general
cases, such as human-assisted pairing protocols.
5.4 Non-Human-Specific HPAGen
Humans are often called on to play a part in protocols for the authentication
of devices. For example, an authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocol em-
ploying short authenticated strings (SAS) may be used to manually pair wireless
devices by having the user check matching values on each device [86].
In such device pairing protocols, two HPAs are sent to a human, and if
the human recognises the two HPAs as matching and accepts, then the human
takes an action and the devices become paired. As always, the HPAs can be
any human perceptible authenticator, such as two series of sounds, two series of
flashing lights, or text or images displayed on a screen. We formalise this process
by setting the HPA variable to the output of a probabilistic algorithm GenHPA
which selects from the HPASpace of the protocol being analysed, i.e.
HPA← GenHPA(HPASpace)
Note the removal of the human from the GenHPA step, and hence the space
of the generated HPA is HPASpace not HPASpaceH as it has been in the human
generated HPA case. The Recognise function remains human specific, and the
adversary’s win condition remains:
Recognise(H,HPA,HPA′) = 1
Since HPASpaceH is now the size of HPASpace and hence the upper bound is
as for a general trawling attack, the bound on A’s probability of success for a
5.4. Non-Human-Specific HPAGen 77
device chosen HPA is
SuccA Device = Pr[A wins] ≤
max
HPA∗←GenHPA(HPASpace)
∣∣∣∣ q|WH,HPA∗||HPASpace| · Pr[HPA∗]
∣∣∣∣ .
5.4.1 Human-based Recognition with Two Devices
An example implementation, which could now be rigorously examined using our
formalisation, is pairing protocols for Bluetooth devices. When using human
assisted pairing of devices using Bluetooth, one method is for protocols based
on short authenticated strings (SAS). In these protocols, the SAS are somehow
represented on two devices for a human to compare, using for example audible
tones or flashing lights. Now these protocols involving a human can be examined
formally using our model.
Alice Bob
input: mA input: mB
Pick K ∈U {0, 1}κ
(c, d)← commit(mA, K)
mA,c−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Pick R ∈U {0, 1}ρ
mB ,R←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
d−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Kˆ ← open(mˆA, cˆ, dˆ)
Authentication Stage
SAS ← Rˆ⊕HK(mˆB) SAS ← R⊕HKˆ(mB)
authenticateAlice(SAS)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
authenticateBob(SAS)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
check SAS is the same; check Alice 6= Bob
output: Bob, mˆB output: Alice, mˆA
Figure 5.3: Pasini and Vaudenay’s SAS Protocol [86]
We will demonstrate how to incorporate our formalism by providing a security
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proof of Prasad and Saxena’s human-assisted Bluetooth pairing protocol [91]
which is based on Pasini and Vaudenay’s SAS protocol shown in Figure 5.3 [86].
Pasini and Vaudenay’s protocol is designed to allow for the authentication of a
potentially large message, by comparing two short strings. Note that by ensuring
the messages came from a specific party, i.e. authentication, this also ensures
integrity has been maintained. That is, if a third party changes the message, thus
breaking integrity, then the message no longer originates from the initial party
that sent the message. So the intention of the Pasini and Vaudenay protocol is
to have no confidentiality of the messages sent, but have assurances of integrity
and know who has sent the messages.
In Pasini and Vaudenay’s protocol, there is a critical final step over an au-
thenticating channel. Using Vaudenay’s definition of this channel from [119],
“The authentication channels provide to the recipient of a message the insur-
ance on whom sent it as is. In particular the adversary cannot modify it (i.e.
integrity is implicitly protected). . . . (the) channels are not assumed to provide
confidentiality.” The SAS protocol in Figure 5.3 employs a commitment scheme
(commit, open) and a keyed hash function. An overview of the protocol is:
1. Alice selects a string K of length κ at random.
2. Alice commits to the value K and their message mA. This commitment is
c. The commitment is such that Alice cannot later manipulate the value
of K having seen what value Bob later sends.
3. Alice sends c and mA to Bob.
4. Bob then picks R at random and sends R and their message mB to Alice.
5. Alice sends d, used to open the commitment scheme, to Bob.
6. Bob uses mA, c and d to create (or “open via the commitment scheme”)
K. The hats on the values (shown in Figure 5.3), that is, comparing c with
cˆ, indicates that the value has passed over an insecure channel. Thus the
value at Bob, cˆ, may no longer be the original c created by Alice.
7. Finally, both parties create a string, SAS, using a keyed hash function.
Both parties XOR (⊕) R with the output of a hash, keyed with K, of the
value mB.
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Informally, to give an intuitive understanding of the benefits of the protocol,
note that by both parties XORing R with the output of a hash of the value mB,
with the hash keyed with K, and by comparing the SAS values the two parties
create, if the SAS values are equal then the following values must have been the
same:
K Otherwise the hashes would output different values.
R Otherwise the result of the XOR would be different. Note the use of the com-
mitment scheme which generates K and the order of the protocol ensures
R is sent and known before the output of the hash can be computed.
mB Otherwise the hashes would output different values.
mA Otherwise the opening of the commitment at Bob would have resulted in a
different K at Bob, which would have meant the keyed hashes would have
output different values.
Thus, if the two SAS values are the same, then the messages mA and mB have
been successfully sent between the parties without being changed by a third
party.
Prasad and Saxena’s adapted protocol exchanges and authenticates public
keys by instantiating mA from Figure 5.3 as pkA, and, critically, the human makes
the authentication assessment thereby taking the role of Pasini and Vaudenay’s
authenticating channel. Thus, by comparing two short strings, the (far longer)
public keys are authenticated. Note that the protocol of Pasini and Vaudenay’s
is well suited for exchanging public keys, as the keys are public but there must
be assurances that the keys belong to the original senders, as is the goal of the
Pasini and Vaudenay protocol.
The authentication assessment is made possible by transforming the con-
structed SAS string into a series of audible tones (beeps) or flashing lights (blinks)
for the human to compare and, if the assessment is that the devices are the same,
to accept and pair the devices. We shall call this protocol the Beep-Blink proto-
col. The adapted authentication stage of the protocol [91] is shown in Figure 5.4.
Prasad and Saxena [91] state, “The security of our scheme is equivalent to
the security of the underlying SAS protocol under the assumption that the user
does not commit any errors.” This leaves open to what extent human errors
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Alice Human Bob
input: pkA input: pkB
Authentication Stage
SASA ← Rˆ⊕HK( ˆpkB) SASB ← R⊕HKˆ(pkB)
AuthenticatorA = AuthenticatorB =
Transform(SASA) Transform(SASB)
AuthenticatorA−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ AuthenticatorB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Comparison
Human checks Authenticators are the same; check Alice 6= Bob
output: Bob, ˆpkB output: Alice, ˆpkA
Figure 5.4: Prasad and Saxena’s human-assisted device pairing protocol based
on SAS protocol [91]
may impact the security of the protocol and how these can be dealt with in
the security analysis. We have shown that it is necessary to go beyond the
presumption of humans acting perfectly. Indeed, their human study [91] clearly
showed firstly that the humans did not act perfectly, and secondly that the level
of error depended on the type of HPA used.
An interesting philosophical point is that even 1s and 0s for voltage levels
in a circuit have already undertaken a transform to be human recognisable. So
the SASs of Pasini and Vaudenay could be considered HPAs, and the subsequent
lights by Prasad and Saxena are also, though different, HPAs from different
HPASpaces. In this way, the SAS-family of protocols, or the transformed SAS
into beeps and blinks, can be seen as GenHPA algorithms, the probability dis-
tribution of which may be very well known, which output a HPA in the form of
a visual or audible SAS.
Instead of the human being pre-loaded with a HPA and being sent a HPA′
as the two HPA inputs to the Recognise function, HPAA will be on device A,
and HPAB will be on device B. The formalisation for the human specific version
of Recognise, including the concept of WH,HPA as the set of HPAs which are
indistinguishable for that human, still apply. While the intention of the Prasad
and Saxena protocol would seem to be that the human either accepts on both
devices or rejects on both devices [91], there clearly exists the case where on one
device the human selects “Accept” and on the other device the human selects
“Reject”. As such, for device A, their (potentially transformed) SAS is held as
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HPA and the SAS supplied by device B will be HPA
′
; and similarly for device B.
The authentication stage of Prasad and Saxena’s protocol, using our formalism,
is shown in Figure 5.5. We now use our contribution to present a proof of the
Prasad and Saxena protocol, capturing some useful human considerations.
Alice Bob
HumanA DeviceA DeviceB HumanB
input: pkA input: pkB
Authentication Stage
HPAA ← HPAB ←
Rˆ⊕HK( ˆpkB) R⊕HKˆ(pkB)
HPAA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
HPAA←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
HPAB←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
HPAB−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Recognise Recognise
(HumanA,HPAA,HPAB) (HumanB,HPAB,HPAA)
Check 1 ←Recognise; check Alice 6= Bob
output: Bob, ˆpkB output: Alice, ˆpkA
Figure 5.5: Prasad and Saxena’s human-assisted device pairing protocol consid-
ered using our formalism
Prasad and Saxena’s protocol [91] may be seen as an instantiation of Pasini
and Vaudenay’s protocol [86], with the human in Prasad and Saxena’s protocol
playing the role of Pasini and Vaudenay’s magical authentication channel. The
protocol outlined in Figure 5.5 is a more concrete description of how the protocol
of Prasad and Saxena could be implemented. Beyond capturing the inability of
humans to perfectly execute a protocol, and hence that the security of Prasad
and Saxena’s instantiation is not at all equivalent to that of Pasini and Vaudenay,
our formalisation allows for capturing and analysis of a far more realistic set of
issues. For example, using the concrete protocol outlined in Figure 5.5, there
is no reason why there could not be two potentially spatially separated humans
doing the comparison (one for device A and one for device B) rather than one
human in the one location; and there is no reason why the protocol cannot end
with device A believing it is paired with device B, without device B believing it is
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paired with device A (and vice versa). This lack of equality between the pairing
status of the devices may be through either Recognise failing or else through time
delays in the human making a choice.
5.4.2 Proof of human-assisted device pairing protocol
A Bellare-Rogaway 1993 based model [7] was used to provide a security proof for
Pasini and Vaudenay’s SAS protocol [86], upon which Prasad and Saxena based
further human centred protocols [91]. However, in Prasad and Saxena’s work,
no formal security analysis could be given to the BEEP-BEEP, BLINK-BLINK
and BEEP-BLINK variations of the underlying SAS protocol. Rather, the claim
was made that the derived protocols had equivalent security to the underlying
SAS protocol [86] under the assumption that the human did not commit any
errors [91].
Now, with our formalisation, the security framework exists to formally analyse
such protocols.
Adversarial model
Recall the model for short authentication string-based pairing security, described
by Pasini and Vaudenay [86] based on Bellare and Rogaway’s model [7]. An
outline of Pasini and Vaudenay’s model is described here for completeness:
Launch (n, role, x) launches a new protocol instance on node n playing role (e.g.
either Alice or Bob) with input x. It returns a new instance tag piin.
Send (pi, y) sends an incoming message y to the instance pi. It returns an outgoing
message z, or the final output of the protocol if it completed.
Corrupt (n) injects a malicious code in node n so that its behaviour is no longer
guaranteed.
These queries are standard in cryptographic models. For example, the Send query
allows the adversary to run the protocol normally and to inject messages of his
choice, reflecting the assumption that the adversary controls communications
between protocol participants. The Launch oracle creates a unique tag piin, which
allows node n to have multiple protocol instances running. Corrupt allows the
adversary to effectively take over a node, meaning that any code the adversary
wishes could be injected at the corrupted node such that the node would do what
the adversary wants.
5.4. Non-Human-Specific HPAGen 83
In the model, the participants IDn are located at nodes in the network. In
Pasini and Vaudenay’s proof for their protocol [86] the winning condition for the
adversary in such a message cross authentication protocol is “if some instance
ended on an uncorrupted node with a pair (m, ID) but no instance on the node
of identity ID with input m was launched.” For a complete description of the
model, see [86].
Theorem 5.4.1 (Success probability of Beep-Blink protocol). Let ζ be A’s suc-
cess probability in the SAS protocol of Pasini and Vaudenay [86], thenA’s success
probability in the Beep-Blink protocol of Prasad and Saxena [91] is bounded by
ζ + SuccADevice .
Proof. We employ Shoup’s game hopping proof technique [112] augmented by
Dent [32]. We employ a sequence of two games, the first game being the security
game for the protocol shown in Figure 5.5 which is the human protocol of Prasad
and Saxena represented with our formalism. We transform this to the security
game for the original protocol of Pasini and Vaudenay shown in Figure 5.3 [86],
bounding the adversary’s advantage between the two. As such our proof aug-
ments the proof of Pasini and Vaudenay to cater for the human considerations
of the Prasad and Saxena protocol. We denote Wini as the probability of the
adversary winning game i.
Game G0 describes the real protocol, as run by Prasad and Saxena [91], using
our formalism (see Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.3). The game is played between a
probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) bound adversary A and a simulator. The
simulator simulates protocol participants as specified in the natural protocol
specification, and answers all of A’s queries.
Game G1 describes a game which is the same as Pasini and Vaudenay’s SAS
protocol [86]. The difference between Game G1 and Game G0 is that in Game G1,
the original SAS protocol, the authentication comparison is based on equality,
whereas in game Game G0 the authentication comparison is based on our human
formalism. Hence, remembering SuccADevice defined above,
|Pr[Win1]− Pr[Win0]| ≤ SuccADevice .
Therefore,
Pr[Win0] ≤ SuccADevice + ζ.
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Pasini and Vaudenay [86] describe a win condition of at most 2−ρ plus the
adversary’s advantage against the hash function, where ρ is the number of bits
of the SAS. They approximate ρ by log2
N2R2
2p
, where N is the number of partic-
ipants, R is the number of runs of the protocol, and p is the attack probability,
with the example given for ATM-like PIN numbers of p = 3 · 10−4. Our formal-
ism gives more meaningful values for p, taking into account human imperfection,
and allows for the comparison of representational transform techniques (such as
beeps and blinks). This means a more accurate security parameter of ρ could be
calculated.
In this way, a general framework may be created for all such unauthenticated
key exchange protocols followed by HPA recognition.
5.5 Summary
This work presents a method of accumulating data which will allow for the
comparison of schemes in which the human will need to recognise some data.
When represented formally using our technique, schemes can be compared using:
the size of HPASpace (maximise), HPASpaceH (maximise) and the ratio between
the two (bring to equality); the size of WH,HPA (false positives, minimise); the size
of  (false negatives, minimise); and the frequency of use distribution (normalise).
In Chapter 7 we will use the Recognise formalism presented in this chapter.
Chapter 6
CHURNs
In Section 2.4 we explained that in standard authentication protocols, an assur-
ance of freshness is looked for to mitigate the risk of replay attacks. This need
for freshness and the attack it prevents has been identified for a long time. The
protocol presented in Figure 2.1 was created in 1978. However, for protocols
involving humans, it has been the accepted norm to have no such assurance of
freshness, meaning that replay attacks are possible. Previously there has been
no technique to provide the equivalence of a nonce for human users, to provide
the human user with an assurance of freshness. We now present a tool to create
nonces for human use.
6.1 Introduction
A common attack on protocols, particularly authentication protocols, is the re-
play attack. In this attack, messages sent between participants in the protocol
are captured by the adversary and stored, to be re-sent at a later time to the
participants. Because the messages recorded are legitimate messages, even if the
messages are encrypted this replaying attack will work unless well-known coun-
termeasures are taken. The common countermeasures to prevent a replay attack
are the inclusion of a random nonce, which is a random number used only once,
a timestamp, or a counter.
The replay attack and its countermeasures are well known and understood,
such that commonly used security protocols between computers, such as HTTPS,
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use a random nonce. Nevertheless, such measures are not in place for protocols
involving a human at the human-perceivable level. Prior to this thesis, there
has not been the concept of a human-created random nonce. Indeed, the most
common human authentication protocols used on the Internet, such as to log
into webmail, banking institutions, or social media, involve the same messages
being sent every time. While underlying protocols may ensure that the messages
sent between computers are unique, rendering the replay attack ineffective, this
is neither visible to the human nor does the human play any part in the decision
making process. The lack of a direct role for the human to play in these protocols
represents a loss of control and loss of power to them and requires blind trust
that the protocol used protects their privacy and security. We have filled this
gap with the Computer-HUman Recognisable Nonce (CHURN).
As stated in Chapter 3, for users without a security background, mechanisms
such as extended validation certificates, HTTPS, and a padlock, that is, indica-
tors of security, are ineffective because the user asks “Who decides?” That is,
who decides whether the padlock symbol is shown? Many security researchers
have created methods in an attempt to address this issue. They write about
education, ensuring the human’s mental model is similar to the program, and
creating better security indicators [2, 78,92,96].
Discussing the advantages and disadvantages of education, mental models,
and enhanced security indicators is beyond the scope of this thesis; however,
a useful example to put the security researchers in the position of the non-
security-academic is published by Shin et al. [110]. They analysed 212 smart
phone applications, of particular interest being the top 30 apps in the finance
category. Their findings show that even in this finance category, not all of the
22 apps that had login pages supported the SSL protocol commonly used to
secure communication in a web browser setting. For smart phone apps, there
is no controlling program such as a web browser that decides whether or not to
display security indicators such as a padlock. While some of the analysed smart
phone apps did display a padlock, this is simply a person (the app designer)
deciding to put a picture of a padlock on their app, and was no guarantee of
security. This means that the security academic smart-phone users are in no
better position than smart-phone users in the general public. The question of
“Who decides?” for whether security indicators, such as the padlock symbol, are
displayed on smartphones has an answer which requires blind trust and a total
6.1. Introduction 87
loss of control. A CHURN is an important building block in creating protocols
where the security properties are perceptible.
The goal of our research is to empower the human by giving more control to
the human, while providing the human user with protection against replay at-
tacks using methods that have been used extensively for many years in computer
protocols. We do this via the creation of a random nonce that the human shares
control in the creation of, called a CHURN.
6.1.1 Example Use Case
An example of the use of a human nonce would be in the Verified-by-Visa pro-
tocol. In standard implementations of this protocol, a user would initially give
to Visa a personal message or passphrase. This message will be used by Visa to
authenticate Visa back to the human in all future protocol runs. Unfortunately,
this phrase is kept constant. As Dhamija and Tygar write, “The most obvious
weakness of this scheme is that the bank must display the shared secret in order
to authenticate itself to the user. If the secret is observed or captured, the image
can be replayed until the user notices and changes it [34].”
To make the Verified-by-Visa protocol resilient against such replay attacks,
our human nonce generator could be used to create a nonce for the user on each
protocol run. An example protocol may include, similar to the establishment of
the personal message in the existing protocol, the nonce the human has picked
being sent to Visa via an out-of-band channel such as via their bank’s website;
and then Visa could send this current nonce back to the human via their web
login which would both provide protection against replay attacks and implicitly
authenticate Visa to the human. In this way, the human would gain some control,
by both selecting the nonce and by seeing their nonce come back to them. The
human will be able to see and understand the security of the protocol. The
human would still log in via their password to authenticate.
6.1.2 CHURN Overview
Previous limitations regarding the process of humans picking their own nonce
revolve around the inability of humans to act randomly. We combine a computer
random number generator with human choices to create a random sequence that
the human has shared control over. We do this using the computer to pick
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characters in a random manner, and present sets of four choices to the human
for the human to pick from. The human selects one character from the set of four
characters and this will be the first character of their CHURN. Next, the human
is presented with another set of four characters, and makes another choice, and
this becomes the second character of their CHURN, and so on up to the size of
the CHURN.
A CHURN does not need to be remembered (as per a password), only com-
pared and recognised (as per a standard nonce). Thus, a CHURN can be random
while a password needs to be memorable and hence typically not random. We
employ various design features, such as moving the location of the choices pre-
sented to the human, to create an output which is fairly similar to a random
sequence. Our trial demonstrated that the tool we have developed is a method
for humans to generate a random sequence to a desired security level, and demon-
strates that the humans are adding a source of randomness beyond that of the
computer’s random number generator.
6.2 Background
A number of ingredients are considered when designing a CHURN generator. In
Section 2.4 we described nonces and the need to use them to mitigate replay
attacks. We now discuss, from a human point of view, issues of control and the
ability to be random. Finally we will examine the data analysis methods that
present information about the degree of randomness a specific set of information
has.
6.2.1 Power, Control and Trust
In the world of design, questions of power and control are significant and a central
consideration and focus. As Bratteteig and Wagner state, “All decisions are a
choice between possibilities, and selecting one of them and making it concrete as
a change in an artefact, is a demonstration of the capacity to transform, which
is a key aspect of power [15].”
Currently, very little control or power is given to the users in security proto-
cols. For many users blind trust is required that their information is secure and
that they are communicating with the party they think they are communicat-
ing with. This lack of power and lack of control continues beyond the simplest
6.2. Background 89
login systems to more secure two factor security systems that employ security
code generation tokens such as RSA’s SecurID. In the case of SecurID, the user
presses a button which causes the token to display a “random” number that can
be thought of as a one-time password that can be traced to a specific token since
each token will have a different seed value used in the random number generator.
The immediate user and the company employing the RSA solution must trust
that the seed has not been compromised.
As designers of security systems which humans will use, we can choose to
empower the users of our system. Of course, there are the usual concerns such
as:
 users will make errors of omission [64];
 “user behaviour tends towards the easiest path” [22];
 ask a user to “write down 100 random decimal digits, chances are very slim
that he will give a satisfactory result” [65];
 and “computations involved are far beyond the abilities of most humans” [59].
A critical benefit of making the user an empowered part of the security process
is that they may trust the process more [30]. Lee et al. have shown us that
specifically in the context of web-based e-commerce customers who feel higher
levels of trust will revisit the site more often [71].
6.2.2 Randomness, Uncertainty and Test Methods
A seemingly fundamental part of a random nonce that allows it to be used as an
indication of freshness is that the nonce is random. Perhaps more particularly,
the value of the next nonce must be unpredictable, and hence uncertain. Our
objective is to create a method where humans can have a decision making role,
ideally leading to a feeling of ownership and empowerment, in the creation of an
unpredictable sequence. We have called that unpredictable sequence a CHURN,
which is to be used to provide freshness assurances in protocols involving a
human.
Many standard statistical measures that indicate randomness are inappropri-
ate for assessing the results of our experiments [29, 101]. The reasons are varied
as to why the standard statistical tests are not useful in our case, but mainly
90 Chapter 6. CHURNs
center around the need for many data samples and for the samples to be large,
particularly given an alphabet size of 94. In our case we need more of an in-
dication of how random the sequence is, rather than a true/false assessment of
whether the sequence is uniformly random.
For the purposes of assessing how random the sequences generated by our
experiments were, we have settled on four main tests:
1. Histogram;
2. Entropy;
3. Compressibility; and
4. Hamming Distance.
Each method will now be discussed further.
Histogram
A histogram, or simple count of the frequencies of each character, was used for
each participant for each of the different experiments. Indications of randomness
are firstly the smoothness of the histogram, with a smoother histogram indicat-
ing greater randomness. Secondly, the portion of the alphabet used is also an
indication of randomness, meaning that a participant who uses 95% or more of
the alphabet is seen to be more random with regard to the entire alphabet than
a participant who uses 40% of the alphabet.
While providing valuable insight into the randomness and uncertainty of the
created sequences, this test is limited in that a participant who sequentially
cycled through the entire alphabet would be shown to be perfectly random, at
least in the single character frequency setting. That is, the histogram would be
ideally smooth with all characters being used the same number of times. For
the purposes of our experiments, which will be described in detail in Section 6.4,
we conducted histogram analysis for single characters, bigrams, trigrams, and
n-grams up to 8 characters in a row which exhausted all matches. Repeating
some bigrams is expected given an alphabet of 94 and a sample size of 400, while
repeating four characters in a row is unexpected if the values are random.
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Entropy
In 1948 Shannon gave us the concept of the entropy in the information theory
discrete setting, based on Boltzman’s H theorem entropy equation [109]. Entropy
is a measure of uncertainty, and increases as uncertainty is increased. Shannon’s
entropy H equation is:
H = −
n∑
i=1
pi log2 pi
Where n is the number of elements in a set, and pi is the probability of that
element appearing. For a given n, H is maximized when all pi are equal, meaning
that all pi = 1/n. At this point, H will equal log2 n. So for a 94 character
alphabet, Hmax will be 6.55459. As Shannon writes, “This is also intuitively the
most uncertain situation [109],” so higher entropy values will indicate greater
uncertainty.
Shannon’s entropy gives a useful measure of uncertainty when our data is
analysed in the single character setting. Because each sample is 400 characters
and the alphabet size is 94, there is at least a chance that all elements of the
alphabet may be used and entropy may be maximized. As soon as bigrams are
examined, the alphabet becomes 942, which is 8836. This means that our samples
cannot achieve a maximum value for two-character and higher entropy, simply
because every n-character element in the n-character set cannot be present in
our samples of 400 characters. While entropy gives a useful single comparative
value for both the number of symbols used and their relative frequencies, as per
the histogram test with the sample sizes we have it is susceptible to patterns
that guarantee the entire alphabet is used but which are in no way random.
For example, if our sample was an exact multiple of the size of our alphabet,
then maximum entropy could be achieved by repeatedly typing out the enter
alphabet in sequence. All values would be equally likely and would have been
used exactly the same number of times each. Use of such non-random, though
entropy maximising, patterns may be detected when higher order entropy values
were compared.
Compressibility
In general, compression algorithms work by removing statistical redundancy
in the data to be compressed. As Ziv and Lempel write, “Once the relevant
source parameters have been identified, the problem reduces to one of minimum-
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redundancy coding [127].” A data file which is more compressible is more pre-
dictable and less uncertain, which indicates that the source of the data was less
random. Since various compression algorithms look for patterns and repeated
sequences, this mitigates the use of non-random patterns not being detected by
histogram and entropy analysis.
To give insight into how compression tools work, an example compression
tool may be thought of as having three parts: a model structure for contexts
and events, a statistics unit for estimation of the event statistics, and an encoder
for the events [70]. This is sometimes summarized to a model and an encoder.
Improvements to the model lead to better compression effectiveness, while im-
provements to the encoder tend to lead to better compression efficiency [80].
We picked three compression tools to illustrate the uncertainty of the output
from our trials. Firstly, an arithmetic encoder by Moffat, Neal and Witten [80]
was used. Arithmetic encoders have history that started with Shannon, and
ideally approximate entropy [70]. This means that if the single character entropy
of a file was 5.8 of a maximum 6.5, then the file may compress down to 89.2%
of its original size, if the model used was a single character model. We used a
single character model.
Our second compression tool was gzip. Gzip is a widely used and accepted
compression tool. Gzip employs a variation of the LZ77 algorithm [127] which
replaces second occurrences of duplicated strings with a pointer to the first string
to create the set of literals and match lengths. Our third compression tool was
bzip2, a compression tool that uses the Burrows-Wheeler transform as opposed
to the LZ77 algorithm of gzip.
Hamming Distance
Hamming described the distance between two code points D(x, y) as being the
number of coordinates for which x and y are different [52]. This distance is
referred to as the Hamming Distance. As an example, the distance between any
two of the following code points on a three dimensional cube is 2 (that is, two
changes are required to move from any 3 digit code to another) [52]:
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
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The Hamming Distance is used to measure the number of differences between
two sequences of equal length. So if two 20 character sequences are compared,
the greatest Hamming Distance possible is 20 (meaning the two sequences of
characters have no common characters in the same position in both sequences)
and the minimum Hamming Distance is 0 (meaning the two sequences are exactly
equal to each other and hence there are no differences).
6.3 Developed Program
Based on our prior human trials and the knowledge we have gained from others’
research, there were a number of critical design decisions made in the develop-
ment of our prototype CHURN-creation program. These include symbols and
alphabet used, displaying choices, random choice locations, and constraining the
user, which we will now discuss further.
6.3.1 Symbol Alphabets Used
The size of an alphabet is one of the adjustable security level variables available
with a CHURN. As a random sequence used only once, the symbols must simply
be able to be recognized by users. As such, playing cards and Mahjong tiles are
just two possibilities to use as alphabets for the human user to draw from, and
alphabets may be adjusted for specific cultures or organizations. The alphabet
size is critical, because if there are twenty symbols in the CHURN then before
any further processing or considerations (discussed further below) there are α20
combinations possible where α is the size of the alphabet.
Because we wanted to have a baseline to compare the output of our CHURN-
generator with, we used the keys available on a standard keyboard. There were
other analysis advantages, since each character used was a single byte. So we used
all digits, upper- and lower-case letters and special characters from a standard
American keyboard. That is, the alphabets we used were:
0123456789
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
~!@#$%^&*()_+-={}|[]\:";’<>?,./‘
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As such, there were ten digits, twenty-six lower case alphabetic characters,
twenty-six upper case alphabetic characters, and thirty-two special characters,
giving a total alphabet size of 94 characters. It should be clear that sub-alphabets
may be used together especially if the method of providing the choices to the
human user is graphical and touch based (or mouse-click based) rather than
restricted to a keyboard. This means that the set of 52 playing cards could
be added to this 94 character alphabet to create a combined alphabet of 146
characters. This would mean that there are 146 choices for each symbol position,
and for 20 symbols there would be 14620 combinations possible.
6.3.2 Displaying Choices
Our general technique to provide computer-aided random sequence generation
from a user is to use a computer-based random generator to create a set of choices
for the human to pick from. We did this to overcome Knuth’s observation that
humans are typically unable to create a random sequence themselves [65].
There are two major effects of presenting random choices for the human to
choose from. The first effect is that the human is restricted to choices that are
as random as the computer pseudorandom number generator used can create.
The second aspect is that then the human adds a second source of randomness
by making a choice, if their choices are random. One of the main focuses of our
trial is whether humans will act as a second source of randomness. A significant
benefit of our design is that if the human choices are not predictable, then even if
the computer’s random number generator’s seed value and algorithm is known by
an adversary, the adversary still needs to guess which of the values the human
will have selected in each position. Since the CHURN is used only once, the
adversary needs to make the correct guess the first time.
We settled on four choices presented to the user at any one time for the user
to make a selection from. Four choices may be represented by 2 bits. This means
that up to 2 bits of security comes from the human choices for every character in
their generated CHURN, and as such this is a second security parameter variable
by adjusting the number of characters per CHURN and the number of choices
presented per character. At four choices per character and twenty character
positions, for our trial we had a potential 40 bits of security from the human
choices.
We do not restrict the choices such that if a “Z” has already been selected
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for the first possible choice, a “Z” could still appear in each of the other three
choices.
6.3.3 Random Choice Locations
As is clearly understood in the security literature, “user behaviour tends towards
the easiest path [22].” While a CHURN is in no way meant to be used as a
password, particularly since passwords are meant to be memorable and CHURNs
are not, some useful comparisons can be made with computer-assisted password
generators. For example there is the computer assisted password generator here:
http://www.generatepasswordfree.com/. On this password generator, the
user clicks on a background of “random” characters and generates their random
somehow-memorable password. With such a technique, there is nothing to stop
the user leaving their mouse in the same place and clicking the same letter every
time, thus constructing a password of “GGGGGGGGG” for example. The user
is not forced to move the mouse.
By displaying the four choices in random locations, we force the user to move
and to make a separate choice each time. As one of our participants of the trial
stated, “I like how you move the buttons around. If the button didn’t move I
would be tempted to sit on the same button and keep clicking it.” We move the
position of our four choices which are presented to the user randomly both on
the X and Y axis inside a rectangular area for each choice. The restriction we
place on the position of the choices is that the choices cannot overlap each other.
As an example of how the buttons move and do not overlap, see Figure 6.3 on
page 101.
6.3.4 Constraining the User
Displaying multiple choices for the user to pick from, particularly when there are
sub-alphabets such as digits and lowercase letters involved, means that a user’s
preferences in their decision making may significantly reduce the randomness,
entropy and security of the output. For example, with 32 of the 94 choices being
special characters, there will be a special character in many of sets of four choices
presented to the user. If the user had a preference to special characters, she may
be able to restrict the output from the 94 possible characters the input had
down to 32 possible characters. For a twenty character sequence, this reduces
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the number of possibilities by 2.9 × 1039. Indeed, in the part of our trial where
we did not constrain the choices presented to our participants, one participant
said, “Oh no! I wanted to create a string without any alphabet characters and I
was forced to pick a character.” Without any constraint, such subversion either
deliberately or due to unconscious preference, may be possible.
Decomposition of the number of characters in each sequence via a weighted
decision tree as per Shannon, yields that for a 20 character sequence with digit
probability of 10/94, lowercase probability of 26/94, uppercase probability of
26/94 and special character probability of 32/94, yields two digits, six lowercase,
five uppercase, and seven special characters. While clearly each sequence having
this mix of characters is non-ideal because lowercase and uppercase have the
same probability, and yet lowercase has six characters while uppercase has five,
restricting the user such that each sequence has this combination of characters
prevents various forms of undermining the method for creating a CHURN.
Here is a five-character example of how we enforced this constraint on the
users. In the five-character example there will be one digit, one lowercase char-
acter, one upper case character, and two special characters. Firstly we created
four fresh sequences, because this is the number of choices presented at once to
a user. These sequences had in the first position a random digit, second position
a random lowercase character, third position a random uppercase character and
in the fourth and fifth positions random special characters. The example four
sequences are shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Random characters in fixed positions in sequences.
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3 Position 4 Position 5
Sequence 1 6 r W # [
Sequence 2 4 t E ; =
Sequence 3 1 e F > ?
Sequence 4 6 c B \ -
Secondly, we created a fresh single random permutation for this set of four
sequences. For example, a random permutation of positions 1,2,3,4,5 may be
3,5,2,1,4. Finally we rearranged each of the four sequences using the same per-
mutation, such that the “digit” is in the same location in all four sequences. The
result of applying the permutation 3,5,2,1,4 is shown in Table 6.2.
Now, the user of our CHURN-creator will be presented with the choices from
the first position of all four sequences first. That is, the user will be asked to pick
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Table 6.2: Random characters in the same-across-sequence random positions.
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3 Position 4 Position 5
Sequence 1 W [ r 6 #
Sequence 2 E = t 4 ;
Sequence 3 F ? e 1 >
Sequence 4 B - c 6 \
between “W”, “E”, “F” and B”. Once they have made that choice, they will be
presented with the choices from the second position of all four sequences. That
is they will be asked to pick from “[”, “=”, “?”, and “-”, and so on.
In this way, each sequence is guaranteed to have random characters in random
positions, but a fixed number of each character type per sequence. By way of
illustration, Figure 6.1 shows an example twenty sequence output created by one
of the participants:
vO3f;Hw{x+OrK2h>$.[C
U=8w(S‘,5^-WQkyyGqk‘
hhjpN+7F5$?L/Y{‘kJa[
vhl0LQl^:3@FxPH’|k)]
93w#X}y\e~D[Qu|%IdQb
owc>Pv&3J=0ZY.V%g@j;
5saMrXI’cV,}?’mGu,?1
/#$3IY(idF\tc#b=KJ1r
LYr?iJqdf#_.!45_aVC,
p?WZyLN)l0$D(/1&g+mf
4uU;bo*Mf(V1E?%w*E[x
_tR;"c(I_KF{w_c0vf7L
f!4lDe)bWR+rNIf+_#*0
6pZi?wMo}}-W5|~‘pLnJ
9er9K‘=Q\jy@N:CI~z$v
Q}kmPm*SRp7\?K5f:{\k
3!omk\H’(5Rb~;R+hPXw
W9L{-8B~dNqFo"hka:’=
T(hb&P-+@sG_mL4W_7yf
%k0hqE(|\:+2ANrVT<xl
Figure 6.1: Example twenty sequence constrained output
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Such a constraint reduces the number of possible sequences generated. For
an alphabet of 94 characters, 20 characters per sequence means
9420 = 2.90× 1039
possible combinations. Using our constraints, the number of possible outcomes
becomes
102
2!
× 26
6
6!
× 26
5
5!
× 32
7
7!
× (20!) = 3.52× 1037.
This is a reduction by a factor of approximately 100, or reduced to 1.2%. The
reason why the constrained version reduces is because there is no distinction
between multiple characters from a sub alphabet. For example, two identical
digits that appear somewhere in the 20 character sequence. That is, if the first
of the two digits is a “5” and that is permutated to sequence position 1, this will
result in the same combinations as when the second digit is a “5” and the second
digit is permutated to sequence position 1.
Using our random number generator, the inbuilt random function in C#,
we generated sequences both constrained and unconstrained for 5,040,000 char-
acters and analysed the results. The single character entropy values were very
similar: 6.554573 for the unconstrained sequence versus 6.554312 for the con-
strained sequence. This similarity was repeated through the n-gram tests, with
subsequences in the unconstrained set having eleven more six-character sequences
used out of the possible 689,869,781,056 six-character sequences, than the con-
strained set. It should be noted that even a 5,040,000 character sample is too
small for analysis at anything higher than three character positions for entropy,
because there will not be enough n-gram symbols to cover all the possible n-gram
sequences. The 3-gram entropy for the unconstrained sequence was 19.541 and
for our constrained sequence it was 19.515, out of a maximum of 19.664.
6.4 Test Setup and Hypotheses
Our goal is to compare a CHURN-generator, which is the constrained graphical
version, with how random humans can be when unassisted. Our hypotheses were:
H11: Sequences created by humans using our CHURN-generator would be sig-
nificantly more random than sequences created by humans without the aid of a
CHURN-generator.
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H21: There will be a significant second source of randomness due to the human
input to a CHURN-generator.
H31: Humans will feel more in control creating a random sequence using a
CHURN-generator than when they are given a random sequence created by a
computer.
To investigate these hypotheses we asked the participants to complete four tasks:
keyboard entry, mouse entry unconstrained, mouse entry constrained, and a small
questionnaire at the end. In a commercial implementation of a CHURN, a useful
indication of freshness would occur using just five characters. However, for the
purposes of gaining the most data possible from our participants, all sequences
in our tests were 20 characters long. We will now discuss the tasks performed by
each participant further.
6.4.1 Keyboard Entry
To compare how random an unassisted human can be we needed an unassisted
human baseline for each participant, and as such we asked each participant to
type in 20 sequences of 20 characters as random as they could using a keyboard.
The entry form from our prototype is shown in Figure 6.2.
Before each keyboard entry trial we outlined to each participant what the
usable keys were by pointing to them individually as we said them, particularly
for the special characters. Essentially the range of possible keys to be used
equated to every key on four rows of the keyboard with the exception of the
Enter key and the Tab key. Participants were also told not to use the spacebar.
As users entered their sequence they could see what they had typed. As soon
as each of the 20 character sequence was completed, it was hidden from the users
view to contribute to the sequences being distinct from each other. This had
the effect of not allowing participants to return to earlier sequences and adjust
them. Once all 20 sequences were complete, all sequences were revealed back to
the participants in a non-editable form and the sequences were saved to file.
6.4.2 Mouse Entry Unconstrained
Keyboard entry was unconstrained in that a sequence of twenty characters could
have been all digits. Our CHURN-generator is constrained such that all twenty
character sequences are guaranteed to have a set number of characters from each
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Figure 6.2: Participant keyboard input form.
of the sub-alphabets. As a step between the unconstrained keyboard and the
constrained mouse entry, we used unconstrained mouse entry.
Users were presented with a window, approximately the size of a smart phone,
with four options to pick from by clicking with a mouse. The four options were
at locations which had been generated randomly, and each option’s value had
been generated randomly from the alphabet of 94 characters without constraints
such as “all choices shown at a time must be of the same sub-alphabet”. The
process is shown in Figure 6.3.
As may be seen in the left picture of Figure 6.3, the first four choices presented
to users were z S b and ]. The user in Figure 6.3 selected S, which took the user
to the middle screen with S shown as selected at the bottom in “Your values”
and a second set of four choices were presented. This second set of four choices
contained 7 t * and g. The user selected g which moved them to the third screen
in Figure 6.3 which has S g as the selected so far sequence, and another choice
of four characters being J ˜ and H. In this way 20 sequences of 20 characters
were selected by each participant.
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As a secondary capability of this test, even though the positions of the choices
and the choices themselves were generated randomly, they were generated ran-
domly and saved. At which point all our participants were shown the exact
same four choices in the exact same position for all 20 choices per 20 sequences
for the test. What this allows us to do is to examine how random the users’
choices were. Each trial participant would select from the same four choices in
the same four positions as every other participant to construct a sequence, and
then each participant’s sequence could be compared to every other participant’s
corresponding sequence using the Hamming Distance. Two participant’s first
sequences are shown in Table 6.3 to illustrate the concept.
Table 6.3: Hamming Distance example from first sequence.
Participant First Sequence
A b7JEzL<+KgZ~es4sK‘C#
B ]tJESL.??C;f8s:sgZ4q
Table 6.3 shows two twenty character sequences with five matches. A point to
note is that the first three choices were made from the choices shown in Figure 6.3.
The Hamming Distance for the two sequences is 20− 5 = 15. Each participant’s
responses may be compared in this way with every other participant’s responses,
for each of the twenty sequences. For fifty participants, 50× 50 = 2500 compar-
isons per 20 character sequence. We remove 50 comparisons from the 2500 com-
parisons because for each participant one comparison would be with themselves,
leaving 2450 comparisons. Since participant A compared with participant B is
the same as participant B compared with participant A, we divide by two to get
the number of unique-pair comparisons, which is 1225 unique-pair comparisons
per twenty character sequence. This gives significant data for comparison with a
binomial distribution, which the distribution of Hamming Distances for unique
pairs for each sequence will have if the participants are choosing at random.
6.4.3 Mouse Entry Constrained
Our CHURN-generator is constrained to reduce the user’s ability to minimize
the alphabet size used. Therefore our third test is a test which shows how the
CHURN-generator works, specifically with a constrained range of choices and
with each participant being shown fresh random choices each time. How the
CHURN-generator is constrained is illustrated in Figure 6.4.
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Figure 6.4: Constrained mouse entry form.
The left picture in Figure 6.4 shows four choices that are presented to the
user, and they are constrained such that all choices are lower case alphabetical.
The right picture in Figure 6.4 shows a second set of choices presented to the
user, the user having selected m to move to the right hand picture, and now the
choices are constrained such that they are all digits.
6.4.4 Questionnaire
At the end of the data entry, each participant was asked to complete a question-
naire. The questionnaire mainly had demographic questions such as age, gender,
and education level. The final three questions were particular to our study and
they asked:
 How many times a week do they use an authentication protocol to access a
website on the Internet? Specifically, banking, ecommerce, Facebook, and
webmail were mentioned.
 Compared with getting a random sequence of characters given to them by
a bank, how in control of their random sequence did they feel when they
were allowed to pick each position in the sequence from a set of four choices,
as per the mouse entry methods?
 Comparing their keyboard entry and the computer-assisted mouse entry,
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which did the users feel resulted in a more random sequence being gener-
ated?
6.4.5 Ethics
Permission was gained from our university’s Human Ethics committee for this
trial. Risks were minimal compared with every day computer usage or compared
with playing a computer game. All participants signed a consent form prior to
taking part and were able to leave at any time. All participants did finish the
trial.
6.5 Results
We separate the analysis of our results into the following areas: participant
analysis; the human side to randomness; histograms; entropy; compression tools;
and Hamming Distance. We will discuss each area further now.
6.5.1 Participant Analysis
Fifty participants took part in and completed our trial. While common criticisms
of academic security trials are that the vast majority of the participants are
university educated, male, and in the 18–25 year old age bracket, we managed
to secure a range of participants to take part in our study. The analysis of our
participants is presented here.
Age, Gender, and Qualifications
More than a third of our participants were female (19), and approximately a
third had no university qualification and were not current university students
(16). The age ranges of the participants are shown in Figure 6.5.
Logins per week
Each login secured with a password to a website on the Internet is an example of
where a CHURN could be used to enhance security. The number of times a week
that participants would log into a website such as banking, e-commerce, Facebook
or webmail using a password ranged from three participants answering zero times,
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Figure 6.5: Histogram of participant ages.
through to a participant reporting 140 logins per week. The distribution of the
number of logins a week per participant is shown in Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6: Histogram of logins per week.
Feeling in Control
A critical part of secure human protocol design is to empower the user and
make them feel as though they are in control. More than two thirds of our
participants reported feeling more in control using the CHURN-generator to
create a random sequence than being given a random sequence to use by a
computer. Five participants reported feeling less in control. A participant stated:
“The reason I would like to choose my own random numbers rather
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than be given them by the bank is because there is less chance of
someone else having them.”
6.5.2 The Human Side to Randomness
There are two general observations to make about human randomness. Firstly,
that humans cannot make uniformly random choices and secondly that humans
will see patterns in uniformly random things, such that they will think that some-
thing that is uniformly random is not uniformly random. This ability to detect
patterns, and to presume that patterns indicates non-randomness, typically leads
to humans not picking two digits the same in a row when asked to write random
digits down, even though approximately one in every 10 digits should be the
same as its predecessor when selected at random [65].
Two examples of verbal responses from participants as they used the uncon-
strained mouse entry form were:
“There does not seem to be enough numbers. It makes me want to
pick numbers.”
“. . . I picked a capital last time, so I’m trying not to pick a capital
this time.”
A further consideration is that humans may repeat a certain character more
often than others. While this behaviour is restricted in both of the pick-one-
value-from-four-presented methods employed in the trial, we had a participant
state while using the unconstrained mouse entry method, “Let’s try finding an
‘A’ and always click an ‘A’.” Therefore humans can err on the side of not being
random due to too much repetition; as well as erring on the side of not enough
repetition, unless a CHURN is constrained to minimize such behaviour.
As the final question on the questionnaire that all participants completed
as part of the trial, participants were asked to compare the randomness of the
sequences they generated by themselves compared with the randomness of the
sequences they created via the CHURN generator. More than a third of the
participants thought that the sequences they created unaided were more random
than the sequences generated by the CHURN generator. The analysis of the
results of the randomness and uncertainty tests on the aided sequences and the
sequences generated by the CHURN generator are presented now.
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6.5.3 Histograms
An illustrative example of the range of values used by each participant in the dif-
ferent tests is a histogram, the simplest of which is the single character histogram.
We will first discuss single character frequencies, then n-gram frequencies.
Single character histograms
For the purposes of the single character frequencies, the characters used in each
of the twenty sequences are combined for each participant. The single charac-
ter histogram for each participant for both the human-unassisted keyboard and
CHURN-generator are shown in Figure 6.7.
The data in Figure 6.7 is not meant to be readable on a per-participant or
per-character basis. In particular, on the x-axis only every second character is
labelled, even though all values are presented. However, two observations are
clearly noticeable.
Firstly, no participant used all characters from the available alphabet of 94
characters in the un-assisted human keyboard input test. Indeed, the maximum
number of characters from the alphabet of 94 possible characters used by any of
the fifty participants when they used the keyboard input was 84. The mean was
59.4 and the minimum was 23. In contrast, in the computer assisted CHURN
output shown in Figure 6.7, in many cases all characters were used by each par-
ticipant. Eighteen of the fifty participants used all 94 characters available in the
alphabet, the lowest number of characters used by any participant using CHURN
was 90 and the mean was 92.82. The minimum number of characters used via
CHURN being six characters more than the maximum number of characters used
by any unassisted participant, is clear supportive evidence that CHURN gives
more random output.
The second critical observation to be made of Figure 6.7 is with regards to the
y-axis. In the unassisted human keyboard creation of random sequences, many
participants used the same character a significant number of times. Specifically,
exactly half the fifty participants used one of the characters from the 94 char-
acter alphabet thirty or more times in their random keyboard entry sequences.
Thirty or more times, out of 400 characters, means that 7.5% or more of the
output was the one character for half the participants. In contrast, the most any
one character was used by any participant when using the CHURN-generator
was 14 times. There were four participants who selected the same character
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14 times when using the CHURN generator. Again, maximum usage of indi-
vidual characters is a strong indicator that the computer-assisted human, using
the CHURN-generator, produces a significantly more random and unpredictable
output than an unassisted human can.
N-gram histograms
The process for analysing the sequences in an n-gram fashion was to look at
non-overlapping n-grams inside each sequence. This means two things. Firstly, if
bigrams (two character sequences) are considered, then there are ten bigrams per
sequence, and 200 bigrams per participant. This ensures independence between
bigrams. Secondly, a 5-gram could not start in one sequence and end in another,
though this would not occur because five is a divisor of twenty. In this way we
keep the sequences distinct.
A repeat of four character sequence is very significant. Each 4-gram should
appear every 944 4-grams on average. That is, every 78, 074, 896× 4 characters,
or every 312, 299, 584 characters. Using the unassisted keyboard input, fifteen
participants had at least one 4-gram repeat in their twenty sequences of twenty
characters (400 characters total) generated. Two participants had at least one 8-
gram repeat in their unassisted keyboard input. If this was occurring randomly,
an 8-gram should repeat on average every 948 = 6, 095, 689, 385, 410, 816 8-grams.
Using the unassisted keyboard input, forty participants had 3-gram repeats.
In contrast, using the CHURN-generator, not one participant had a 3-gram re-
peat. A 3-gram should occur on average every 943 = 830, 584 3-grams, and
each participant had 6 × 20 = 120 3-grams analysed using our non-overlapping
each-sequence-distinct method.
6.5.4 Compression Tools
As discussed in Section 6.2.2, compression tools come in a variety of underlying
algorithms. As such, we have settled on three compression tools: an arith-
metic encoder described by Moffat et al. [80]; gzip; and bzip2. In general, the
smaller the compressed file the less random and less uncertain the original un-
compressed file was; and similarly larger files indicate more random and greater
uncertainty. All input files were the same size. Of particular interest will be if
any algorithm reverses the order of the files compared with another algorithm’s
order. That is, if gzip compresses the keyboard output to a file size smaller
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than the CHURN-generator output; while the arithmetic encoder compresses
the CHURN-generator’s output more than the keyboard output.
The compressed file sizes for each participant are presented in Figure 6.8 for
the arithmetic encoder, in Figure 6.9 for gzip, and in Figure 6.10 for bzip2. At
all times the unassisted-human keyboard output compressed to a smaller size
than both the unconstrained and constrained computer-assisted mouse output.
Keyboard output always being smaller than CHURN-generator output, for every
participant and for all three compression tools, is a strong indicator that the
CHURN-generator creates a more random and unpredictable sequence than an
unassisted human can produce.
Figure 6.8: Arithmetic compression of participant’s keyboard, unconstrained
mouse, and CHURN generation output.
Of interest is that for the same files compressed using the three different
tools, some tools compressed the CHURN generator’s output to be larger than
the unconstrained mouse output, while other tools had the unconstrained mouse
output’s compressed file as larger than the CHURN generator’s compressed file.
By compression tool:
 the arithmetic encoder compressed the CHURN generator’s output com-
pressed to a larger file size than the unconstrained mouse’s compressed
output for 23 participants (just under half)
 the gzip compression tool compressed the CHURN generator’s output com-
pressed to a larger file size than the unconstrained mouse’s compressed
output for 30 participants ( 3/5)
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Figure 6.9: gzip compression of participant’s keyboard, unconstrained mouse,
and CHURN generation output.
Figure 6.10: bzip2 compression of participant’s keyboard, unconstrained mouse,
and CHURN generation output.
 the bzip2 compression tool compressed the CHURN generator’s output
compressed to a larger file size than the unconstrained mouse’s compressed
output for 33 participants ( 2/3)
Compression of files is very algorithm- and implementation- specific, and will
give different results for different files. As such, significant conclusions cannot
be drawn from the values of “which output type creates a larger file” for the
mouse unconstrained and CHURN methods, particularly because the differences
between the files in many cases are less than 10 bytes (about 2.7%). The con-
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clusion to draw from these results comparing the CHURN generator’s output
with the unconstrained mouse output, is that the constraints placed in CHURN
do not significantly or even noticeably with sequences of 400 characters decrease
the randomness of sequences compared with an unconstrained solution. Since
the constraints offer significant protection against reduction of the full alpha-
bet to much smaller alphabet, the constraints and CHURN creation method is
recommended.
Our conclusions are based on statistical analysis. As an example, to test that
CHURN-generator output creates a larger, and hence more random, compressed
file using the arithmetic encoder than a compressed keyboard output file, we
used the following null hypothesis:
H0: The mean compressed file size for the keyboard entry files and the mouse
entry files are the same.
First we calculated the differences between the compressed file sizes for the
keyboard and CHURN-generator files for the arithmetic encoder. We then com-
pleted some statistical analysis on these difference values. The mean was 46.46
bytes, the variance was 399.36 bytes, the standard deviation was 19.98 bytes,
and given our 50 samples our margin of error was 2.826 bytes. For 49 degrees
of freedom and a 95% confidence interval, our T-statistic is 2.009575. Using the
T-statistic multiplied by our margin of error gave us a 95% confidence interval
of 40.78 − 52.14 bytes. Because our confidence interval does not include 0, we
rejected H0 thus concluding that the CHURN-generated files do create larger,
and hence more random, compressed files.
6.5.5 Hamming Distance
We applied Hamming Distance calculations to the mouse unconstrained data to
ascertain the variation that humans were adding to the process. We could do this
because all participants saw the same four choices in the same four locations for
every set of four character choices in their twenty sequences of twenty characters.
If the selections made by each participant when they are selecting from the
four choices presented to them follow a normal random distribution, then the
Hamming Distances between each of the participants’ corresponding sequences
should be a Binomial distribution. Based on a probability of 0.75 (that is, for
each four-choice character position the probability of a match is 1/4 or 0.25, and
the probability of a mismatch and hence +1 to the Hamming Distance is 0.75),
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and 1225 unique pairings, the expected values for the Hamming Distances for
each of the twenty sequences of twenty characters is shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Binomial distribution of Hamming Distances based on 1225 pairs and
probability of 0.75.
Hamming Distance Binomial probability Expected number of unique pairs
with this Hamming Distance
0 9.095E-13 1.11E-09
1 5.457E-11 6.68E-08
2 1.555E-09 1.91E-06
3 2.799E-08 3.43E-05
4 3.569E-07 4.37E-04
5 3.426E-06 0.004
6 2.570E-05 0.031
7 1.542E-04 0.189
8 7.517E-04 0.921
9 3.007E-03 3.68
10 9.922E-03 12.15
11 0.027 33.15
12 0.061 74.59
13 0.112 137.70
14 0.169 206.55
15 0.202 247.86
16 0.190 232.36
17 0.134 164.02
18 0.067 82.01
19 0.021 25.90
20 3.171E-03 3.88
The observed values for the Hamming Distances for each of the twenty se-
quences are shown in Figure 6.11, along with the ideal curve from Table 6.4.
While the observed Hamming Distance values from Figure 6.11 do resemble the
expected values shown in Table 6.4, the graphs have been skewed to the left. So
while humans are contributing a source of randomness, the full 2 bits of security
is not gained from each character position in the CHURN sequence. Extremely
promising is the fact that out of 1225 comparisons for 20 sequences (24,500 com-
parisons), no two participants created the same two sequences despite being given
the same choices in the same positions. Our study represented trying conditions
where 800 mouse clicks were required from participants in a row, suggesting that
participants started to tend towards the easiest path possible and “click on the
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nearest value”. 50 participants and four choices per position means that at least
13 participants started on the same first value of the 20th sequence, and even
so, for the 20th sequence there was only one pair with the smallest Hamming
Distance of four, out of 1225 20th sequence comparisons.
6.5.6 “Who Decides?”
As described in Section 3.4.1, there is the question asked by human users in
security ceremonies of who decides? Who decides which part of the browser (or
application) can be changed by a developer, and which parts are fixed by the
web browser? Who decides whether HTTPS is shown in the address bar of a web
browser; if a padlock is shown in the status bar or address bar; if the address
bar is a certain colour? As stated at the beginning of this chapter, this question
of “who decides” is of further concern in the case of smart phone applications,
where the answer is “the application developer decides on an individual basis,”
thus necessitating blind trust.
The answer to the question “Who decides” in the case of a CHURN is the
human; at least partially. This goes beyond simply feeling in control, which
is also important and which two-thirds of our participants stated they felt, as
described in Section 6.5.1. For each character position, the humans are making
choices, choosing between four symbols presented to them in random locations.
If humans made the selection of a symbol perfectly randomly, this would mean
the probability of selecting a particular choice would be 0.25, and that each
of the twenty sequences presented in Figure 6.11 would approximate a binomial
distribution with a centre at 15 (that is, 0.75 of 20 possible matches for Hamming
Distance).
In Section 6.2.2 we stated that we knew human decisions were not completely
random, and that typical uses of such tests as the Chi-Squared (X 2) tests were
of little use to us because the test would show us that the values in a CHURN
selected by a human would have a very low probability of having resulted from a
random process. So we wished for a measure for “How random” the choices were,
rather than “Is this truly random?” As such, we have used compression tools
and other methods to approximate how random the overall sequence created is.
Now we can go a step further. Using the values created from the mouse
unconstrained data we can analyse just the human contribution to randomness.
We can do this because all participants saw the same four choices in the same
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four locations for every set of four character choices in their twenty sequences
of twenty characters, and we have completed the Hamming Distance analysis on
those choices in Section 6.5.5.
By changing the binomial probability from 0.75, which it should be for Ham-
ming Distance if 1 value was chosen randomly from 4, to lower values, we can
match a binomial probability curve to the data acquired from our tests, on a per-
sequence basis. When the constructed binomial curve results in a Chi-Squared
test showing a probability of at least 0.5 that the values from the actual Ham-
ming Distance curve for a sequence came from that binomial distribution, we
will have a good approximation for the binomial probability for our actual data.
To acquire these best-match binomial values, we used the unconstrained non-
linear optimization fminsearch function in Matlab. The fminsearch function
takes a function as its parameter. Looking at the curves in Figure 6.11 we can
see that the peaks of the curves are at approximately 13, or a probability of 0.65.
Therefore, in the function supplied to fminsearch we stepped through probability
p values from 0.5 to 0.8, with a step size of 0.001 and calculated this calculation
at each probability:
1225∑
i=1
ln
(
20
yi
)
+ yi ln p+ (20− yi) ln(1− p)
where yi is each of the 1225 Hamming Distance values.
As a graphical example of the process, we show a graph of the 1225 participant
comparisons from Sequence 8 in Figure 6.12. As can be seen in Figure 6.11,
Sequence 8 is our worst case from our twenty sequences. Sequence 8 is the curve
furthest to the left, meaning its probability of a mismatch is lowest. Figure 6.13
shows the same curves as Figure 6.11 with the addition of the matched curve for
probability 0.6271 from Table 6.5.
Once we have a binomial probability for the Hamming Distance curve for
each sequence, we can subtract it from 1 and invert this number to find the
number of choices. So the ideal case of a probability of 0.75 would become
1/(1 − 0.75) which is 4. By taking the log to base 2 of the generated number-
of-choices number, we get the number of bits required to represent this number
of choices. By multiplying the number of bits per choice, which is the number
of bits per character position, by the number of characters in the sequence, we
get the number of bits of security that the human choices have in the resulting
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Figure 6.12: Observed Hamming Distances for participant pairs for Sequence 8
versus the ideal p=0.75 n=1225 Binomial Distribution.
sequence.
This bits-of-security number, which depends on the security parameter which
is the length of the sequence, is our best number for an approximation for how
much randomness the human choices add to the process. That is, if the random
number generator algorithm for the underlying four choices presented to the
human for each character position is known, and the seed for the random number
generator also becomes known, this would mean that the four values presented
to the human for each character position is known. Even with the adversary
knowing which four values are presented to the human for each character position,
the adversary would still have this bits-of-security number, added by the human,
to overcome.
As stated in Section 6.4, in some instances a CHURN of only 5 characters
may provide the security properties desired. Therefore, the fitted probabilities
for each of the sequences and the resulting bits of security if the CHURN is
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Figure 6.13: Observed Hamming Distances for participant pairs for Sequence 8
with matched Binomial Distribution of p=0.6271 and n=1225.
5 characters or 20 characters are displayed in Table 6.5. A summary of the
minimum, maximum, and average values are presented in Table 6.6. This will
provide useful data for making a decision regarding the security parameter of
how many characters to have in a CHURN, as this will be the resulting security
if the random number generator and seed become known.
The figures presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 become particularly important in
the case where the algorithm for generating the random choices, and critically
the “seed” or “initial value” for that algorithm becomes known. As discussed in
Section 6.2.1, a random number provided by a device such as the RSA SecurID
token, requires blind trust on the behalf of the human that the generated number
is random and cannot be predicted by a malicious party.
In March 2011, a security breach occurred at RSA which meant that the
values presented on SecurID tokens were predictable. This knowledge was later
used in a breach at Lockheed Martin [51,75,100].
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Table 6.6: Minimum, maximum, and average values for human contribution to
randomness.
Number Number Bits of Bits of
of of security if security if
probability choices bits 5 characters 20 characters
min 0.6271 2.6817 1.4231 7.12 28.46
max 0.6982 3.3135 1.7283 8.64 34.57
average 0.6631 2.9684 1.5697 7.85 31.39
In contrast, in the case of a CHURN there is a significant number of com-
binations that any malicious entity would need to cater for even if the random
number generator of the device, and the random seed, became known. This is
because a critical element in the design and construction of a CHURN is the
human-ownership of the constructed random sequence. Thus, even though the
malicious entity may be able to completely predict which four values, in which
four positions, are presented to a user, the human will still be making choices
from those four values. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 tells us that the minimum number
of bits of security from any of our twenty sequences, when compared across the
1225 comparisons for each of the twenty sequences, was 28.46 bits of security for
a sequence of 20 characters. This means that the malicious entity would still have
effectively 369, 244, 195 possible combinations to select from, even if the human
selection distribution (thus the reduction from 40 bits of security to 28.46 bits
of security for a 20 character sequence) was known.
6.6 Limitations
A CHURN is designed to provide humans with confidence of freshness. Providing
a freshness assurance does not protect against other attacks such as Man-In-The-
Middle (MITM) attacks, rather freshness only mitigates replay attacks.
A CHURN is a random sequence that a human had some control over the
creation of, and as such does not stand on its own. Protocols which include
humans will need to be developed that use CHURNS in the same way that
computer-to-computer protocols use random nonces.
A critical part of the use of a CHURN is that the human looks at it and
recognizes the CHURN as their fresh random sequence, when the CHURN is sent
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back to the human by the party they are communicating with. Some technique
will be required to ensure the human follows the protocol. For example, sending
back to the human multiple random sequences such that the human has to pick
which sequence was their CHURN and that information will be included in the
next protocol message.
6.7 Summary
Returning to our three hypotheses, we have shown that sequences created by
humans using our CHURN-generator are significantly more random than se-
quences created by humans without the aid of a CHURN-generator. We have
shown there is a significant second source of randomness due to the human input
to a CHURN-generator via the Hamming Distances and how close the Hamming
Distances were to a true Binomial distribution. We have provided security val-
ues both for our tested 20 character sequences, and for sequences of 5 characters
which would still provide useful security assurances for many real world scenar-
ios. Finally, more than two thirds of our participants reported feeling more in
control using the CHURN-generator to create a random sequence than being
given a random sequence to use by a computer
.
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Chapter 7
Human Perceptible Freshness
Humans have had a need to communicate securely for thousands of years, with
documented evidence of the use of a scytale (used for transposition ciphers)
as early as 475BC [81]. With the proliferation of computers over the last half
century, and the capacity computers provide for cryptanalysis, calculations in
confidentiality-ensuring cipher schemes have quickly become too complex for the
general populace to complete by hand. This has led to a situation where trust
is required, not just by the general user but by informed security professionals
also.
We shall use HTTPS, a widely used protocol researched and discussed in
Chapters 3, 4 and 5, as an example to explain why human-followable security
is required. From there, we will define human perceptible freshness and use the
recent work by Jager et al. [62] to provide an example of how such a security
property may be used in a cryptographic proof of security.
7.1 Introduction
There is a set of people, in the minority of the populace, who are security pro-
fessionals who feel confident that they know what security properties HTTPS
provides and how HTTPS achieves this. They know what the HTTPS indicators
are in a web browser to give them the confidence that HTTPS is being used.
However, few people, even in this security trained minority who believe they
know how HTTPS works, would have set up a test to capture network packets
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on a connection using HTTPS, and would have looked at the packets to ensure
encryption has been used. A smaller subset would have then taken the extra
step, having found an “encrypted” packet, of trying to decipher the packet to
ensure that decryption, or perhaps decoding, was not trivial.
The reason to focus on this set of people, who are the security researchers
and professionals, is because they are the people creating new academic and
real world solutions. There is a persistence in thinking that users need to read
warnings (and hence we need to write better warnings [56,61,67]), users need to
learn about indicators (and hence the research should be “how to create better
indicators” [28,33,58,78,123]), or that the users need to learn more so that their
mental model of what the application is doing matches what is being done by the
application [2, 3, 17, 121]. Until this thinking is adjusted, the improvements we
need will not be realised. If we can highlight that these approaches do not work,
even for the security researchers and professionals, then this will motivate the
need for a new approach to security protocols involving humans, significantly.
Some commonly used web browsers give little indication of there being a
form on a webpage delivered over HTTPS that has a completely insecure HTTP
address as the form’s target. Since the webpage containing the form is sent to the
user’s machine over a HTTPS connection, the typical HTTPS security indicators
of showing “HTTPS” in the address bar, displaying extended validation certificate
information, and a padlock to show HTTPS is in place are all displayed to the
user. Even if the user goes to the trouble of viewing the certificate information for
the connection, there is no indication that the link may be insecure. However,
all of these indicators are showing information regarding the connection over
which the webpage was loaded, they are not showing indicators for where the
information submitted on a form on the webpage may go.
An example is our university, the Queensland University of Technology, which
has a secure connection for a website used by staff and students called “QUT
Virtual”. QUT Virtual is a webpage unique and private to each staff member
and student, with information and a number of forms on it. One of those forms
provides the capability to type in some text to search the library catalogue,
see Figure 7.1. The QUT Virtual webpage has been delivered over a secure
connection. While several other forms on the page have target addresses which
are HTTPS addresses, the form for searching the library catalogue has a HTTP
address as the target and the information on that form will be sent over an
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insecure connection. Note that in Figure 7.1, for this webpage with the library
search form with the insecure HTML target address, “https” is shown to the user
at the start of the address bar and a padlock is shown at the end of the address
bar.
Figure 7.1: Example HTTPS webpage with a HTTP form viewed using Internet
Explorer 10.
While no security for a library search may be fair, the same display of all the
security indicators would occur for a webpage delivered over HTTPS which has
a form via which users submit their bank login information. Even the security
professional would need to look at the source code for the website, on top of
the checks of all the security indicators, to ensure that the target of the form
is a HTTPS address. The source code check would need to be done every time
the webpage is visited, as the content may have changed. Perhaps checking the
source code every time a webpage is used may be done by someone very security
conscious and diligent. However, such a check does not take into account the
possibility of the webpage being updated dynamically, such that the source code
shown is not the source code used by the webpage when the user clicks the
“submit” button on the form.
To further emphasise this point regarding trust, and that even the security
professional minority require significant trust, the case of smart phone appli-
126 Chapter 7. Human Perceptible Freshness
cations was presented in Chapter 6. Since there is no overarching program to
load the app(-lication)s in, as per a web browser for webpages, each application’s
designer makes individual choices over what security to use and what security
indicators to show to the users. To ask the question asked throughout this thesis
again, “Who decides?”, the answer in the smart phone case is that the designer
of the applications is the person who decides, and they may have no security
training at all. As such, there is no enforced connection between security indica-
tor shown, and security provided. Shin et al.’s [110] analysis of 212 smart phone
applications showed both secure applications with no security indicator and in-
secure apps with indicators shown. Both of these cases occurred in applications
supplied by financial institutions. In such an environment, expert knowledge such
as “What does an extended validation certificate mean?”, “What is HTTPS?”,
“How does a user view the certificate information and what do the different fields
mean?” will not help the user. This results in users who are information security
experts being placed in the same position as the general population is with web
browsers, that is, having no easy method to discern a secure application from an
insecure application.
This means that there are only two ways forward regarding use of the device.
The first option is that the user will not use the smart phone for anything, such as
banking, which needs security. This option is increasingly problematic in the case
of the web browser on a personal computer, since many large organisations such
as government have forms that are only accessible via the Internet. The second
option is that the user applies blind trust, and crosses their fingers and hopes.
In such an environment as this, users will create their own security mechanisms,
which is exactly what we found in the case of web browser usage on computers,
as described in Section 3.4.2.
Such a need for blind trust is highly undesirable, leading to both the situation
where secure systems are not trusted and also where insecure systems are trusted.
Therefore, we wish to move towards a concept of human followable security. This
is a step beyond Hopper and Blum’s (α, β, t) human-executable protocols [59].
Rather than the human being able to follow the steps and execute a protocol,
the question being asked is “Is the security understandable?” It is also a shift
from a common traditional HCI-security standpoint of trying to get the users
to “do the right thing” [2]. What is human followable security? The answer to
this question is too large to be fully encompassed by this thesis. However a step
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towards human followable security is human perceptible freshness.
In this chapter we define human perceptible freshness (HPF), building on
prior work to define how HPF may be instantiated in cryptographic protocols.
As discussed in Section 2.4, the need to ensure that messages are new, or fresh,
is a very common protocol requirement to prevent replay attacks [13]. However,
even though the need for freshness of protocol messages has been clearly under-
stood for some time, typical protocols involving humans have a password sent
by the human, or HPA sent to the human, repeatedly used. As discussed at the
beginning of Chapter 6, the Verified-by-Visa scheme sends the same recorded-at-
initialisation message (HPA) to the user on every protocol run, to authenticate
Visa to the human. This has a known weakness that if the secret is captured it
can be replayed [34].
By using out-of-band channels a HPA could be fresh each time it is sent
to the human inside a protocol. For example, the human could send a fresh
message to a trusted party such as their bank, the bank could pass on the fresh
message to a third party such as Visa, and Visa could use the fresh message in a
Verified-by-Visa protocol run. Note that the connection between the human and
the bank is pre-existing, meaning the human is familiar with and has used the
connection to their bank previously. Similarly, the connection between the bank
and Visa is pre-existing, as this is how credit card payments are authorised, see
Section 4.2.2.
One method of providing HPF would be via the use of CHURNs (see Chap-
ter 6), which the human would know has been recently created because the hu-
man assisted in the creation of the CHURN. The human could send a CHURN
via a secondary channel, and when they receive the CHURN back they recognise
(see Chapter 5) the CHURN, thus gaining an assurance of freshness and implicit
authentication.
7.2 Human Perceptible Freshness (HPF)
As discussed in Section 2.4, there is a need to ensure that messages in a protocol
are fresh, that is that they have not been sent before, to prevent replay attacks.
While freshness has been achieved for some time in cryptographic protocols be-
tween computers via techniques such as nonces, timestamps and counters, there
seems little or no focus on freshness in protocols involving humans, particularly
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in the direction of “to” the human.
Intuitively, we say a protocol has human perceptible freshness if an object
that the human had control over the creation of, and which has not previously
existed to the human’s knowledge, is sent back to the human and it is the first
time the object has been sent to the human. The critical elements to this human
perceptible freshness concept are:
First use As is common in protocol design, a freshness value must have the
property that it can be guaranteed not to have been used before [13].
Human-control A concept that is a unique to HPF, the human must have
some control over the creation of the freshness value.
Non-predictable The freshness value must be non-predictable.
We shall now discuss the implications of these attributes.
First Use The concept of needing to be able to guarantee that a freshness
value has not been used before suggests some sort of computer pre-selection, or
other random generator preselection, of values. Otherwise, if a human were to
select freshness values unaided, we have shown in Section 6.5.3 that the likelihood
that the values could be guaranteed to not have been used before is remote.
Human-controlled While values may be pre-selected by a random generator
to construct the freshness value from, the human must have some control over
the creation of the freshness value. In this way, the human can understand that
the value is unique (fresh) to them. A contrasting case would be if a computer
provided the human with a freshness value, in which case the human could not
be confident that other computers in the world were not all outputting identical
freshness values, thus providing no surety of freshness.
Non-predictable In cryptographic protocols, predictable freshness values
such as timestamps and counters are viable because simply by having a part of
what will be the “plaintext” change will ensure that the “ciphertext” is different,
thus preventing replay attacks of the ciphertext. However, when using human
perceptible freshness, the ability to recognise that a value is fresh also stems
from the value being unpredictable. This is because firstly, humans are not able
to measure time accurately and it is unrealistic to assume they will maintain
counters. As such, timestamps and counters, guaranteed to provide a new value
each time, are not suitable as the freshness value in the case of human perceptible
freshness. However, because there is no human-perceptible ciphertext which the
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freshness value usually ensures cannot be replayed, the human freshness value
itself needs to have non-predictable qualities. In this way, HPF goes beyond
standard freshness definitions. Now, a critical ingredient required to ensure that
a value is fresh is that the human must also be able to identify that the value is
their value.
It is not by chance that the intuitive definition of human followable freshness
aligns closely with the design requirements for CHURNs presented in Chapter 6.
CHURNs were designed to provide a human equivalent to the concept of a com-
puter nonce, and form one example of a set of values that could provide human
perceptible freshness.
If we presume the freshness value will be sent to the human to recognise, we
can use the recognise formalism presented in Chapter 5 to capture the concept
of whether the human accepts that the freshness value sent back to them is the
value they created. We shall label the freshness value HPAfresh. Now we define
human-perceptible freshness.
Definition 7.2.1 (Human-perceptible freshness). For a given freshness value
HPAfresh, it should be infeasible for a polynomially bound A with access to all
prior HPA values to construct a HPA′ such that
Recognise(·,HPAfresh,HPA′) = 1.
7.3 Model
Utilising the concept of POPS+ described in Section 4.4.2, we focus on the
human element to the proof of security. That is, there need to be security proofs
for each of the higher level cryptographic primitives such as HTTPS used, after
which the human considerations can be analysed. As such, we need two aspects.
Firstly, we need security proofs for “higher level cryptographic primitives” such
as HTTPS. Secondly, we need a way of binding the messages that will form
part of the human-side of the protocol to the cryptographic protocol. From
a proof of security point of view, this binding requires that different sessions
can be identified, such that the requirements for fresh messages can be formally
specified. It turns out that recent work by Jager et al. [62] provides a concrete
solution to these two requirements.
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7.3.1 Existing Work
We build on the authenticated and confidential channel establishment (ACCE)
work by Jager et al. [62]. An outline of the concept of ACCE is that there are
two phases, a pre-accept phase and a post-accept phase. In the pre-accept phase,
the communication partners are mutually authenticated and a session key k is
established. In the post-accept phase, the communication partners use the key
k to encrypt and decrypt data transmitted between them using authenticated
encryption. Thus all future messages, including any messages for the human-
side to the protocol, are delivered over this channel that binds the cryptographic
properties and the session information to the human messages.
ACCE Definition
Jager et al. [62] define an ACCE protocol as a protocol which is executed between
two parties. The protocol consists of two phases, being the pre-accept phase and
the post-accept phase.
In the pre-accept phase each party is authenticated with the other party
(mutual authentication), and a session key k is established. The phase ends
when both parties reach an accept-state.
In the post-accept phase, data communicated between the two parties is
encrypted and decrypted with the key k created in the pre-accept phase.
Model
Jager et al. [62] expand on the work of Bellare and Rogaway [7] to provide a
security model. Jager et al.’s model is shown here for completeness.
Each oracle pisi keeps as additional internal state a bit b
s
i which is chosen at
random at the beginning of the game.
Sendpre(pisi ,m) : The adversary can use this query to send message m to
oracle pisi . Send replies with an error symbol ⊥ if oracle pisi has state Λ = ‘accept’.
(Send-queries in an accept-state are handled by the Decrypt-query below).
Reveal(pisi ) : Oracle pi
s
i responds to a Reveal-query with the contents of vari-
able k. Note that k 6= 0 if and only if Λ = accept.
Corrupt(Pi) : Oracle pi
s
i responds with the long-term key ski of party Pi. If
Corrupt(Pi) is the r-th query issued by A, then we say that Pi is r-corrupted.
Non-corrupted parties have r :=∞.
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Encrypt(pisi ,m0,m1, len,Hdr) : This query takes as input two messages m0
and m1, length parameter len, and header data Hdr . If Λ 6= ‘accept’ or if the
encryption of m0 or m1 results in an invalid ciphertext, e.g. if len is invalid, then
pisi returns ⊥. Otherwise, a ciphertext corresponding to m0 or m1 is returned,
depending on the random bit bsi .
Decrypt(pisi , C,Hdr) : This query takes as input a ciphertext C and header
data Hdr . If pisi has Λ 6= ‘accept’ then pisi returns ⊥. Since this is authenticated
encryption and decryption, as a means to capture the ability of A to construct a
legitimate ciphertext, if the random bit bsi = 0 then pi
s
i returns ⊥; otherwise C is
decrypted and returned. Returning ⊥ if bsi = 0 allows A to ascertain b and win
the security game, if A can construct an authenticated ciphertext to decrypt.
The first three queries are standard in cryptographic models. The Send query
allows the adversary to run the protocol normally and to inject messages of his
choice, reflecting the assumption that the adversary controls communications
between protocol participants. The Reveal query returns the short term key of
the party, modelling the ability for the adversary to acquire short term keys
from parties. Corrupt returns the long term key of the party, thus allowing the
adversary to effectively act on that party’s behalf, with the addition in this model
being that the timing of the corruption is critical. The position of the Corrupt
query in the sequence of queries relates to the definition of freshness, as the party
is said to be fresh before the Corrupt query and not fresh after the Corrupt query.
The last two queries build on the work by Paterson et al. for length hiding
encryption [87]. The Decrypt oracle forbids decryption for any ciphertext which
the adversary could have obtained from the Encrypt oracle in the same state.
Therefore, if the scheme is secure, we expect the Decrypt oracle always to output
fail. If, on the other hand, the scheme is insecure and the adversary can construct
a valid ciphertext of his own (a forgery) then he can use the Decrypt oracle to
obtain b and therefore win the game. If decrypt returns an m then b = 1,
otherwise b = 0.
Definition 7.3.1 (Jager et al. [62]). The probability of A being able to success-
fully guess the value of bsi is  distance from random chance, that is, 1/2. An
ACCE protocol is (t, )−secure if there exists no adversary that can break the
protocol with probability greater than  = auth + enc in time t.
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7.3.2 Updated Model
The concept, that Ellison’s [41] early security ceremony example captures, is that
a user may be securely connected to an entity via HTTPS, but that the entity that
the user is securely connected to may not be the same entity that the user thinks
they are connected to (see Section 4.2.1). Indeed, even when extended validation
certificates are used, and are understood by a user, the user must already have a
correct and exact knowledge of the company’s name. The presumption of such
knowledge is not practical or realistic in many cases. Consider the first purchase
from a website from a company that the user has no prior knowledge of, or cases
where typing in a web address causes the redirection to a seemingly unrelated
address. An example of a large online entity redirecting to another address is
Hotmail.com redirecting their users to Live.com for their login.
Attack
There exists an attack, or perhaps simply a human mistake, where the adversary
has a web address, company name, and an extended validation certificate for
the purposes of HTTPS, which may be for a company other than the company
that a human wishes to be communicating with. A HTTPS channel, with both
parties having certificates, which Jager et al.’s ACCE work targets [62], will
create a secure channel with “some entity”. The proof of security of an ACCE
channel states that except with negligible probability, party A will definitely be
communicating with the party who owns the security certificate for Party B, and
Party B will definitely be communicating with the party who owns the security
certificate for Party A. This assurance is made between the two computers.
Above the level of the two computers communicating with each other, at
one or both parties, may also be a human. Returning to the Verified-by-Visa
example discussed in Section 7.1, if a user visits an online store for the first
time, and the store redirects (possibly through a sub-form) the user to Visa for
payment, what assurance does the user have that they are communicating with
Visa? In the past, the authentication from Visa to the user has come via the
reuse of a personal message or passphrase the user recorded in a setup phase
(see Section 6.1.1). If the Verified-by-Visa protocol was updated with a CHURN
replacing the personal message, then the message authenticating Visa may be
fresh each time. Such human-level authentication, above the level of the ACCE
channel, allows for a check regarding whether the server S ′ that the human’s
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computer C is securely connected to, is in fact the server that the human wishes
to be connected with.
H-ACCE Protocol Definition
We define a human ACCE protocol, H-ACCE, which is based on the ACCE
protocol of Jager et al. [62]. Such a H-ACCE protocol consists of three phases,
being the pre-accept phase, the human-accept phase, and the post-accept phase.
In the pre-accept phase, as per the definition of an ACCE protocol (see Sec-
tion 7.3.1), each party is authenticated with the other party (mutual authenti-
cation), and a session key k is established. The phase ends when both parties
reach an accept-state.
In the human-accept phase, which is entered once the two parties reach an
accept-state, a HPA′ is sent from a party, for example S ′, to the other party C
over the created ACCE channel, using the key k. The second party C decrypts
the HPA′ and displays the HPA′ to the human H. H uses the recognise function
from Section 5.2.1, Recognise(H,HPA,HPA′). If H accepts, then the protocol
continues to the post-accept phase. If H rejects, then the protocol is aborted.
By H accepting we say that S ′ is in the set of accepted parties of the entity S
that H sent their HPA to.
H will have sent their HPA to a party they trust S. S may then either use
the HPA themselves or may have forwarded H’s HPA on to a third party S ′′
from S’s set of accepted parties. This captures the idea that a human may know
and have a secure connection to their bank and hence may send a HPA to their
bank, and the bank then forwards that HPA onto another party such as Visa,
through the existing secure channel between the bank and Visa. Thus, if Visa
sends the HPA to the human through a channel created by an ACCE protocol,
then the human gains assurance that Visa is Visa, or at least is an entity that
their bank would release the HPA to. For example, this could also be Mastercard
or similar.
In the post-accept phase, as per the definition of an ACCE protocol, data
communicated between the two parties is encrypted and decrypted with the key
k created in the pre-accept phase.
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Updated Model
To facilitate the creation of proofs of security for protocols using H-ACCE, we
must modify the model presented in Section 7.3.1 to allow for the separation of
parties into humans and computers. Parties must be able to send messages to
the human, via their computer, for authentication. We restrict these human au-
thentication messages to the human-accept phase of the H-ACCE protocol, after
the pre-accept phase. Since messages sent in the pre-accept phase are modelled
using the Send query, and messages sent in the post-accept phase are modelled
using the Decrypt and Encrypt queries, we create a new query SendCorrectHPA
for obtaining the encrypted correct HPA from the server.
There are now two different end points to the security game. After A gains
the encrypted HPA, A can halt the game and output a HPA′. The adversary
wins if Recognise(H,HPA,HPA′) accepts. Or A can continue the game and later
output a bit b as per the original ACCE model.
This model thus provides for the real-world case where a human’s computer
is securely connected with a server, but the server may not be the server that
the human wishes to communicate with. Beyond simply being the wrong server,
the server could be deliberately trying to masquerade as the server H wishes to
communicate with and as such will inject HPAs.
The model also still provides for the case where the adversary tries to break
the encryption. The real world scenario this models is where a human is con-
nected with the correct server and hence the adversary faithfully forwards that
correct HPA message on to H. H will accept the HPA, transitioning the proto-
col into the post-accept phase. Subsequent further communication occurs in the
post-accept phase, at which point the A can still try to break the authenticated
encryption scheme. Therefore A is a benign adversary for the human-accept
phase.
SendCorrectHPA can be used only in the human-accept phase. Only one
SendCorrectHPA can be used per protocol run. The SendCorrectHPA query is as
follows.
SendCorrectHPA(pisi , pi
c
j ,Hdr) This query can be called once for each proto-
col session. If either pisi or pi
c
j is not in the accept-state, or if pi
s
i and pi
c
j are
not partnered, then ⊥ is returned. Otherwise, a ciphertext corresponding to
the correct HPA is returned. If A does not halt and output a HPA, then if
RecogniseH,HPA,HPA outputs reject then the session is aborted at the client.
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Otherwise the game transitions to the post-accept phase.
Since the existing model has a Reveal query, this means that A has access to
all prior HPAs for all parties. Allowing A to inject and display to the human
HPA′s captures the concept that the party that the human’s computer is ACCE
securely paired with may be malicious, and may have access to previously used
HPAs.
H-ACCE Security
To provide the intuition of the concept of a server check to mitigate the attack
outlined in Section 7.3.2, we will write in terms of the client and server as per
HTTPS, which is used in the ACCE discussion [62]. The client can be separated
into a human H and a computer C, as per Section 5.3.1.
At the end of the ACCE pre-accept phase, the client has authenticated the
party that they are communicating with is server S ′. After a HPA is sent from
S ′ to H (via C) to authenticate the server to the human, if the human accepts
then the human believes they are communicating with server S ′′, and that the
S ′′ that the human believes they are communicating with is the same as the S ′
that C has a secure connection with. As discussed in Section 7.3.2, this confirms
that S ′′ is in the set of trusted parties of S that the human sent their HPA to.
We now define a secure human ACCE protocol, based on Definition 5.2.1.
Definition 7.3.2 (δ--H-ACCE-Security). An H-ACCE protocol Π is δ--secure
if the protocol is based on a (, t)-secure ACCE protocol, and no efficient adver-
sary can win the H-ACCE security game with probability greater than δ.
7.4 Compiler
The method of using a fixed technique to transform one protocol type into an-
other protocol type is known as a compiler. We now construct a compiler which
will turn an ACCE protocol into a H-ACCE protocol. The steps are these:
1. (additional step) Offline, the human H selects a HPA which the human
remembers and sends to their trusted server S.
2. The standard ACCE pre-accept phase precedes as defined by Jager et al.
[62] between a client C and a server S ′, see Section 7.3.1.
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3. (additional step) After the pre-accept phase, S ′ tries to authenticate to
user H. S ′ asks the trusted server for H’s HPA.
4. (additional step) S ′ sends HPA′ to the human via their computer C over
the ACCE channel using key k.
5. (additional step) The Recognise(H,HPA,HPA′) function is executed and, if
the human accepts, the protocol proceeds; otherwise, if the human rejects,
the protocol aborts.
6. The standard ACCE post-accept phase.
Using TLS we can provide a concrete example of an instantiation of an ACCE
protocol, shown in Figure 7.2.
Human Client Server Trusted
H C S ′ Server S
Out-of-band Communication (added by compiler)
HPA−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Pre-accept phase
TLS handshake←−−−−−−−−−−−→
Human-accept phase (added by compiler)
OOB{Request HPA′}−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
OOB{HPA′}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
HPA′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Recognise(H,HPA,HPA′)
if reject→ abort
Post-accept phase
further communication←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 7.2: Compiled H-ACCE protocol based on TLS protocol proven to be a
secure ACCE protocol
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Theorem 7.4.1 (H-ACCE Security). If pi is a (, t)-secure ACCE protocol, then
the compiled protocol pi′ is a δ--secure H-ACCE protocol.
Proof. The intuition of our proof is that by simulating of an ACCE protocol we
can reduce a H-ACCE protocol to a Recognise game; and secondly by simulating
the Recognise game we can reduce a H-ACCE protocol to an ACCE protocol.
Thus there are two ways for the adversary to win:
Case 1 by winning the security game of the underlying ACCE protocol (see
Section 7.3.1); or
Case 2 by winning the Recognise security game (see Section 5.2.2).
Since we have the adversary’s advantage for both of these cases, we can provide
the security of the H-ACCE protocol.
Suppose there exists a successful adversary A against a H-ACCE protocol.
Case 1 We build an adversary AACCE against the ACCE security game using
A. Let oracle pisi be the client and picj be the server partner of pisi . The ACCE
game challenger, CACCE, creates all public key and parameter information and
sends this to AACCE who faithfully passes this information on to A. AACCE
responds to all queries from A using CACCE, except in the case where A asks
the special H-ACCE query SendCorrectHPA. When A asks the SendCorrectHPA,
AACCE generates a HPA using the GenHPA algorithm, and calls Encrypt, with
both m0 and m1 being the generated HPA, to CACCE and returns the response
to A.
At some stage A outputs a bit b which AACCE passes on to CACCE. In this
case, AACCE wins the security game exactly when A wins the security game,
and thus the advantage of the H-ACCE adversary is the same as the ACCE
adversary.
Case 2 Again we employ Shoup’s game hopping proof technique [112] aug-
mented by Dent [32]. We employ a sequence of two games, the first game being
the security protocol shown in Figure 7.2. We transform this to the security
game for the Recognise function from Section 5.2.1, bounding the adversary’s
advantage between the two. We denote Wini as the probability of the adversary
winning game i.
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Game G0 describes the compiled H-ACCE security game of 7.2. The game is
played between a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) bound adversary A and a
Recognise adversary ARec. ARec simulates protocol participants and answers all
of A’s queries. ARec generates all public keys and parameter information, and
sends this to A.
Game G1 describes a game which is the same as Game G0, except that when
A calls the SendCorrectHPA query, ARec responds with a random string of the
correct ciphertext length. At some stage A halts and outputs a HPA. A’s
advantage is bounded by its advantage over the ACCE encryption algorithm,
hence from Definition 7.3.1
|Pr[Win1]− Pr[Win0]| ≤ enc.
Since in G1, A gets only a random string, A gains no information from
its interaction with ARec. Therefore, remembering Definition 5.2.1 and thus
Pr[Win1] ≤ δ, A’s total advantage is bounded by δ + enc.
Since the adversary either wins with case 1 or case 2, then A’s advantage is
the maximum of (auth + enc) and (enc + δ). Therefore, A’s advantage must be
bound by
SuccAH-ACCE ≤ auth + enc + δ.
7.5 Human-Perceptible Freshness for H-ACCE
This chapter describes a new concept, human-perceptible freshness, for cryp-
tographic protocols involving humans. In standard cryptography, freshness is
assured based on devices such as nonces, timestamps and counters. When fresh-
ness is defined, there is a way of binding the values for nonces, timestamps and
counters to particular executions of a protocol. Typically these previous execu-
tions of the protocol are called sessions.
7.5.1 Session Identifiers
There are various ways to create session identifiers, typically called session IDs
or SIDs [24]. The session ID is critical, because this is how two parties will know
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they are a pair, and ensuring communication is only with the correct party is a
critical reason for both the use of cryptography and a necessity for systems to
interact correctly.
An entity, such as a bank, on the internet will have several concurrent execu-
tions of a protocol happening at once. This analogy can be taken a step further
by considering who might be interacting with the bank. An entity, such as a
supermarket, may have multiple different protocol executions (for example, from
different checkouts) to the same bank, at the same time. There needs to be a
method to make these protocol sessions distinct from each other and separately
identifiable. There needs to be a method of creating distinct session identifiers.
An example of a method for the creation of session identifiers is the concept
of matching conversations between the two parties, as defined by Bellare and
Rogaway [7]. In later work, Bellare et al. used concatenation of the messages
exchanged in the execution of the protocol to identify matching sessions [6].
Of particular importance to the concept of freshness is that because the ses-
sion identifiers are being created by a function of the messages being sent be-
tween the parties, then simply having a new item such as a nonce, timestamp,
or counter means that the current session is discernible from all prior sessions.
Indeed, the definition for freshness in cryptographic protocols is usually based on
this concept, for example by the nonce corresponding to the protocol run with
that session identifier being new.
Therefore, a critical aspect of how to discern if the messages in a protocol
are being sent freshly becomes the question of how to identify and separate the
current protocol execution from all prior protocol executions. It is unrealistic to
expect humans to be keeping and comparing transcripts of protocol messages. It
is to this end that we have used the ACCE channel as our building block, because
simply by encrypting using key k generated in the pre-accept phase, we can
cryptographically bind the HPA sent to the human in the protocol to a particular
session, which can be used to prove that messages are fresh. Therefore, we can
now define human perceptible freshness for a H-ACCE protocol (H-ACCE-HPF).
7.5.2 Human Perceptible Freshness for a H-ACCE pro-
tocol H-ACCE-HPF
Based on our general definition of HPF from Definition 7.2.1, and based on the
freshness section of the definition of security (Jager et al.’s Definition 8 [62]) for
140 Chapter 7. Human Perceptible Freshness
an ACCE protocol using the model outlined in Section 7.3.1, we define H-ACCE-
HPF as:
Definition 7.5.1 (Human-perceptible freshness for a H-ACCE protocol H-AC-
CE-HPF). We say that an H-ACCE protocol has freshness and human percep-
tible freshness if party Pi is rj-corrupted with r0, the query that causes pi
s
i to
accept, being before rj; and, given the set of previously used HPAs by Pi and by
all other parties, {HPAsi−1}∪{HPAm 6=si−1 }, A’s advantage of selecting a HPA′ that
the human recognises as their HPA should be no more than δ.
Note that for parties Pi that are not corrupted, r =∞.
In the CHURNs we presented in Chapter 6, we have a concrete example of
a HPA which could be used in the protocol presented in Figure 7.2 to create
a protocol that satisfies Definition 7.5.1 for a H-ACCE-HPF protocol. This is
because of the high cryptographic security of the resulting CHURNs which a
computer aided the creation of, and also because, even if the random number
generator algorithm and seed were known such that all “random” values could
be predicted, the 20 character CHURN would still have a minimum of 28 bits
of security (see Table 6.6). The protocol from Figure 7.2 with CHURNs as the
HPAs is shown in Figure 7.3.
Corollary 7.5.1 (CHURN Provides H-ACCE-HPF Security). If pi is a secure H-
ACCE protocol, then the protocol with a CHURN as the HPA has H-ACCE-HPF
Security.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter we have introduced the concept of human-followable security,
and provided a concrete construction which provides one of the pillars of human-
followable security: human-perceptible freshness. By using the CHURNs pre-
sented in Chapter 6 and building on recent ACCE work by Jager et al. [62], we
have created a POPS+ security proof as introduced in Section 4.4.2. The use of a
higher level cryptographic primitive of an authenticated and confidential channel
establishment protocol, which in the real world is instantiated by the TLS pro-
tocol, allows us to build protocols for human use where the human-interaction is
the focus of the proof.
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Human Client Server Trusted
H C S ′ Server
Out-of-band Communication (added by compiler)
CHURN−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Pre-accept phase
TLS handshake←−−−−−−−−−−−→
Human-accept phase (added by compiler)
OOB{Request HPA′}−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
OOB{CHURN′}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
CHURN′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Recognise(H,HPA,CHURN′)
if reject→ abort
Post-accept phase
further communication←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 7.3: Compiled H-ACCE protocol using a CHURN and the TLS protocol
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
We step through the conclusions drawn from each of our chapters, and present
future directions for research that builds on the work presented in this thesis.
8.1 Conclusion
We started our research in qualitative human studies to gain an understanding of
human use of security protocols. We also analysed protocols known to be broken
when used by humans, to build an understanding of what a security ceremony
was, and what security ceremony analysis would need to be. Based on the
understanding gained by this research, we have made various contributions to aid
cryptographers make protocols which would be secure for human use. They are: a
model for human recognition, a method for humans to create cryptographically
significant sequences that can be used as human nonces, and a new security
definition, human perceptible freshness, useful when creating protocols intended
to be secure when used by a human, and a compiler to deliver this definition.
8.1.1 Enhanced Understanding of Security Ceremonies
Through this research we have arrived at the thesis that a security ceremony,
more particularly a secure security ceremony, must include human-followable
security. Along the way, we have stated other definitions of a security ceremony
which have been based on our research, each of which is useful in building for
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others an understanding of the significant aspects of a security ceremony.
The first definition of a security ceremony was that a security ceremony is a
protocol in its context of use. The implications of this definition are significant.
We can no longer simply create proofs of a protocol and hope that a protocol
proven secure can then be used in any context and remain secure. A similar
example for ease of understanding to a cryptographer who may think that “a
protocol proven secure can then be used in any context and remain secure” is
exactly what a security proof should mean, is the case of a block cipher proven
secure. No-one claims that simply by employing a proven secure block cipher
every protocol that uses that block cipher will be a secure protocol. The block
cipher may remain secure, while the protocol that employs it may not be secure.
A second implication of this concept that security ceremonies are protocols
in their context of use, stems from what we have learnt from our research and
what was already available in other research. That is, no design is ever used
as intended. We examined what it meant for a group to develop a collective
information practice, that is, their way of using the design. We have gone further
than this, and highlighted that ingredients for future uses for the design may not
exist yet. The impact of this realisation is that hoping to show that a given
protocol would be secure for the uses of the protocol would be flawed, because
the list of uses would not be complete yet. Therefore, from this point of view, all
that ceremony analysis does is look at a protocol in a single context of use, and
the best that can be hoped for is that the protocol is secure for that particular
context of use.
The next logical definition of a security ceremony, which we have defined as
a protocol it its context of use, is that a protocol with additional steps (context)
added to it is simply another, higher level, protocol. As such, security ceremonies
are nothing new, and perhaps no new tools are required to analyse security cere-
monies simply because it is called a security ceremony. Existing protocol analysis
techniques may be sufficient. However, if existing protocol analysis techniques
are to be used, then new aspects of the model will be required, new security
definitions and concepts will be required, and new tools to deliver the new se-
curity properties will be required. That is what we have provided by increasing
the modelling capabilities by formalising human recognition, by creating new
security definitions such as human-perceptible freshness, and the new tool we
have developed to deliver human-perceptible freshness is the Computer-HUman
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Recognisable Nonce (CHURN).
8.1.2 Formalising Human Recognition
This work presents a method of accumulating data which will allow for the
comparison of schemes in which the human will need to recognise some data.
When represented formally using our technique, schemes can be compared using:
the size of HPASpace (maximise), HPASpaceH (maximise) and the ratio between
the two (bring to equality); the size of WH,HPA (false positives, minimise); the size
of  (false negatives, minimise); and the frequency of use distribution (normalise).
We have provided an upper bound on the adversary’s probability of success,
both for the case of a human generated HPA and a device generated HPA. We
have shown how our formalism may be included easily into existing proofs, pro-
viding a more complete model in the case of mutual authentication over TLS, and
creating a formal proof of human-assisted device pairing protocols to be created
for the first time. Many similar examples of protocols involving humans where
our formalism will be directly useful exist. Such an example would be standard
Verified-by-Visa protocol implementations, where, due to the large numbers of
people and the large numbers of protocol runs, useful values for each of the
variables in our formalism will be available. At the softer end of the scale, our
formalism could be applied to human protocols which exist completely in the
human realm, for example where a human may have to authenticate themselves
to another human which is typically based on some sort of recognition.
8.1.3 CHURNS
We have shown that sequences created by humans using our CHURN-generator
are significantly more random than sequences created by humans without the aid
of a CHURN-generator. We have shown this by compression file sizes always be-
ing smaller for the unaided human, entropy values being lower, histogram values
showing not all characters are used, that certain characters are used excessively,
and that certain longer sequences of characters were repeated. This increase in
randomness is despite a third of the participants thinking the CHURN generator
was either the same or less random compared with their typing on a keyboard.
We have shown there is a significant second source of randomness due to the
human input to a CHURN-generator via the Hamming Distances and how close
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the Hamming Distances were to a true Binomial distribution. This means firstly
that humans gain control over their CHURN, and secondly, if ever the seed value
for the random number generator becomes known, the CHURN still has some
level of security.
Finally, more than two thirds of our participants reported feeling more in
control using the CHURN-generator to create a random sequence than being
given a random sequence to use by a computer. This confirms the final hypothesis
that humans will feel more in control using the CHURN-generator than being
given a random sequence.
8.1.4 Human-Perceptible Freshness
When examined from an abstract perspective, the major points made in the
original security ceremonies paper [41] may be interpretted as “there must be
human followable security.” This message has flowed through our own human
studies and analysis of security ceremonies. A clear and significant step towards
human-followable security has been made with human-perceptible freshness.
We have shown the need for human-perceptible freshness. A critical security
goal of standard cryptography is the concept of freshness, however this aspect is
not employed in protocols involving humans, in a way that is followable by the
human user.
We have defined human-perceptible freshness as a security goal. Protocols
can now be developed which will satisfy this security goal.
We have created a compiler, which may employ the CHURN presented in
Chapter 6, which delivers a protocol with human-perceptible freshness. The
compiler takes as input an ACCE protocol, realised in the real world by the
TLS protocol, and outputs a protocol which also satisfies the human-perceptible
freshness property. We have called this resulting protocol a H-ACCE protocol.
8.2 Future Work
Here are some directions to take this research which we believe are meaningful
and promising. Of course the ultimate goal is to create secure crytographic
protocols which include humans, and have those protocols implemented and used
in the real world, thus giving human users the security assurances they hope they
have now but do not.
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8.2.1 CHURNs
Significant further research and development must be conducted once the CHURNs
are used in protocols by the general public. It is envisioned that the progress
of CHURNs will be similar to the progress of CAPTCHAs, ”Completely Auto-
mated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart” [120]. That
is, CAPTCHAs, used widely in the Internet, have changed significantly over the
past 10 years as actual usage by humans has been researched and understood,
and as attacks using machines have developed. Therefore, continued research on
CHURNs will be required as implementations are developed and used.
8.2.2 Formalising Human Recognition
Although our formalism makes significant steps forward for provable security in
the presence of humans, as with any modelling of humans there are limitations.
The most significant limitations are firstly, as already discussed, for the purposes
of a security proof A cannot select a HPA′ that is outside of HPASpace. For
example, if we define HPASpace as the set of 16 pixel black and white images,
many humans may not reject images of a size other than 16 pixels, such as 25
pixels, which would be outside scope of HPASpace.
Secondly, we have not included the concept of context in the formalism, and
as such the Recognise function presented is not probabilistic. Much has been
learnt in recent years about context, perhaps best summarised in Dourish’s pa-
per “What we talk about when we talk about context” [36]. Dourish writes of
the deficiencies in addressing context as a static representational problem. For
example, a context rule may be that personal telephone calls should be ignored
at work (i.e. in the “work context”), and in general, that rule would work and
could easily be implemented on a smart phone, but that should not be the case
if the call is regarding a significant problem with the worker’s child. Certain
entities that users log into or use regularly, such as Facebook and Google, will
have enough information to construct meaningful HPASpaceH ’s for individuals.
Therefore meaningful data will exist for the distinction we have made in this
paper between HPASpace and HPASpaceH , and hence trawling and targeted at-
tacks. However, we leave as significant and separate future work, the concept of
context. Ideally the use of context will be in regards to an “occasioned property
that arises from the activity” rather than a “stable representational” view of con-
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text. Context will impact both the Recognise and GenHPA functions, and getting
meaningful data allowing for correct modelling on a specific-to-each-human basis
will be difficult.
8.2.3 Human-Followable Security
Existing theory on protocol design for cryptographic authentication protocols
states that at a minimum we need three aspects in creating a secure protocol.
Firstly we need to specify who the parties communicating are, secondly we need
some assurance of freshness, and thirdly we need a way of binding that infor-
mation together such that it cannot be changed and keeping it confidential (see
Section 2.4).
While requirements may change depending on definitions of security used and
required, these three ingredients seem critical in creating secure human proto-
cols. In Chapters 6 and 7 we have presented a method for providing one of the
critical ingredients: an assurance of freshness. Due to the properties of ACCE,
meaning we have a channel that already provides authentication and confiden-
tiality, the human receiving their fresh message back from the party they are
communicating with also provides authentication. While this authentication is
via the use of a human perceptible authenticator HPA, this is not human per-
ceptible authentication. That is, since the guarantee that the other party must
be who the human expects is based on a process that is not human-followable
(such as HTTPS), there is not a human-followable property which guarantees
that the other party must be who they claim to be.
Therefore, as future work, still to be provided are the two other ingredients,
being the authentication messages and the method of binding the information
together in a human followable way.
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